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Abstract 
In this dissertation I investigate the theory and practice of “power” in social movement 
organizations that use consensus decision-making, a form of deliberation that espouses radically 
democratic and anarchist political ideals. Over the past several decades consensus decision-
making has grown popular in anarchist-inspired North American social movements. From the 
environmental direct action alliances of the 1970s to the recent Occupy Wall Street movements 
of 2011-2012, the consensus process has often been idolized as the most radically democratic 
and anarchist method of decision-making, considered as a way to remove or eradicate “power” 
from group deliberation. Contrary to this popular discourse, I will argue that we can think more 
usefully about consensus decision-making as a specific tool of power rather than a general ideal 
against power, but only if we understand power more carefully as an essentially neutral concept 
of collective interaction which can never be removed from any human social relations.  
 In today’s North American anarchist and radical democratic discourses the meaning of 
“power” is commonly divided into three separate concepts: power-to, power-over, and power-
with. These three concepts are treated as distinct and opposed phenomena, based on a 
dichotomous theoretical opposition between the freedom of individual agency and the constraint 
of social structure. My contention is that power-to, power-over, and power-with should actually 
be understood as interrelated concepts concerning the dynamics of human collective action 
systems. Thinking of power as a concept that describes the dynamics of collective action 
systems, I ask a double question: What can the theory of power teach us about consensus 
decision-making? And, how can we study consensus decision-making as a way to elucidate the  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theory of power? Addressing how this double question can help to build a more careful analysis 
of power in consensus decision-making, I aim ultimately to contribute to the social theory of 
power as well as to the praxis of anarchist and radical democratic organization.  
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0) Introductions 
This is an investigation of “power” in social movement organizations that use consensus 
decision-making, a radically democratic and anarchist method of decision-making that has grown 
popular over the past several decades in North America. The consensus process has been the 
focus of an anarchist conceptual tradition concerning “power” which I believe must be examined 
more closely and critically if we are to in fact be able to get the best out of the method. As Gene 
Sharp, the historian and theorist of nonviolent direct action, has stated: “if we wish to create a 
society in which people really shape their own lives, and oppression is impossible, then we need 
to explore alternative ways to meet the society’s basic need for means of wielding power. We 
also need to explore the origins of political power at a much more basic level.”  In this project, I 1
will argue that we can think more usefully about consensus decision-making, as well as other 
forms of radical democratic anarchist praxis, if we rethink “power.”  
  In today’s North American anarchist and radical democratic discourses the meaning of 
“power” is commonly divided into three separate concepts: power-to, power-over, and power-
with. These three concepts are treated as distinct and opposed phenomena, based on a 
dichotomous theoretical opposition between the freedom of individual agency and the constraint 
of social structure. My contention is that power-to, power-over, and power-with should actually 
be understood as interrelated concepts concerning the dynamics of human collective action 
systems. Thinking of power as a concept that describes the dynamics of collective action 
systems, I ask a double question: What can the theory of power teach us about consensus 
decision-making? And, how can we study consensus decision-making as a way to elucidate the  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theory of power? Addressing how this double question can help to build a more careful analysis 
of power in consensus decision-making, I aim ultimately to contribute to the social theory of 
power as well as to the praxis of anarchist and radical democratic organization. 
!
(0.1) Praxis: For the Anarchist Quest(ion) of Power 
This is a praxis of quest(ion)ing power. Praxis is a critical process of developing the link 
between thought-work and organizational-work. It is the combined activity of thinking about 
how to change the world so that we may work differently, and working to change the world so 
that we may think differently. I like to call praxis an act of quest(ion)ing because this tricky 
wording highlights the bond between asking questions to wage a quest, and waging a quest that 
poses questions. The quest is a practical activity and the question is a theoretical activity: works 
and thoughts. Bringing them together is a praxis activity: working thoughts and thinking works.  
 In Gilles Deleuze’s sense, praxical theory means that “a theory has to be used, it has to work. 
And not just for itself. If there is no one to use it, starting with the theorist himself who, as soon 
as he uses it ceases to be a theorist, then a theory is worthless, or its time has not yet arrived.”  2
Focusing on the ideas of consensus decision-making and power which are presumed in normal 
anarchist activist discourse, I aim to make this project do work as a critical quest(ion) that can 
connect the theory of power with the practice of consensus decision-making, for the praxis of 
challenging our powers as radically democratic anarchic humans.  
 My quest(ion) is to re-think power in consensus decision-making while also using consensus 
decision-making as a way to re-think power. 
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(?) The question: on the one side, theoretically, the question is about the philosophy of power 
as applied to anarchist radical democratic activity. In this register, I ask theoretical and abstract 
questions: What is “power?” How do we understand and apply the concept of power to the 
practice of anarchist radical democracy?  
 (!) The quest: on the other side, practically, the quest is about empowering anarchist radical 
democracy — specifically in terms of consensus decision-making, and generally concerning 
egalitarian organization more broadly. In this register, I ask more goal-specific and object-
oriented questions: How is power performed in consensus decision-making? What does 
consensus decision-making teach us about how to build a concept of power that is most 
appropriate and useful for anarchist radical democratic praxis? 
!
(0.2) Practice: Anarchist Discourses and the Consensus Decision-Making 
Process 
This is a philosophical interrogation of power theory linked with a technical investigation of the 
pedagogical discourses and historical traditions of consensus decision-making practices. My 
focus is on an organizational level of power,within relatively small groups engaged in producing 
collective action through deliberative decision-making. This is a specific, small-scale focus. It 
will not cover every aspect of power, but it does deal with one very important part of social 
movement praxis: as community organizer Jessica Bell says in introduction to a portrayal of 
consensus processes, “decision-making is essentially about power within a group; who has it, 
who doesn’t. Decision-making matters.”  In the same vein, the first words of Marsha Willard’s 3
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guide to consensus decision-making declare that “decision authority is at the heart of 
empowerment.”   4
 My focus is on how the discourses of “power” are expressed in consensus decision-making. 
The study of “discourse,” to draw from social theorist Stuart Hall, refers to “a group of 
statements which provide a language for talking about — a way of representing the knowledge 
about — a particular topic at a particular historical moment. […] Discourse is about the 
production of knowledge through language.”  I analyze the “discourse” of  how power is 5
deployed in consensus decision-making manuals, focusing especially on manuals and guides that 
aim to teach the process to activist groups and small organizations to inspect how the procedures, 
rules, values, and validations of the process reflect on contemporary anarchist radical democratic 
activism since the 1960s. My main object of discursive study is a collection of twenty-six 
consensus manuals written between 1975 and 2013, all of which teach and preach consensus as a 
technique of deliberation for North American activist movements and grassroots organizations, 
and were freely available on the internet as of 2013. I have assembled this collection of 
documents by a saturation search for “consensus decision-making” via online databases, 
libraries, and websites. This set of documents represents a coherent (but certainly not exhaustive) 
survey of free and internet-available resources for learning and performing consensus decision-
making. Throughout this project, I also make reference to other written materials concerning 
anarchist democracy, consensus process, and small-group activist dynamics that I have collected 
at workshops, through facilitators and organizers, in bookshops or online forums, and from 
archives across the continent. These sources help to fill out a representative pattern of discourse 
that relates specifically to the anarchist-oriented traditions of consensus decision-making. 
 5
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 The discourses concerning power and democracy that are expressed in the consensus manuals 
relate most specifically to a historical amalgamation of 1970s feminist, anarchist, and anti-
nuclear direct action movements that inherited the traditions of the 1960s civil rights, anti-war, 
and participatory democratic activism. In 1977, the Center for Conflict Resolution — an 
organization involved in the growing anti-nuclear and anti-war activism of that time — published 
their influential Manual for Group Facilitators, a document that was largely focused on the 
techniques and procedures of consensus decision-making defined as: 
A decision-making process in which all parties involved explicitly agree to the 
final decision. Consensus decision making does not mean that all parties are 
completely satisfied with the final outcome, but that the decision is acceptable to 
all because no one feels that his or her vital interests or values are violated by it.   6
Growing throughout the 1980s the process became strongly affiliated with anarchist currents that 
culminated in the alter-globalization movements of the late 1990s and early 2000s, and more 
recently blossomed spectacularly in the Occupy Wall Street and General Assembly movements 
of 2011 and 2012. Today, the process is commonly used by a loosely identified category of 
“grassroots activists” That is, consensus is broadly used by groups of people who work together 
to organize demonstrations, direct actions, campaigns, and mobilizations; by those who run 
infoshops, bookstores, community centres, communes, and conventions; who edit alternative 
newspapers and journals; and who participate in College and University based social justice 
organizations. Consensus decision-making is a process of deliberation which aims to allow 
everyone an equal capacity to influence the course of their group’s collective action. The 
Rhizome Network, a website project developed in 2012 to provide freely accessible resources for 
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consensus decision-making, sums it up in a simple bold formula: “consensus is an explicitly non-
hierarchical egalitarian process.”   7
 I will often abbreviate my reference to “consensus decision-making,” calling it “consensus 
process” or simply “consensus.” These shorthands are also normal parlance among those who are 
engaged with the method. Recognizing that consensus often “operates as one term in a whole 
chain, or cloud, of associated concepts” for contemporary movement discourses, anarchist 
historian Andrew Cornell has highlighted that a striking array of value gets packed into the ideal 
of consensus. 
This chain includes: participation, empowerment, horizontalism, direct democracy, 
participatory democracy, community, prefigurative politics, anarchism, and 
perhaps other terms as well. Because relatively little has been written about 
consensus, and because many learn the term and its practices in the excitement and 
chaos of moments of rapid social movement expansion, the meaning of these 
concepts are often conflated and their relationships to one another are blurred.   8
The fact that consensus decision-making is linked so intensely to this range of values and ideals 
makes it especially relevant to democratic activism and scholarship, because it concentrates and 
intensifies many of the general values and goals espoused by modern democratic ideals more 
generally. In the same way that a psychologist examines extreme or abnormal mental conditions 
to shed light on the limits of “normal” mental operation, an inspection of this extreme type of 
democracy can be very illuminating for understanding the conditions of “normal” democracy. 
Since the concepts and practices of democracy are such a crucial aspect of modern Western 
politics, studying consensus decision-making as an extreme case of democracy can provide 
important insights about the broader social and political developments of our society. 
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 My main purpose, however, is not to contribute abstract formulas concerning democracy in 
general. Rather, I want to work on a more specific practical contribution to anarchist radical 
democracy. The traditions of anarchism articulate a commitment to, as anarchist scholar David 
Graeber has written, “creating and enacting horizontal networks instead of top-down structures 
like states, parties or corporations; networks based on principles of decentralized, non-
hierarchical consensus democracy.”  However, not everyone likes the title “anarchism,” the 9
historical associations that go with it, or the praxes that it evokes. Even those who share an 
affinity with these general anarchist principles will often deflect the name in order to avoid its 
historical baggage, preferring to identify with a looser range of related social movement, activist, 
and leftist traditions. For instance, rather than use the label “anarchist,” activist and writer Chris 
Dixon recently wrote about consensus as a crucial tool for “the anti-authoritarian current:” 
What many activists appreciate about consensus decision-making is that it makes it 
difficult for a majority to force decisions on a minority, encourages collective 
problem solving through discussion and compromise, and aims to equalize 
participation. In the anti-authoritarian current, most small groups and collectives 
use some form of consensus.   10
Uri Gordon, activist and political theorist, has also written in this vein, noting that contemporary 
anarchism derives from the “convergences of radical feminist, ecological, anti-racist and queer 
struggles, which finally fused in the late 1990s through the global wave of protest against the 
policies and institutions of neo-liberal globalization.”  Using an alternative range of associations 11
and labels allows for a broader affiliation of political streams that may share the values of anti-
authoritarian practices without identifying specifically with the European-centric historical 
traditions, tactics, and cultures of anarchism.  
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 Personally, I also think it’s important not to reduce the great array of social justice 
movements, identities, strategies, and projects to the single banner of anarchism. However, I 
have chosen to address the ideals and practices of an “anarchist” label mainly because my own 
political experiences do stem from these traditions. I agree with Dixon: “Depending on your 
vantage point, the anti-authoritarian current is part of contemporary anarchism, an attempt to 
move beyond it, or a different political formation altogether. In my view, it is all of these things 
at once.”  I grew up into the social movements of the alter-globalization era, from the late 1990s 12
through the 2000s to the present, where my political identity and activist work came together as 
“all these things at once.” Through involvement with anti-authoritarian anarchist organizing and 
culture I have experienced firsthand the powers and the problems of consensus decision-making. 
Through those personal experiences I developed a passion for quest(ion)s about anarchism, 
consensus process, and radical democracy, that ultimately led me to pursue this research project. 
Learning is for growing, and so I focus my attention on the traditions, practices, and ideas which 
have contributed to my own growth, and which I also hope to grow out of. 
 So I focus on a tradition labelled “anarchist” because it names an important set of political 
experiences, but I don’t wish to restrict the importance or the impact of my thoughts to that 
tradition alone. To be clear, I never want to support the impression that I’m focusing on the 
consensus process and the anarchist tradition because I believe these to be the only true options 
for radically egalitarian change. I don’t think we should forever rely on consensus decision-
making, and the wastelands of anarchist naval-gazing are already too well charted. I choose 
“anarchist consensus decision-making” as a focal point for this contribution to a wider 
revolutionary praxis. The anarchist discourses of power in consensus decision-making are worth 
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inspecting because they reveal an especially extreme case of egalitarian decision-making 
methods and ideals, and therefore they can teach us important lessons about egalitarian 
organization which bear upon a whole range of political praxis for equality. Whether or not you 
ascribe to the banner (I personally do not wish to bear any single banner — it’s hard to do 
anything else while you’re waving a big heavy flagpole), the projects and problems of anarchist 
politics can provide food for thought to any and all egalitarian, anti-authoritarian, anarchistic, 
radically democratic social justice-oriented movements.  
 
(0.3) Theory: Building a Better Anarchist Concept of Power 
In this dissertation I work on praxical quest(ion)s that I hope can contribute to what Andrej 
Grubačić has called anarchist low theory:  
Anarchism does not need a single, anarchist High Theory, a notion completely 
inimical to its spirit. Much better, we think, would be to apply the spirit of anarchist 
decisionmaking processes to theory: this would mean accepting the need for a 
diversity of high theoretical perspectives, united only by certain shared 
understandings. Instead of being based on the need to prove others’ fundamental 
assumptions wrong, it would seek to find particular projects in which different 
theories co-exist and reinforce each other. So much more than High Theory, what 
anarchism needs is low theory: a way of grappling with those real, immediate 
questions that arise from a transformative project.  13
Theory is about praxis: transforming our own common sense for the purpose of empowering our 
own common practice. And, as Karl Marx once put it, this kind of praxical theory “is not a 
scalpel but a weapon. Its object is its enemy, which it aims not to refute but to destroy.”  My 14
theory will be about empowering the praxis of power in anarchist radical democratic decision-
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making, not to refute the powers of oppression, domination, and exploitation… but to destroy 
them.  
But what is to be destroyed? This sentiment of struggle belies the problem which lies in the 
common sense anarchist discourse of “power.” Anarchist ideals tend to circulate around a starkly 
defined enemy: when anarchism is conceived as a political philosophy built on the struggle to 
eradicate any situation where someone or some group exerts power over another person or 
group, then it is power itself which becomes the enemy. This is also the ideal purpose of 
consensus decision-making. For instance, the Vernal Project (an online publication of assembled 
consensus decision-making sources) introduces the technique as  
a form of cooperative, non-coercive decision-making. Though simple to describe, 
this process usually requires great understanding and a fair bit of experience to 
practice well. Briefly, a group of people gathers together, raises an issue, discusses 
it, poses various solutions, and then chooses the decision that best satisfies the 
group. Individual preferences and concerns are considered, but the decision is for 
the group and so must satisfy the group as best it can — not any individual.   15
The aim of a consensus decision-making process is to achieve a final decision that enjoys the 
consent of all involved members, through a process that maximizes engagement and inclusion. 
No one is allowed to “have” power, control the group, or exert disproportionate influence over its 
character and its course.  
Power is commonly conceived in this way as the capital P “Power” against which 
emancipation and equality must fight. When we do finally overthrow it we envision building a 
beautiful society free from such evil, a utopian idealistic system of true equality where power has 
no place. The overall purpose of consensus decision-making and anarchist politics are usually 
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expressed by a grandiose ethical opposition between the good of egalitarianism versus the evil of 
power. The same opposition between good equality and evil power is common in the traditions 
of progressive modern politics broadly, and it is especially deeply rooted in both anarchist and 
radical democratic political philosophy. Political theorist Barry Hindess has reflected, for 
instance, on the way that the concept of “power” so often symbolically stands in as the name of 
an abstract “enemy of freedom.” As he says, in the wake of enlightenment philosophy the 
political idea of “power is introduced to explain why the conditions required by the utopian ideal 
do not exist.”   16
These models which depict Power as the name for equality’s enemy are confused by the fact 
that we also use the word “power” to refer to our own capacity to overthrow that Power. This 
equivocal confusion has inspired many authors, both scholarly and activist-oriented, to construct 
a categorical difference between the concept of power-to that represents the good power and a 
concept of power-over that represents the evil Power. Jonathan Hearn notes, for instance, that 
this distinction pervades the visions of socialist utopian ideals, and “is foundational to Marx’s 
analysis of capitalism and his prediction of its demise. It implies the possibility of a world free of 
alienation, in which we can have as much ‘power to’ as we want without any problems of ‘power 
over’, of delivering our powers into the hands of others.”  In the anarchist discourses which I 17
am studying, the dichotomy between power-to and power-over has been expanded into a three-
way distinction between power-to, power-over, and power-with. Power-to is valued as good and 
natural. It is the free right of individual persons and groups to exert their capacities, to act or to 
do anything at all. The very opposite of that power-to, power-over represents the evil activities of 
authority, control, exploitation, domination, or any other mode of “having power over” the 
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actions of others. This power is the source of repression, domination, and authority — all those 
arch-enemies to the anarchist project. The third type of power, power-with, depicts the basic 
manner by which people influence each other in everyday conversation, through symbolic 
association, by emotional and rational assertions of social influence. Power-with is the kind of 
communicative power which must be nurtured in the process of democratic deliberation, in order 
to develop the anarchist means of organizing mutually inter-active egalitarian influence. Cindy 
Milstein has defined anarchism in these terms as the task of replacing the politics of power-over 
with the politics of power-with. “The circle A symbolizes anarchism as a dual project: the 
abolition of domination and hierarchical forms of social organization, or power-over social 
relations, and their replacement with horizontal versions, or power-together and in common — 
again, a free society of free individuals.”   18
I think our efforts to empower a radically egalitarian future are in fact impeded by an 
unreflective fixation on models of power that separate the evil of “power-over” out from the 
good of “power-to.” I’m with Michel Foucault when he says that “one can say to many 
socialisms, real or dreamt: between the analysis of power in the bourgeois state and the idea of 
its future withering away, there is a missing term – the analysis, criticism, destruction, and 
overthrow of the power mechanism itself.”  The discourses of anarchic democracy usually 19
espouse the notion that “power itself must be overthrown,” but I believe this model resigns us to 
the big, boring, smashy-smashy acts of an exceedingly blunt critical instrument. We hurt 
ourselves with this idea. It does not help. It needs work to become a more detailed, more precise 
instrument.  
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I endeavour to criticize, destroy, and overthrow the power mechanism that is built into our 
own anarchisms, real and dreamt – but not by criticizing, destroying and overthrowing power 
itself! We have to overthrow certain mechanisms of power, yes, but not “power itself.” We need 
to treat the binary distinction between power-to and power-over with more critical care. 
Although I stand with the political goal of defeating “Power” in general, I do not think that the 
conceptual premises that categorically separate evil-Power from good-power are up to the 
challenges posed by the anarchist political project. A big symptom of this problem is revealed in 
how the discourses of consensus tend towards haughty self-righteousness and predetermined 
moral assumptions. By separating the good from the evil so categorically, and assigning 
consensus process as the salvation of good power-to against the clutches of evil power-over, any 
critical attention gets locked into a for-or-against duel between zealots. Zoe Mitchell, who wrote 
a four part “Critique of Consensus Decision-Making” posted on an Indymedia email discussion 
list in 2002, remembers that when she began to wonder about the problems of consensus she felt 
immediately pressured to conform to a culture that had already established a consensus about 
the value of consensus. “Criticizing the process, in many of my detractors’ views, was the 
equivalent to advocating distant representative democracy, where participation is limited to 
voting every four years and writing letters to Members of Congress.”  This kind of 20
righteousness leads to treating consensus as absolutely different than normal democracy, setting 
up radical anarchist democracy upon an essentializing difference between the right path and 
everything else. A utopian schism is opened between the ideal form of democracy and the idols 
of all other forms of democracy.  
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As Jessica Bell reflects in her consensus guide, “consensus is often viewed as the only 
decision-making process activist groups should use, presumably because it’s seen as being the 
only truly participatory democratic decision-making method that groups should use.”  However, 21
the problems of power do not hinge on the simple question of choosing to overthrow it or not, 
and the problems of democracy are not as simple as picking the “only right” method. Against the 
grain of anarchist common sense, in this dissertation I will argue that we cannot ever essentially 
divorce manifestations power-to from manifestations of power-over. In order to devise a more 
critical concept of power that can do better art self-reflective analysis concerning how power is 
arranged in anarchist organizational forms, we cannot begin by presuming that our power is all 
good and purged of evil Power. I will approach the problem by explaining power as a 
phenomenon of human relationships; it can be engaged in many different ways, some more 
exploitative and oppressive, some less so, but there is always a degree of conflict and contrast 
within communication and collectivity which cannot be erased. We cannot overthrow power 
itself without abandoning the collective activity of human interaction. From this perspective, 
power is with us as long as social interaction is with us… and social interaction is what makes 
us. Some modes of social interaction we consider horrific — dominating, exploiting. Some 
modes of social interaction we call great — mutually empowering, communally egalitarian. If 
power is an element of all social relationships then it is a phenomenon that must be transformed, 
not vanquished. We could only vanquish power if we ceased to be collective, communicative, 
and co-conductive creatures involved in the project of our constitution.  
Power cannot be vanquished because it is a concept that depicts something like social energy: 
as with physical energy, it can be transformed, modified, shaped, and coordinated… but never 
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destroyed. Building upon this basic premise helps to shift the discourse in more productively 
technical concerns about how power is arranged in various types of collective action systems. In 
order to break down injustices of hierarchy, statism, patriarchy, racism, colonialism, capitalism, 
and all the isms by which some people gain more control through exploiting, dominating, and 
disempowering other people, we have to build new systems of radically anarchist power. We 
have to treat power in the same sense as the 19th century anarchist author Pierre-Joseph Proudhon 
once wrote of “justice:” “the theoretical and practical progress of Justice is such that we cannot 
detach ourselves from it in order to see its end. […] We will never know the end of Right, 
because we will never cease creating new relations among ourselves.”  Gustav Landaeur, a 22
German writer and activist who wrote in the European anarchist tradition at the turn of the 20th 
century, is also widely quoted as defining the State in similar terms: “the State is a social 
relationship; a certain way of people relating to one another. It can be destroyed by creating new 
social relationships; i.e., by people relating to one another differently.”  In either case, the “new 23
relations among ourselves” or “people relating to each other differently” are the essential activity 
of power. Power is what happens when people develop collective action systems, and what 
happens when people are developed by collective action systems. We can only destroy modes of 
power we deem “evil” by empowering those which we deem “good.” It is a never-ending process 
of promoting justice. 
Power itself has to be reconstructed in a way that works for projects of radical equality — a 
power theory that can serve feminist empowerment; a power theory that can enable egalitarian 
work; a power theory that can project progressive politics. As Luce Irigaray has urged in the 
feminist political register, if feminists “aim simply for a change in the distribution of power, 
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leaving intact the power structure itself, then they are resubjecting themselves, deliberately or 
not, to a phallocratic order.”  My quest(ion)s for anarchist politics are posed on this front as an 24
attempt to operationalize the idea that, as Foucault argued, “relations of power are not something 
bad in themselves, from which one must free oneself,” and that therefore “the problem is not of 
trying to dissolve them in the utopia of a perfectly transparent communication, but to give one’s 
self the rules of law, the techniques of management, and also the ethics, the ethos, the practice of 
self, which would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination..”  25
So what are the anarchist communications, rules, techniques, and ethics, which can transform our 
games of power into those approaching the minimum of domination? How can we evoke a 
theory of power that helps to clarify the complications of power that arise to determine the 
different characteristics of anarchist collective action? That’s the quest(ion).  
!
(0.4) Contents: Chapter Overviews  
In Chapter 1) Presenting Consensus Decision-Making as a Tool of Anarchist Radical 
Democratic Dual Power, I will present the concepts of radical democracy and anarchist dual 
power. These concepts drive the historical tradition of consensus decision-making in its affinity 
with the so-called “new social movements”  that since the 1970s have increasingly emphasized 26
anarchist ideals and strategies for transforming society. These articulations of radical democracy 
and dual power will situate the potentials and problems of the consensus process within the 
larger contexts of contemporary North American anarchist-oriented social movements. 
In Chapter 2) Surveying Anarchist Power Theory, I will survey the three-way distinction of 
power-to, power-over, and power-with that has been popular in the anarchist radical democratic 
 17
discourses of consensus decision-making. The common anarchist ethic pits the “good” of power-
to against the “evil” of power-over, while an associated anarchist politics promotes power-with 
as the organizational means of vanquishing the evils of power-over. In the process of explaining 
these concepts, I will describe two key axioms that support an agency perspective on power, 
which is the most common conceptual paradigm of power for both anarchist theory and 
mainstream North American social and political thought. Then, I will compare how these two 
agency perspective axioms are logically defined in dichotomous opposition to equivalent axioms 
of a structure perspective on power. Where the agency perspective privileges power-to the 
structure perspective privileges the focus on power-over, constructing a dichotomous opposition 
which goes tot he heart of modern social theory. As the political theorist Thomas Wartenberg has 
put it, “the expressions power-to and power-over are a shorthand way of making a distinction 
between two fundamentally different ordinary-language locutions within which the term “power” 
occurs. Depending upon which locution one takes as the basis of one’s theory of power, one will 
arrive at a very different model of the role of power in the social world.”  While addressing 27
some useful analytical applications suggested by each perspective, I will argue that they can each 
offer only a limited and partial understanding of power in general. Ultimately, we need to build 
another perspective if we want to understand how these two opposite viewpoints can be 
integrated into a system that allows them to make sense to each other. For a more powerful 
anarchist theory, we will need a theoretical perspective that can focus on the concept of power-
with, a conduct perspective on power.  
In Chapter 3) Constructing a Conduct Perspective to Diagram on Power in Anarchist 
Collective Action Systems, I will construct a theory based on power-with that can integrate the 
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three concepts of power-to, power-over, and power-with as map for understanding collective 
action system dynamics. I will begin to explore this new perspective by addressing two new 
axioms that support the conduct perspective on power, elaborating the general blueprints for a 
perspective that can theoretically bridge between agency and structure, power-to and power-over. 
In the next section, I will then devise some preliminary diagrams to illustrate how the concepts 
of power-to, power-over, and power-with can serve as an instrument for examining the dynamics 
of collective action systems. Expanding on the classic political philosophical theme of heads and 
bodies, I will finish the chapter by applying these diagrams to distinguish between authoritarian 
versus anarchist modes of power. The consensus process can thus be depicted as capable of 
creating a collective action system that is distinct from the more common authoritarian design 
based on the emergent synthesis of a voluntary, performative, and transient anarchist solidarity.  
 In Chapter 4) Analyzing Consensus Decision-Making as Tool of Anarchist Radical 
Democratic Dual Power, I will apply the theoretical tools introduced in chapter 3 to analyze how 
the processes of consensus decision-making can function in two very different manners. The 
consensus process is a unique tool of anarchist power, but tools do not always work the same 
way: their power changes depending on circumstances and applications. No tool is good for 
every job, and the most powerful tools are also dangerous when used incorrectly, irresponsibly, 
or accidentally. The consensus process can be used to create an emergent solidarity of collective 
action systems, but it can also be abused to conserve the established solidity of collective action 
systems. To help clarify this difference between the uses and abuses of the consensus process 
tool, I will engage with how the consensus process can be explicated according to the theory of 
insurgent democracy, mainly as developed by political philosophers Miguel Abensour and 
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Jacques Rancière. In the model of Abensour’s insurgent democracy and Rancière’s politics 
versus the police, democracy is understood as a challenge to any instituted and established form 
of power, including even those which are supposedly authorized as “fully democratic.” The 
consensus is most useful when it can empower an insurgent democratic movement against 
established and normalized institutional inequality by creating a new consensus that builds 
collective action systems of anarchist solidarity. But the consensus process is a hindrance to the 
same insurgent democratic activities insofar as it functions to conserve an old consensus that 
reinforces the solidity of instituted inequality. In this second case, insurgent democracy must in 
fact be wages against consensus systems, rather than empowered through them. The value and 
power of the process depends greatly on its uses and contexts. Recalling the dynamics of 
anarchist body-without-a-head collective action systems developed in chapter 3, I will finally 
explore in some of the problematic conditions that lead the consensus process to be applied 
abusively as a tool for conserving established social solidity. 
!
(0.5) Praxis: For the Anarchist Toolbox of Power  
What is anarchist power? What is an anarchist theory of power? How can we conceptualize of 
power in a way that helps empower anarchist collective action systems? These are the guiding 
quest(ion)s of my project. Consensus decision-making is a unique and special mode of anarchist 
power, which I contend is most powerful when used to create emergent solidarity. However, it 
cannot be treated as the one and only mode of anarchist organization — that mistake transforms 
its powerful potential into a problematic power. There is no single utopian anarchist power 
system; there must always be many powers in a diverse and communicative alliance of collective 
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action systems. My reconceptualization of power-to, power-over, and power-with strives to 
depict these concepts as dynamic elements present in any type of collective action system, so that 
they can be more useful for the self-reflexive analysis of anarchist projects than our currently 
popular concepts of power tend to be.  
 The work embodied in this dissertation is a construction project, to design some new 
conceptual tools that could possibly empower the quest(ion)s of anarchist power. This work is 
intended to begin of a story, to make a proposal, to propose some blueprints and explore some 
new sense. I’m not settling the truth, or putting a question to rest. I’m setting a course, I’m 
pushing a quest(ion) into motion. To find out where these quest(ion)s ultimately lead, we must 
apply them in praxis: continuing to pose questions about who we are, and continuing to pose 
quests about who we can become.  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Chapter 1) Presenting Consensus Decision-Making as an Tool of 
Anarchist Radical Democratic Dual Power      
The contemporary traditions of North American consensus decision-making developed mainly 
from feminist, anarchist, and environmentalist movements of the 1970s. As noted by the 
Rhizome Network, an online educational resource for consensus-based process developed in 
2011: 
 There’s no doubt these groups are the direct ancestors of the social change groups 
that now choose to use consensus. They developed specific models, gave us the 
language we now use around consensus, initiated training programmes and so 
much more. What’s also not in doubt though is that they drew, consciously or 
unconsciously, on a much longer tradition of communities using decision-making 
models that enshrined many of the values core to consensus.   28
In this chapter I will elaborate on how consensus decision-making expresses the values of 
radical democracy and dual power that are currently enshrined in North American anarchist 
social movements.  
 First of all, consensus decision-making is understood as a technique of radical democracy. 
The concept of “radical democracy” enshrined in consensus process emerged from the 
experiences of 1960s sense of participatory democracy expressed by what is now commonly 
called the “new social movements.”  In this chapter, I will address how contemporary anarchist-29
inspired social movements conceive of “radical democracy,” in this tradition, as an ideal of 
egalitarian and inclusive political participation that challenges the perceived failures of 
mainstream official government forms of mass democracy.  
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Second, the anarchist tradition of consensus decision-making also emphasizes that it is a 
process capable of conducting dual power. The concept of dual power refers to a movement’s 
capacity to simultaneously empower both prefigurative political pedagogy and contentious 
political struggle. There are two sides to radical political change. On the one side, a prefigurative 
politics of changing our own practices: the “figure” of the new world we want to create should 
be “prefigured” in the political practices we use to change the old world. The most oft-quoted 
representation of this point is probably Gandhi’s sweet sound bite, “be the change you wish to 
see in the world.” And on the other side, a contentious politics of waging struggle against our 
enemies: to change the world requires mounting a contention against the current states of 
injustice. These two sides of dual power are most commonly depicted as emphasizing the means 
(prefigurative focus on internal transformation) and the ends (a contentious focus on external 
victory) of political change. Consensus decision-making is supposed to activate dual power 
because, as one commenter said, it “is a model of the society we want to live in, and a tool we 
use to get there.”  30
If the values of radical democracy and dual power accurately represent important anarchist 
projects, then they also present important anarchist problems. These are the projects/problems 
which I quest(ion).  
In the first case, consensus decision-making relies on a split between an idealized image of 
radical democracy built on egalitarian participation and an idolized official democracy built on 
authoritative control. This distinction relies heavily on a starkly moralized and logically 
dichotomous division between “good” (communion and equality) and “evil” (command and 
power). The distinctions between an idealized good democracy and an idolized evil democracy 
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rings with dangerous religious overtones, especially articulated in the history of consensus 
decision-making. This simplistic division should be quest(ion)ed. I contend that this conceptual 
model distorts our movements’ capacity to build more effective radical democratic institutions. 
How can we think more strategically about the good and the bad uses of our ideals, rather than 
moralize about the good and evil drama of our idols?  
In the second case, consensus decision-making is supposed to be a dual power, but it usually 
tips to the prefigurative side of the equation. By privileging the prefigurative over the 
contentious, many organizations using consensus decision-making have thrown off the balance 
of dual power. However, I shall argue that the truly radical value of the consensus method 
remains possible, if we can apply it appropriately as a tool in moments where prefigurative and 
contentious political practice are mutually balanced. Consensus can serve the praxis of anarchist 
dual power, but not always. Not for every problem or in every situation. How can we do better at 
picturing the balancing act required to create effective dual power? 
My intervention into these quest(ion)s will proceed from rethinking the theory of power that 
is taken for granted in the radical democratic and dual power values of consensus decision-
making. For the moment, however those analyses of power will have to wait for their object to 
come into focus. In this chapter I will visualize the projects of anarchist radical democracy and 
dual power as they have been developed in the processes, discourses, and histories of 
contemporary North American consensus decision-making. The remainder of this dissertation 
will then analyze theories power in order to critically reexamine those projects.  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(1.1) A Rough Guide to the Consensus Decision-Making Process 
Detailing one of the most extensive contemporary models of consensus process, the Rhizome 
guide present the procedure’s general steps as follows:  
 Step 1: Be clear and ensure your clarity is shared. 
 Step 2: Have a broad and inclusive discussion. 
 Step 3: Pull together, or synthesise, a proposal that emerges from the best of all the 
group’s ideas, whilst simultaneously acknowledging concerns. 
 Step 4: Friendly amendments – tweak the proposal to make it even stronger.  
 Step 5: Test for consensus – do we have good quality agreement? 
 Step 6: Make it happen.  31
The Rhizome Network is a British online reference project for consensus decision-making 
processes that arose in 2011, a product of the excitement generated for the procedures during the 
assembly movement surge of 2010-2011. These features are shared with the Seeds for Change 
manual, another online reference project source for consensus decision-making technique. The 
Seeds for Change guide offers a similar picture, but further categorizes the process into three 
larger phases: opening out, discussion, and synthesis, under which are noted six steps:  
 Step 1: Introduce and Clarify the issue(s) to be decided. 
 Step 2: Explore the issue and look for ideas  
 Step 3: Look for emerging proposals  
 Step 4: Discuss, clarify and amend your proposal  
 Step 5: Test for agreement  
 Step 6: Implement the decision  32
Calling on just one more example, Shawn Ewald’s explicitly anarchist-focused manual also 
distills consensus into three “levels or cycles:”  
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 In the first level, the idea is to allow everyone to express their perspective, 
including concerns, but group time is not spent on resolving problems. In the 
second level the group focuses its attention on identifying concerns, still not 
resolving them. This requires discipline. Reactive comments, even funny ones, and 
resolutions, even good ones, can suppress the creative ideas of others. Not until the 
third level does the structure allow for exploring resolutions.   33
The basic template represented by these broadly outlined phases and steps are common across 
the varieties of consensus process. The first phase — “opening out” — begins when a group 
comes together to debate a specific issue according to the premise that anyone involved and 
interested has the right to join the discussion, to air their concerns and express their ideas about 
the issue at hand, and to have direct influence on the final decision. In marked contrast to 
hierarchical systems of decision-making and bureaucratic structures that rule most of our daily 
lives in North American culture, this assumption that every participant has a direct and equal 
influence on the outcome of the process is already a radical move. Everyone is encouraged to 
contribute any ideas to an open and free discussion of the issue, in a brainstorming session that 
intends to generate as much collective participation as possible.  
 The second phase — “discussion” — takes the longest. Since no one person, faction, or 
establishment should control the decision, everyone therefore has to accept that consensus is 
usually marked by long, trying, and tiring discussions. This phase is the “muddle in the 
middle,”  as a subtitle of the Rhizome guide puts it. Here, the group must open up the discussion 34
to every possible voice if they expect to be able to create a proposal which synthesizes all the 
positions and perspectives addressed in the previous “opening out” phase. In the muddled middle 
proposals will be drafted and debated, with opportunity for any concerns, objections, or 
 28
modifications to be brought forward in “friendly amendments” — challenges or changes to the 
proposal that could make it better and/or more amenable to key concerns about its viability. 
Supplementary procedures such as “go-rounds” (where every participant is asked to express their 
basic thoughts on the issue at hand) or “straw-polls” (where a quick, non-final show of hands is 
used to gauge approximate levels of support for a proposal-in-process) can be implemented to 
assess the “tone” or “vibe” of members in a group. If the proposal finally lacks sufficient popular 
support among all members, the muddle must resume anew. Another proposal may be 
formulated, and the steps will be repeated.  
Finally, in the third phase — “synthesis” — the group moves to finalize a decision. When it 
appears that a proposal has been tailored so as to enjoy everyone’s general support, the group can 
“call for consensus.” Hopefully, this is where “synthesis” can be reached, where the process of 
consensus will have produced emergent solutions and ideas through collective deliberation. The 
ideal goal of finding a proposal that can synthesize all concerns is, understandably, often rather 
difficult and certainly not always possible. Sometimes, if disagreements are insubstantial or 
minor, its enough to find a shaky common ground. Sometimes, if disagreements are strong 
enough, the whole process will either start over or stall completely.  
The final “call for consensus” is a key point that distinguishes this process. The Seeds for 
Change manual summarizes these final decision options as follows:  
Blocks: I have a fundamental disagreement with the core of the proposal that 
cannot be resolved. We need to look for a new proposal. 
Stand asides: I can’t support this proposal because ... but I don’t want to stop the 
group, so I’ll let the decision happen without me and I won’t be a part of 
implementing it. 
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Reservations: I have some reservations but am willing to let the proposal pass.  
Agreement: I support the proposal and am willing to help implement it.  
Consensus: No blocks, not too many stand asides or reservations? Active 
agreement?  
Then we have a decision!”  35
The fact that consensus process culminates in a range of possible final stances represents an 
integral aspect of the procedure. The process of “calling for consensus” involves more than 
simply voting “yay” or “nay.” Consensus aims to generate group decisions that enjoy widespread 
support, but it makes room for a variety of recorded positions concerning the final consented 
decision. Participants can stand against, they can stand aside, they can stand apart, they can stand 
with reservations, they can stand alongside. And all these options contribute to developing a 
more nuanced awareness of just how much popular appeal is held in the decision at hand.  
Among these final decision options the “block” is the most unique and special aspect of 
consensus decision-making. The block provides any individual with the procedural capacity to 
officially hold power-over the group’s decision. As the Rhizome guide says, “so far the flow 
we’ve presented could be for any decision-making system looking to maximize participation. It’s 
at Step 5 that it becomes uniquely consensus. That’s because this is where we entertain the 
possibility of agreeing to disagree and of the veto (or block, major objection or principled 
objection — it goes by a lot of names).”  The “block” (or “veto,” which tends to be the 36
preferred term in the United Kingdom) represents a unique and distinguishing feature of 
consensus process. One single person who strongly opposes the proposal can “block” it, usually 
based on an argument that the proposed decision would contradict the group’s fundamental 
purposes, principles, or goals. The block is a procedural feature by which any one person can 
 30
assert their will upon the entire group, a regulator that levels out any formal authority into 
portions of individual responsibility. As such, it is often one of the main points at which conflict 
and problems erupt for the groups using consensus. The procedures of blocking are therefore an 
important site of power analysis, and I will return in later chapters to deal more carefully with the 
structural powers invested in the block.  
 The “stand-aside” option is also important, since it provides individuals with a more 
tempered means of staking out their difference from the group’s majority. To “stand-aside” 
means, as stated above in the Seeds for Change Guide, “I can’t support this proposal because ... 
but I don’t want to stop the group, so I’ll let the decision happen without me and I won’t be a 
part of implementing it.”  Consensus has historically been performed by groups composed of 37
voluntary members who espouse anti-authoritarian, egalitarian, and non-coercive principles. In 
such groups, no member is bound to obey the group’s commands and no member is able to 
command the group, so any assent to perform a group-deliberated decision must be voluntarily 
and freely engaged. The option to “stand-aside” is therefore crucial because it allows for 
participants to explicitly state that they will not stop the group from making the decision, but 
they themselves will not take part in performing the decided-upon actions. The “reservation” 
option serves a similar but less distinct role. It is more oriented towards recording the level of 
collective enthusiasm for a proposal, offering participants the option to register technical or 
strategic disagreements, expressing concerns that do not amount to full-scale refusal of the 
proposal. 
There are also common roles and functions which can be assigned to individuals within the 
process. These roles are usually allotted on a rotating basis. Each meeting should assign a new 
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person to every role so that no one person becomes too entrenched in the power which is granted 
by a particular task. Common roles include facilitator, co-facilitator, note-taker, vibes-watcher, 
process observer, and stack keeper. The facilitator has one of the most important jobs in the 
process, roughly equivalent to “chairing” a meeting. They must be prepared to define an agenda, 
direct on-topic conversation, summarize group discussions, and reinforce orderly and respectful 
interactions. Jessica Bell writes that a facilitator “influences what topics will be discussed in a 
meeting, how these topics will be discussed, and how decisions will be made; helps everyone in 
the group reach the best outcome possible in the time available; maintains a positive and 
constructive meeting environment.”  A co-facilitator shares these duties, if the situation 38
suggests that two heads might be better than one. Notetakers take notes, keeping records of 
decision options, final decisions, action points, task appointments, and other necessary 
information. A vibes-watcher keeps their eye on group emotional relations, checking especially 
for body-language that could indicate problems such as boredom, frustration, anger which would 
lead to poor involvement int he deliberation process. A process observer is a member who sits-in 
on a meeting without participating, taking notes on procedural and emotional processes in order 
to offer helpful feedback for improvement. In the words of the Consensus Achieved short 
manual, stack keepers “keep a stack or a list of who would like to speak and calls on people 
based on who raised their hand first. This keeps dominant or loud members from interjecting 
over others trying to speak and brings more order to the meeting.”  Many groups often now use 39
a progressive stack, which requires that the stack keeper gives priority to speakers from normally 
marginalized groups  — giving people who may normally have had more difficulty being heard 
in normative spaces a better opportunity to express themselves. “If you self-identify as trans, 
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queer, a person of color, female, or as a member of any marginalized group, you’re given priority 
on the list of people who want to speak — the stack. The most oppressed get to speak first.”   40
 Although theses roles have certainly evolved over time, they have remained surprisingly 
consistent since the developments of consensus process in the 1970s — from my earliest source, 
Berit Lakey’s 1975 “No Magic Facilitation Method”  (which specifically discusses the roles for 41
facilitator, process-observer, and vibes-watcher), right up to the most contemporary versions of 
2012's Rhizome and Seeds for Change manuals (which go into a fair amount of detail on all of 
the above). Ultimately, the point of any role in consensus process is to empower group dynamics 
and group decisions which are “inclusive, participatory, collaborative, agreement-seeking, and 
cooperative.”  In the tradition of consensus decision-making, these principles are ultimately 42
associated with the spirit of radical participatory democracy, which has been a powerful ideal in 
North American new social movements since the 1960s.  
 
(1.2) The Spirit of Consensus Decision-Making: Democracy in the New Social 
Movements  
The Rhizome guide to consensus states that “the common thread with groups using consensus is 
probably the search for a genuinely egalitarian and inclusive model of democracy.”  Democracy. 43
First of all, let’s consider the literal etymology of that word. The word “democracy” comes from 
a combination of the Greek word demos, meaning a “group” or a “people,” and kratos, meaning 
“power” or “strength” or “force.” For the ancient Greeks who coined the term, demokratia meant 
a political system of rule where power is organized among a group of equal people. As a 
combination of demos and kratos, the meaning of democracy is literally a matter of organizing 
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power among people. Democracy is kratos enacted by/for/from the demos: people-power, the 
rule of the people.  
 The quest(ion) of democracy, literally conceived, is something like this: how to organize 
people and power in an egalitarian manner, such that those people are able to equally create and 
control the powers of their own collective affairs? By beginning with this literal and abstract 
definition, I set my sights on a conceptually open-ended orientation to democracy treated first of 
all as an ideal according to which political organization should be arranged. So, assessing 
consensus decision-making as a project of democracy, thus far broadly conceived, we can begin 
to think about the process as an organization of egalitarian people power.  
When talking about alternative forms of democracy, as expressed through social movement 
and revolutionary discourses of the 20th century, we hear talk of radical democracy, 
participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, real democracy, direct democracy, assembly 
democracy… There is a broad lexicon of “democracies” to choose from. In this section I engage 
with the way that the concepts of participatory democracy and radical democracy are applied to 
the anarchist projects of consensus decision-making.  
First, I will address how consensus decision-making and the new social movement traditions 
have articulated the theory and practice of participatory democracy. For the moment, I will focus 
on a participatory and deliberative democracy perspective. I do not choose this focus because I 
think that participatory democracy is necessarily the best theoretical perspective. I begin with 
this tradition because it is historically associated with my object of study: the contemporary form 
of anarchist consensus decision-making arose from the 1960s new social movements as a part of 
the resurgent interest in what was then commonly called “participatory democracy,” expressing 
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ideals and principles which were further developed theoretically by the deliberative democratic 
tradition in the 1970s and 1980s. We should recognize how the consensus process used today by 
anarchist activists owes its lineage to the participatory and deliberative traditions of democratic 
theory. It is important to emphasize that the concepts of anarchist participatory radical 
democracy which I outline here represents a general, broad, and principled ideal which reflects 
the practical spirit of consensus process, rather than any more specific distinctive academic 
definition which could be attached to any of these terms. However, we should also therefore be 
prepared to critically examine it according to competing theoretical traditions. Once I have 
developed my own theoretical approach to the concept of power in chapters 2 and 3, I will return 
in chapter 4 to consider how an alternative approach to the theory of insurgent democratic theory 
can provoke more critical analysis of the assumptions inherent in this spirit of consensus 
decision-making.  
!
(1.2.1) Participatory Democracy  
The theoretical traditions of participatory democracy and deliberative democracy are focused on 
understanding how to develop systems of collective deliberation in which all participants have 
equal power to affect any political decision which bears upon their own involvement in the 
collective affairs of their institution. Generally, the deliberative democracy approach considers 
“democracy” as the process whereby political choices can be achieved through the rational 
debate of all interested, free, and equal group members. A high quality and quantity of 
“participation” is required to assert democratic action. Consider this list of necessary qualities for 
deliberative democracy presented by one of its most prominent theorists, Seyla Benhabib: 
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 (1) participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms of equality and 
symmetry; all have the same chances to initiate speech act, to question, to 
interrogate, and to open debate; (2) all have the right to question the assigned 
topics of the conversation; and (3) all have the right to initiate reflexive arguments 
about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are 
applied and carried out. There are no prima facie rules limiting the agenda of the 
conversation, or the identity of the participants, as long as any excluded person or 
group can justifiably show that they are relevantly affected by the proposed norm 
under question.  44
In a study concerning how the Alter-Globalization social movements of the 2000s understood 
their own claim to radical democracy, sociologist Donatella della Porta states that “deliberative 
participatory democracy refers to decisional processes in which, under conditions of equality, 
inclusiveness, and transparency, a communicative process based on reason (the strength of a 
good argument) may transform individual preferences, leading to decisions oriented to the public 
good.”  Participation in deliberative equality requires equal access to the general facility with 45
language activities that are required to engage effectively in public debate. In Elizabeth 
Anderson’s account, the participatory principle in democracy demands “a kind of standing in 
civil society to make claims on others, that they respect one’s rights, pay due regard to one’s 
interests, and include one as a full participant in civil society… Everyone counts, and everyone 
counts equally.”  The present-day articulations of consensus decision-making clearly exemplify 46
such participatory emphases on language capacities and egalitarian access.  
Rhizome’s “Brief History” finds the ancestors of consensus processes in all sorts of places — 
in the Anabaptists and Quakers, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, the San Bushmen, the 13th 
century Hanse League of North Baltic Cities, and, yes, of course, let’s not forget, the Caribbean 
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Pirates.  Many a “brief history of consensus” tries to date the practice as far back as possible, 47
presumably in search of some illustrious ancestral pedigree. These historical digs could certainly 
unearth interesting critical questions, but my focus is more directly concerned with the principles 
and procedures of consensus decision-making as it is performed in current North American 
anarchist-inspired activism. As such, we should focus on a shorter history that more directly 
influences people’s conceptualizations of what they’re doing in practice today. The more 
immediate story of consensus is usually said to begin with Quaker deliberative processes and the 
influence born by Christian pacifist activism on 1960s activism in North America. The Quakers, 
in particular, were very influential on the lineage that would drive the later developments of 
consensus for other activist purposes. The Quakers believed that each individual held a private 
responsibility to act as their conscience dictated in community decision-making, according to 
each person’s sense of an ethical relation to God. It was with a religious ethical responsibility in 
mind that the Quakers came together in a “circle of Friends” to act according to their own 
understanding of being accountable to God, and no one else.  
 Arguing that by the 1960s many newly developed versions of “participatory democracy” 
already owed a great deal to Quaker methods, Ethan Mitchell explains that  
quakers played critical organizing roles in many cooperatives and intentional 
communities, as well as in the anti-war and civil rights movements. This provided 
a great number of possible transmission points to secular activist groups which saw 
value in conducting business "after the manner of Friends." Consensus appealed to 
a desire for a more radical democratic process than representative majoritarianism. 
Moreover, for many young secular radicals, Quakers provided these movements 
with an ambience of tradition and spiritual authority.    48
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Andrew Cornell traces the legacy of the Quakers influence through the 1950s and into the 1960s 
movements by way of the Peacemakers, an anti-war organization formed in 1948 that promoted 
revolutionary nonviolent challenge to the existing social structure.  Shaping itself intentionally 49
in contrast to both the socialist-communist movements and to liberal “membership 
organizations,” Cornell recounts that “the group structured itself as a network of small cells that 
elected a steering committee, but operated autonomously from one another in pursuit of the 
organisation’s defined goals.”  The organization’s defined goals were, like the Quakers’, 50
idealistically ethical in character, a tone that would have profound effects when disseminated 
more broadly in the blossoming student movements of the 1960s. 
 In the early 1960s, radically participatory organizing methods also gained prominence by 
way of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). SNCC developed in 1960 as a 
way to continue the momentum started by a wave of African-American student sit-in protests 
across the U.S. South. As historian Clayborne Carson explains, SNCC activists were 
distinguished by the way that they “strongly opposed any hierarchy of authority such as existed 
in other civil rights organisations.”  SNCC employed participatory and consensus-oriented 51
models of decision-making as a way to build capacity for leadership among all its members. 
Young activists were drawn to SNCC as an alternative to the model of mobilization based on 
authoritarian control, centralized organizational systems, and idolization of leaders such as 
Martin Luther King Jr. or Elijah Muhammed within the civil rights and black power movements 
of the 1960s. Longtime organizer Ella Baker, who helped facilitate SNCC’s founding conference, 
famously expressed the general sentiment when remarking that “strong people don’t need strong 
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leaders.”  Instead of relying on the singular charisma of a strong leader, the SNCC process stove 52
to create the collective strength of strong leaders. As SNCC member Bob Moses later recalled:  
 Folks were feeling themselves out, learning how to use words to articulate what 
they wanted and needed. In these meetings they were taking the first step toward 
gaining control over their lives, by making demands on themselves… They were 
not credentialed people; they did not have high school diplomas for the most part. 
They were not members of labor unions, or national church associations. Yet 
through the process, they became leaders.   53
The importance of collective process was central to SNCC’s initial mobilization strategy because 
it helped to recruit people who might otherwise have never felt empowered to contribute their 
skills and knowledge. SNCC developed a sense of cohesive group unity in the process that 
helped the organization grow as egalitarian.  
 As the nonviolent ideals and methods of the Peacemakers and Quakers combined with these 
traditions of collective leadership building in the Civil Rights movement, an ideal of 
“participatory democracy” gradually coalesced as the popular general expression of radical 
values for a resurgent student movement in the 1960s. By the late 1970s the practices of 
consensus decision-making inherited that mantle when they exploded in popularity through mass 
anti-nuclear mobilization efforts such as the Clamshell Alliance, the Abalone Alliance. By this 
time, however, the emphasis was more definitively placed on nonviolent and peace-based 
philosophy derived from the more mainstream and White cultures of the Quakers, peacemakers, 
and second-wave feminism. George Lakey — founding member of the Movement for a New 
Society (MNS), a group that contributed significantly to the popularization of consensus during 
the 1970s and 80s — asserts that an egalitarian and nonviolent philosophy of participatory 
 39
democracy is the root purpose of the consensus process: “consensus is a structural attempt to get 
equality to happen in decision making […] when we are pushing equality, we are pushing 
nonviolence.”  The bond between nonviolent direct action and consensus decision-making is 54
more than a circumstantial connection. The two practices share essential philosophical and 
tactical premises, a point which is highlighted in an MNS-affiliated “Handbook on Nonviolent 
Action” which emphasizes the overall orientation by the point that “nonviolence focuses on 
communication,” in order to draw a common thread between two techniques that both working 
by truth-telling, listening, and conviction.  MNS member Bill Moyers defines consensus 55
decision-making in this context, specifically as a technique of nonviolent action: 
Consensus is a method by which an entire group of people can come to an 
agreement. The input and ideas of all participants are gathered and synthesized to 
arrive at a final decision acceptable to all. Through consensus, we are not only 
working to achieve better solutions, but also to promote the growth of community 
and trust.  56
C.T. Butler and Amy Rothstein’s widely influential manual to Formal Consensus, which gained 
prominence through the Food Not Bombs organizations of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
echoes that emphasis on the nonviolence of group equality, explaining that the method is deeply 
vested in a “traditional nonviolence theory [which] holds that the use of power to dominate is 
violent and undesirable. Nonviolence expects people to use their power to persuade without 
deception, coercion, or malice, using truth, creativity, logic, respect, and love.”   57
 By the late 1980s, the consensus process had become linked to the principled articulation of 
egalitarian democratic organization, particularly in North American grassroots activism that 
focused on the tactics and philosophy of direct action nonviolence tactics, and the specific 
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influence of MNS can be traced all the way to the present. The ActUp organization, for instance, 
founded in 1989 as “a diverse, non-partisan group of individuals united in anger and committed 
to direct action to end the AIDS crisis,”  employed a consensus process that they defined in 58
exactly the same words as Bill Moyers’ definition from the Handbook for Nonviolent Action.  59
On the other side of the continent in 1990, the Earth-First affiliated Redwood Summer Gathering 
of activists, who were organizing to save ancient forests from logging extraction, also used the 
very same phrases to define their commitment to consensus decision-making.  The spirit of 60
nonviolent direct action democracy was still promoted throughout the alter-globalization 
movement of the 1990s and 2000s, and a good two decades later the Occupy Wall Street Guide 
seems to have plucked their basic definition of consensus from the very same source, once more 
repeating its essential purposes almost word for word:  
 Consensus is an inclusive and non-hierarchical process for group decision making. 
It is a method by which the input and ideas of all participants are gathered and 
synthesized in order to arrive at a final decision acceptable to all. Through 
consensus, we are not only working to achieve better solutions, but paving the way 
for an egalitarian model of community decision making.  61
The label of “participatory democracy” which follows this entire historical thread. The emphasis 
is, of course, on the value of “participation,” and this is indeed one of the primary elements 
emphasized by scholars of democracy such as Carol Pateman, a prominent writer on deliberative 
and participatory democratic theory. As she explains, any democratic process worthy of the name 
must privilege equal and direct participation: 
‘Participation’ refers to (equal) participation in the making of decisions, and 
‘political equality’ refers to equality of power in determining the outcome of 
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decisions. ... One might characterise the participatory model as one where 
maximum input (participation) is required and where output includes not just 
policies (decisions) but also the development of the social and political capacities 
of each individual, so that there is ‘feedback’ from output to input.   62
This is certainly a democratic appeal that echoes with consensus prerogatives, and consensus has 
usually been validated on grounds such as these. This is a vision of democracy that cannot be 
satisfied by any practice of representative voting or indirect rule. It is a democracy animated by 
the idealist spirit of direct and immediate deliberative participation, producing collective 
decisions by means of rationally and socially responsible conversation among equals.  
 
(1.2.2) Radical Democracy  
Consensus decision-making is animated by the challenge of radical participatory deliberative 
democracy. In the traditions of the new social movements that have risen since the 1960s, a 
specifically “radical” vision of democracy has been evoked more and more as a way to call up 
stronger equalitarian dreams and practices specifically opposed to the way the ruling 
establishment defines and legitimizes itself as “democracy.” In their broad introduction to 
“democracy in the 21st century,” James Cairns and Alan Sears establish the contemporary 
question of democracy according to this kind of conflict: the bureaucratic and governmental 
institutions of official democracy versus the activist and grassroots movements of democracy-
from-below. They write, “in the official frame, democracy is seen primarily as a form of 
government — one marked by the election of representatives and by specific rights and freedoms 
such as freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and the rule of law.”  On the other hand, 63
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democracy-from-below “democracy is not about being governed but rather about achieving a 
society based upon the active, collective self-government of all members.”   64
 Thinking now about “radical democracy,” let’s take a moment to reflect on the linguistic 
root of the word “radical.” The root of the word “radical” is derived from the Latin radix, 
meaning “root.” A radically literal definition of radical democracy indicates a type of 
democracy that is especially deeply rooted in that ideal democratic proposition of a political 
system of rule where power is organized among a group of equal people. Treating democracy as 
radical takes people’s political practices to the roots of their ideals: a radical type of democracy 
would be more deeply rooted in the equality of people and power than its “un-radical” 
alternatives and official democratic iterations. We might now call the idea of radical democracy 
the “official opposition” to the instituted mechanisms of democracy in the North American 
political system; it is the ideology that opposes the ruling establishment’s legitimating discourse 
of official democracy with the challenge of its own ideals. Activists fighting for all sorts of 
movements — from climate justice to student debt, from indigenous sovereignty to union 
solidarity — commonly articulate their diverse causes according to the common promise of a 
radical democracy:  as a way of pushing for a better, more egalitarian, and more just democratic 
society. 
This general conception of “radical democracy” is a deeply influential ideology for anarchist, 
anti-authoritarian, egalitarian social movements today. In the sociological tradition, John 
McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald offer one classic definition of a social movement as: “a set of 
opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of 
the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society.”  Sociologist Alberto Melucci 65
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emphasizes that a social movement must be both collective and contentious: “first, a social 
movement is a form of collective action which involves solidarity, that is, actors’ mutual 
recognition that they are part of a single social unit. A second characteristic of a social movement 
is its engagement in conflict, and thus in opposition to an adversary who lays claim to the same 
goods or values.”  Here Melucci conceives of a social movement as the collective political 66
activity of striving to determine the organization of the world, always in conflict with other 
social movements who are trying to determine that organization differently. New social 
movement theorist Alain Touraine understands social movements as the makers of social order, 
culture, and meaning; in a Marxist tradition, social movements are the actors of history: “the set 
of cultural, cognitive, economic, and ethical models by means of which a collectivity sets up 
relations with its environment; in other words, produces […] a culture.”  Social theorist Manuel 67
Castells also offers a definition based in the deep seat of social conflict, saying that a social 
movement articulates “purposive collective actions whose outcome, in victory as in defeat, 
transforms the values and institutions of society.”  68
 Social movements are trying to “move” the organization of their society in a particular 
direction. But so are other social movements. They inevitably push against each other. Thus, 
social movements can be conceived as contested action in the hegemony of social organization, 
competing over the limited resources, means of influence, tactical repertoires, and symbolic 
ideals that a society has to offer. In this context, there is a strategic project behind the way that 
social movement actors have come to distinguish between the ideal of radical democracy as 
distinct from other types of official democracy. This has been especially true in what scholars 
often call the new social movements. The label “new social movements” roughly describes a 
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trend that emerged after the transformative years of the 1960s whereby the most popular 
expression of social movements turned away from old grand narrative frames and tactical 
repertoires of socialism-communism towards more loosely structured and locally oriented frames 
and tactics. As Melucci states, the new social movements tended to emphasize “a politics of 
everyday life and individual transformation,”  turning their attention away from the 69
revolutionary historical focus and mass organizational efforts exemplified by labour organizing 
to address issue-specific challenges through protest, direct action, and lifestyle reforms.  
 As sociologist Barbara Epstein has said, “the movements of sixties began not with revolution 
but with the goal of making democracy real.”  Consensus decision-making is a part of the 70
radical democratic collective action frame that grew out of those dramatic and tumultuous years. 
Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow define the concept of a collective action frame as “action-
oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a 
social movement organization.”  Today, radical democracy has a broad appeal as an overarching 71
collective action frame, a concept that exerts the influence of a master frame. As Benford and 
Snow define it, a master frame acts to coordinate the general symbolic sense of political 
possibility for a wide group of social movement actors, working as “a kind of master algorithm 
that colors and constrains the orientations and activities of other movements.”  Emerging as a 72
manifestation of the 1960s wave of radical social movements, the purposes and principles 
enshrined in consensus decision-making carry the specially utopian demands of that era. As was 
famously scrawled on the walls in Paris during the revolts of May, 1968, the spirit of the 60s 
called on everyone to be realistic, demand the impossible. Osha Neumann recalls how the 
exuberant 1960s counter-culture affected his own radical vision, instilling a sense of immediacy 
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to the articulation of prefigurative politics, calling for “’freedom Now!’ The political culture of 
the sixties insisted that liberation was not to be deferred. Freedom would not come as the result 
of a long struggle during which people were unfree. Freedom had to be part of the struggle, an 
experience that one could grab now. The movement would grow by its shining example.”  73
Reflecting this turn in ideological resonance of the 1960s American Left, by the early 1970s 
the ideal of radical democracy had become the brightest political concept for progressive Left-
leaning movements in North America, outshining the old stalwart socialism/communism in 
popularity with young and new activists. Following the arc of this trend from the 1960s into the 
1980s, Epstein argues that ‘radical democracy’ “has come to replace ‘socialism’ as the point of 
reference for what used to be called left politics.”  This “turn toward radical democracy involves 74
a turn away from class as a key category of left politics, and also a loss of interest in politics or 
the question of who controls states (and other governing institutions) and what policies they 
produce.”   75
 The turn towards radical democracy as a new guiding alternative ideology was especially 
influential in the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), a perspective apparent in their 
founding document, the Port Huron Statement, first published in 1962. It is clear that the Port 
Huron Statement is not appealing for a revolutionary conflict against the American value of 
democracy. Take the following passage: “As a social system we seek the establishment of a 
democracy of individual participation, governed by two aims: that the individual share in those 
social decisions determining the quality and direction of his life; that society be organized to 
encourage independence in men and provide the media for their common participation.”  SDS 76
evoked the ideals of democracy as a way to downplay the Old Left’s ideological mobilization of 
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socialism/communism, which was considered by many Americans to be a foreign or somehow 
un-American set of values and beliefs. On the other hand, the appeal to democracy in this 
statement comes from inside the already-instituted symbols of American ideology, evoking such 
ideals as “individuality,” “participation,” “quality and direction of life” to the service of the 
egalitarian dream. SDS appealed for a deepening of the democratic values that are already 
instituted into American society; it calls for the resurgence of ideal democracy against its 
idolization, a return to its roots. The Port Huron Statement does not call out American 
democracy, that it should be attacked and destroyed by the revolutionary overhaul of alternative 
ideals. It calls upon the tradition of American democracy, that it should be radicalized by the 
appeal of its own ideals. The radical edge of SDS’s vision for participatory democracy can be 
conceived as coming from inside the idealized claims of official democracy; it is an ideal trying 
to break out of its shell.  
SDS disseminated this vision of participatory democracy to many burgeoning activists, and by 
the end of the 1960s a generation of college students radicalized during those turbulent times had 
grown up treating the ideal of participatory democracy as “the visionary call of the 1960s 
revolution.”  Along with a shift away from the frame of class struggle towards the frame of 77
radical democracy, there came a related shift in movement tactics and tone. Increasingly since 
the “revolutionary vision of the 1960s” took off in North America, the principled tension 
between the radical ideals and the official idols of “democracy” has driven activist rhetoric and 
their strategy. Many modern social movements have now taken on this principled purpose, 
expressing some variant on the promise to challenge the idols of official democracy in North 
American society with the ideals of their own radical roots.  Cairns and Sears articulate, for 78
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instance, that “the struggle for ‘democracy’ in reality has often included vital strands of official 
and from-below perspectives, sometimes deeply interconnected. Indeed, the accomplishment of 
official democracy can be seen as a real, if limited and contradictory step in the direction of 
achieving democracy from below.”  Like the communist who appeals to a utopian vision of the 79
egalitarian society-to-come in order to challenge the shortcomings of actually-existing 
communism, like the Christian who see the ideal of Jesus as an encouragement to improve their 
own actions, the promise of radical democracy serves as an idealized self-referential cultural 
challenge. There is a distance within the term “democracy,” stretched between the official and 
the radical, between the idols that reign over the systematic inequality of modern society’s claim 
to democratic legitimacy and the ideals that reside at the heart of the promise for a system of 
radical equality. 
This conceptual tension between the idols of official democracy and the ideals of radical 
democracy is a key factor in understanding how consensus decision-making is valued by its 
practitioners. In many cases, consensus process relies on promises of ideal radical democracy 
that are downright grandiose. One of the Rhizome Network authors preaches the vision of 
consensus with notable flair:  
 So what is consensus then? At a recent workshop a participant told me a short 
story which illustrated consensus for them: 2 stonemasons are carving blocks of 
stone. When asked what he’s doing the first mason says: ‘I’m carving this block of 
stone.’ When asked the same question the second mason says: ‘I’m building a 
cathedral.’ Consensus has more in common with that second mason…   80
This allegory highlights the idea that consensus is not only a practice or tool used in the process 
of empowering immediately contentious political victories; it is a way to produce radical 
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democratic ideals in its own actions as an activity that has higher vision in mind, working on a 
stone in the greater construction of “another world.” It appeals to the ideal of radical democracy 
for creating a democracy that is still in the making, the grand vision of a cultural quest. 
Consensus decision-making has spearheaded an extraordinarily idealistic and utopian articulation 
of radical democracy which exists in large part because of the appeal that democratic extremism 
holds for people who have internalized the Western cultural rhetoric about democracy but wish to 
move beyond it, to push it deeper, to radicalize it.  
This can be powerful, but it can be dangerous. We have to be more careful about how these 
dynamics play out. This concept of radical democracy has been deeply influential for the 
anarchist new social movements by, as Elisabeth Clemens writes: “mobilizing individuals around 
a new (but culturally acceptable) model or inspiring them to use familiar models for new 
purposes, social movements serve as catalysts for the rearrangement and possible transformation 
of the array of organizational models that characterizes a society.”  Radical democracy 81
expresses a struggle to redefine and reconstruct the dominant frames and practices that presume 
democracy as simply its official manifestations. The ideological assertions (both symbolically in 
its rhetorical forms and practically in its organizational forms) of radical democracy are supposed 
to challenge those presumptions, as the anarchist media group Crimethinc Collective has recently 
put it, by asking: “could it be that "democracy," long the catch-word of every revolution and 
resistance, is simply not democratic enough? What could be more democratic?”  What could be 82
more democratic than democracy? … Consensus decision-making! At least, that’s what the 
consensus decision-makers say. Wherever we hear consensus practitioners tooting their own 
horns, we find the basic pitch that it is more democratic than normal versions of official 
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democracy, and more, that it is even more democratic than the normal versions of radical 
democracy. In this spirit, the Seeds for Change guide opens with a challenge: “What’s Wrong 
with the Democracy We’ve Got?” They immediately answer themselves:  
 Power and decision making is taken away from ordinary people when they vote 
for leaders — handing over power to make decisions to a small elite with 
completely different interests than their own. Being allowed to vote 20 times for an 
MP or senator is a poor substitute for having the power ourselves to make the 
decisions that affect every aspect of our lives.   83
The Seeds for Change people introduce the consensus process as a challenge to “the democracy 
we’ve got:” that is, it acts as a means of practicing the ideals of radical democracy in contrast and 
challenge to the idols of official democracy. It represents itself as the true democracy versus fake 
democracy, actual equality versus acted-out equality. This is an exclamation that invokes the 
ideals of democracy to challenge people, to push us towards ever greater relations of equality:  
 consensus decision making is based on the idea that people should have full 
control over their lives and that power should be shared by all rather than 
concentrated in the hands of a few. It implies wide-ranging liberty, including the 
freedom to decide one’s own course in life and the right to play an equal role in 
forging a common future.  84
In this sentiment, consensus decision-making is explicitly intended to serve as a force of the 
radical democratic insurrection against official democracy; it is framed in contrast against any 
form of decision-making (democratically-labelled or otherwise) that relies on power over people 
rather than the power of people. 
It is often assumed in this way that government generally requires a practice of power-over 
equated with domination and control, that the head-body distinction of command-obedience is 
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the only way to manage political organizations. Take the following position from Stewart Clegg, 
David Courpasson, and Nelson Phillips, as stated in their massive compendium on theories of 
power in the field of organizational studies: 
Domination and organization are inescapably mutually implicated. Domination 
requires organization — concerted action by a body of people employed as staff — 
to execute commands; and, conversely, all organization requires domination in that 
the power of command over the staff must be vested in an individual or a group of 
individuals, in an organization of any scale.  85
On the contrary, the radical democratic ideal proposes that power can be developed in egalitarian 
inter-actions that needn’t vest the power of command in any one person or organizational 
position, instead vesting power in the entire membership of the organization insofar as they act 
together as a group, such that there is no difference between those who command and those who 
enact the dictates of the organization. Democracy is the practice of finding ways to include 
everyone who is a part of the polis (everyone who is recognized as belonging in the community) 
to make decisions and act in a public function for that community, displacing any boundary 
instituted to limit the participation in government by qualification, representation, or right.  
Authoritative official democracy retreats from the essence of radical democracy, because it 
resides in a “fear or lack of faith in the people,” as Paolo Friere has said. “But if the people 
cannot be trusted, there is no reason for liberation.” In contrast, through radical democratic 
means “the revolution is not even carried out for the people, but ‘by’ the people for the 
leaders.”  That essential political work that people perform together to determine who they are 86
as a people: the ancient Greeks called this autonomy. As the philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis 
has put it, “autonomy comes from auto-nomos: (to give to) oneself one’s laws. […] It is the 
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unlimited self-questioning about the law and its foundations as well as the capacity, in light of 
this interrogation, to make, to do and to institute (therefore, also, to say).”  As authority is 87
essential to official democracy, autonomy is essential to radical democracy. And so it seems that 
insofar as democracy should remain an autonomous political activity, no answer from up high, 
no wise directive from an authoritative head should suffice to define it. It is always a practice of 
quest(ion)ing the “we.” Democracy is present where a people autonomously treats themselves as 
a political quest(ion): which are the rules that we ought to make? Which is the people we ought 
to be through those rules? These are the radical quest(ion)s of an autonomous people-power.  
Official democracy treats people-power as a resource to be authoritatively governed by a 
political institution: a politics organized by power-over people’s collective actions for some 
authority to make decisions in the name of “the” people, but without including those people.  
Radical democracy treats people-power as the source by which a political institution is 
autonomously governed: a politics organized by power-with among people with equal power-to 
participate in and to influence the determination of their collective actions.  
 The project of radical democracy is in transforming current practices of official democracy 
into the potential practices of radical democracy.  
!
(1.2.3) Anarchist Democracy 
Consensus decision-making has staked its place in the traditions of mainstream North 
American activism according to the promises of radical participatory democracy. It was 
particularly attractive in the early 1970s, when it was presented to a new generation of 1960s-
inspired activists as a special way of organizing that could counteract a common and all-too 
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accepted reliance on centralized, racist, patriarchal, and normalizing systems of authority — all 
those processes of coordinated control that still prevailed in the institutions of the most popular 
1960s radical groups, despite their own appeals to the ideals of a radical democracy. By the early 
1970s, a generation of activists had absorbed the ideals of radical democracy as the main 
standard of value which they could use to criticize the established society’s many failures; they 
would also, of course, inevitably apply that same standard to their own organizational failures. 
Many would abandon the promise of radical democratic organizing in favour of militant and 
centrally organized models more associated with Lenin and Mao; the promises of Third World 
anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist communism seemed a more forceful and more demanding 
route to revolution.  Others would move deeper, doubling down on a radical democratic critique 88
of radical democracy itself to find deeper ways to critique and transcend the problems of 
authoritarian, hierarchical, exclusionary, and unequal organizational systems that they had run up 
against in the 60s whirlwind. This is where consensus decision-making made its mark. 
Consensus came to prominence during this time, partly at least because it posed as a 
procedural alternative for feminists who were advancing a critique of the masculine culture and 
patriarchal tendencies in the New Left; for anarchists who were resolutely opposed to the strict 
hierarchies carried on by the new communist movements; for on-the-ground civil rights workers 
who didn’t want the bigshot campaign leaders telling everyone what to do and where to protest; 
and for the general cultural temperament of a new generation turned on by the radically anti-
authoritarian aura of the 60s, who longed to realize a utopian way of working together. The turn 
towards radical participatory democracy and stronger attention to anti-authoritarian practices 
opened the chance for a resurgence of anarchist traditions that had been making a comeback in 
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North American radical politics since the 1950s.  As Mark Lance has stated, “if anything is 89
essential to anarchism, it is the idea that social decisions are to be taken by everyone affected, 
and that this inclusion must involve substantive participation of each in deliberation and 
decision-making.  Thus a dispute on the nature of such participation is a dispute about the very 
essence of anarchism.”  Certainly, this radical democratic logic of tension is commonplace in 90
contemporary anarchist and activist discourse, repeated so often that many activists will take the 
idea of “normal” democracy of official government practices for granted as the natural antagonist 
for the “true” democracy of radical democratic practices. Radical democracy is taken as the true 
democratic alternative to the idolized and false claims of official democracy (which, in this vein, 
sometimes is sardonically called “de-mock-racy”). However, this particular framework has not 
always been forefront in anarchist traditions, just as it hadn’t always been prominent in earlier 
left activist traditions generally. The radical democratic emphasis on a tension between the ideals 
and the idols of democracy can indeed be tracked through the more classical anarchist traditions, 
but they have developed different associations and different strengths in the contexts of the new 
social movements.  
Before the 1960s experiences altered the symbolic and strategic landscape of North American 
radicalism, anarchists tended not to call upon the ideals of radical democracy. They spoke of 
“democracy” more in terms of its official manifestations, and critically attacked it for the lack of 
equality it institutionalized in society. This tendency is still strong, of course. Contemporary 
anarchist author Peter Gelderloos, for instance, expresses the popular critical stance against 
official democracy, arguing that “democracy is an authoritarian, elitist system of government 
designed to craft an effective ruling coalition while creating the illusion that the subjects are in 
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fact equal members of society.”  That is, the ruling system of modern capitalist society simply 91
uses the idols of democracy as a way to hold power over people. As C. B. Macpherson urges us 
to remember with virtually the entire span of his scholarship, “it cannot be too often recalled that 
liberal democracy is strictly a capitalist phenomenon.”  At the same time, however, anarchists 92
have long practiced and preached varying modes of people power that support the deeper ideals 
of democracy. Tom Malleson notes that  
although they often lambasted ‘democracy,’ it is undeniable that whenever they 
started to seriously discuss proposals for alternatives, their visions were always 
deeply imbued with a democratic ethos. Their ideas were fundamentally visions of 
radical democracy, of people having equal decision-making power in their 
associations, even if they tended to shy away from using the word ‘democracy’ in 
favour of words like ‘bottom-up,’ ‘self-management,’ ‘auto-gestion,’ ‘worker’s 
control,’ ‘self-government,’ and so on — words which display an unmistakably 
democratic impulse. Occupy is a perfect example of how deeply entrenched this 
discourse is today, but Occupy is only one of the most recently prominent cases in 
a lineage of North American social movements that tout the transformative element 
of consensus as the most importantly radical aspect of democratic politics. And so 
in this frame proponents of consensus usually claim that their method is the most 
radical of all participatory democratic methods, and as such, provides the best way 
to learn about how we must make collective decisions.  93
If you sift through the historically specific nomenclature, it is apparent that, at heart, 
anarchism and radical democracy share certain basic premises. So, what is it that so closely links 
contemporary anarchist activism with the concepts of radical democracy? Explained in the pages 
of an old-fashioned independent newsrag, as a call-out for participation in the 1988 Toronto 
Anarchist Survival Gathering, “anarchy” means:  
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 a society which is self-governed; people organizing themselves on an equal basis 
without leaders or bosses; direct democratic control of our workplaces, 
neighbourhoods and schools, associated with other communities and exchanging 
goods and services freely. People give what they can to the community and take 
what they need. A society which finds a balance with the natural environment 
instead of lording over it. Above all, anarchy is a society where control is 
decentralized so that all of us have power over our own lives and communities and 
work cooperatively instead of competitively. Curious?  94
 It’s likely that many people are indeed curious. These anarchist principles express the broad 
appeal for the Western social ideals of individual liberty and democratic equality generally, 
although for most of Western society these notions would normally be taken as ‘ideals’ rather 
than ‘projects.’ There is an affinity between anarchist and liberal traditions which deserves more 
serious critical attention. At the moment, however, I aim only to develop an ideological 
connection between anarchism and democracy. Both anarchism and democracy are historical 
projects which strive to radicalize the principles of Western society, rather than merely assert 
those principles as idols around which mechanisms of control can be ballasted. The same ideals 
professed by anarchism are common to liberal Western society, but in their mainstream guises 
those ideals are treated like the banners of a social fantasy, a tale we tell to the ghosts of our 
dreams, a story of what we hope is possible but realize isn’t, or an isolated struggle waged here 
and there by some lonely resister. They are turned into idols. As Noam Chomsky recalls, 
anarchist ideals  
 grow out of the Enlightenment, their roots are in Rousseau’s Discourse on 
Inequality, Humboldt’s Limits of State Action, Kant’s insistence, in his defense of 
the French revolution, that freedom is the precondition for acquiring the maturity 
for freedom, not a gift to be granted when such maturity is achieved. With the 
 56
development of capitalism, it is libertarian socialism that has preserved and 
extended the radical humanist message of the enlightenment and the classical 
liberal ideals that were perverted into an ideology to sustain the emerging social 
order.  95
For a history of movements working in and around anarchism, and for so many more that may 
or may not have anything to do with the label as such, these are the goals for collective 
programmes and political projects, the source material for real social organization. They have to 
be not just idols, not even just ideals: they have to be practices. Murray Bookchin has stated the 
overall specialty of anarchism as rooted in its commitment to practicing what others consider 
merely as ideals. And so he comments that  
 no sizeable radical movement in modern times had seriously asked itself if 
organizational forms had to be developed which promoted changes in the most 
fundamental behavior patterns of its members. How could the libertarian 
movement vitiate the spirit of obedience, of hierarchical organization, of leader-
and-led relationships, of authority and command instilled by capitalist industry? It 
is to the lasting credit of Spanish anarchism – and of anarchism generally – that it 
posed this question.  96
This is the vision of anarchist radical democracy: to intensify and radicalize the commonly 
accepted values of democracy, in such a way that those values can be more powerfully enacted 
for immediate communities who practice them. Writing for the War Resisters League Organizer’s 
Manual in 1981, at the height of radical democracy’s resurgence as the prime ideology driving 
the American Left, Carol and Howard Ehrlich put the point of anarchism nicely: “literally, the 
history of anarchism begins with the first person who opposed the idea that any social group had 
the right to structure itself so that some of its members dominated other members.”  Simply put, 97
this mythical history could also represent the birth of democracy. Anarchism promotes the 
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possibility of a social system in which no one has the right to dominate or exploit any other, for 
which all people should be engaged in common production of social equality. Anarchism 
promotes the power of people against systems of power over people, same as radical democracy. 
 But, again, I’d prefer to keep our attention focused on more immediate and less mythological 
histories. I am all too aware of the dangers in reducing all things to variations of Anarchism, 
capital A with a caps-lock on the ISM. “AnarchISM,” as Hakim Bey pronounces with disdain. 
“Like Sinbad & the Horrible Old Man,” this AnarchISM “staggers around with the corpse of a 
Martyr magically stuck to its shoulders — haunted by the legacy of failure and revolutionary 
masochism — stagnant backwater of lost history.”  I don’t want to argue that all movements 98
should drop their own baggage and take up the burdens of “Anarchism,” capital-A ruler of all 
things radical. Really, to reduce anything simply to an “ism” is antithetical to the very spirit and 
traditions of uncapitalized anarchism. And this principle should apply especially to anarchism 
itself: drop the ISM; be the an-arch.  
 When attending to the tangled lineage of anarchist influence on contemporary North 
American projects of radical democracy and consensus decision-making, we must take care not 
to attribute to much power to any one root. Today’s anarchist movements are an amalgamation of 
influences, self-consciously and intentionally so. In this vein, activist and scholar Uri Gordon 
defines contemporary anarchism as a coalition against domination, which has emerged through 
the  
 convergences of radical feminist, ecological, anti-racist and queer struggles, which 
finally fused in the late 1990s through the global wave of protest against the 
policies and institutions of neo-liberal globalization. This has led anarchism, in its 
re-emergence, to be attached to a more generalized discourse of resistance, 
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gravitating around the concept of domination. The word domination today 
occupies a central place in anarchist political language, designating the paradigm 
which governs both micro- and macro-political relations. The term ‘domination’ in 
its anarchist sense serves as a generic concept for the various systematic features of 
society whereby groups and persons are controlled, coerced, exploited, humiliated, 
discriminated against, etc. – the dynamics of which anarchists seek to uncover, 
challenge and erode.  99
Anarchism (like democracy, like feminism, like other -isms that strive against domination and 
exploitation of any kind) is rooted in the general tone of modern political ideal of equality. In this 
project, I will continue to treat “anarchism” as an assembly of voices fighting for a radical 
articulation of equality, in the many corners of a greater struggle. In this spirit, Canadian activist 
and writer Chris Dixon subsumes the current political sense of “anarchism” under the rubric of 
“another politics.”   
 Those who are developing another politics identify politically in many different 
ways and through a variety of legacies of resistance. We call ourselves 
abolitionists, anarchists, anti-capitalists, autonomists, feminists, horizontalists, 
radicals, and many other things. Most of us draw eclectically on a variety of 
influences and traditions. Part of the reason for this, it seems to me, is that we are 
trying to stay critical, avoid dogmatism, and find what actually works.   100
This idea of “another politics” is named vaguely, with open-ended allegiance, so as to signify 
how contemporary radical politics tends towards the intersectional alliance of many traditions, 
threads, cultures, and histories that have now come together to form a diverse assemblage of 
movements and activisms, a loose family of political praxis that includes a strong dose of the 
North American radical democratic traditions.   
!
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(1.3) Anarchist Dual Power Praxis: Radical Democracy and Direct Action  
Social movements are a struggle to change social relations, trying to change the world while 
changing the way the world is changed: this is a task that the anarchist tradition has often 
referred to as dual power. The bond that shapes a dual power of prefigurative and contentious 
politics can be illustrated by sharpening our awareness of the way “radical” is spoken in common 
activist discourse today. We call ourselves “radical” on purpose. It is a title, a self-referential 
name that we take on as a term of valour and valuation. But when we cut into it more critically, 
what does this concept really evoke?  
Our colloquial evocation of “radical” has two sides to it that align uncannily with the old 
conception of dual power. Both elicit the bond between contentious political actions and 
prefigurative political actions. In one sense we evoke the term “radical” to name an activity that 
directly addresses a problem at its root causes. In another sense, “radical” also refers to the 
activity of upholding an active commitment to the root of one’s own principles, purposes, and 
projects. In the first case for something or someone to be called “politically radical” signifies that 
they are engaged in a contentious political practice: it is a performance of critical or practical 
attack that refuses to settle for reforms, instead striving for revolutionary changes that get to the 
root causes of a problem. In the second case, for something or someone to be called “politically 
radical” signifies that they are engaged in a prefigurative political practice: it is a performance of 
basing one’s own political and social practices in different root causes. When we use the term 
“radical” in its colloquial anarchist activist sense it is split between these two poles of dual 
power, between representing a contentious politics and a prefigurative politics.  
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Very often in contemporary activism this split results in a fight over the significance of “being 
radical,” reverberating an old and ongoing debate about which side of dual power is more 
important: the prefigurative activity or the contentious activity? Ultimately, dual power is 
activated when a movement can coordinate both prefigurative and contentious politics in a 
common praxis. This is not always possible and, in fact, the history of consensus decision-
making reveals that the process has often stumbled precisely at this crossroads, grinding down 
when groups and movements get into a standoff between their prefigurative and contentious 
goals. In this section, I will address the dynamics of dual power in the ideals of contemporary 
anarchist radical democracy and consensus decision-making, highlighting this concept as a key 
goal according to which the technique has been practiced over its history. I will finish the chapter 
with a look at how a duel between the split sides of radical dual power continues to be a chronic 
disease for the anarchist radical democratic praxis of consensus decision-making. 
 
(1.3.1) Prefigurative Politics (the Left Hand of Dual Power)  
When Uri Gordon speaks of contemporary anarchism as the convergence of “radical feminist, 
ecological, anti-racist and queer struggles, which finally fused in the late 1990s through the 
global wave of protest against the policies and institutions of neo-liberal globalization,” he could 
just as well be describing the history of consensus decision-making. Consensus and anarchism 
have shared many popular turns of fate over the past 40 years or so, a bond that has been tied 
even tighter by a common association they both also share with post-1960s feminism. During the 
late 1960s and early 1970s feminists developed several methods of direct and egalitarian 
interaction as a way to combat masculine and patriarchal assumptions about decision-making, 
 61
discussion, and emotional culture. Some of these methods, such as the consciousness raising 
circles, were focused on sharing and healing in a feminist centred association. Some, such as 
consensus-based decision-making, were more instrumentally oriented toward sharing power in 
activist and organizing circumstances. In particular, the feminist movement was directly 
influential on the anarchist environmentalist direct action cultures of the later 1970s that would 
come to adopt consensus processes as their formal and central methods of deliberation.  
Feminist author C.S., introducing a classic debate between Jo Freeman and Cathy Levine 
concerning feminist organizational structure in the early 1970s, proposed a convergence of 
feminism and anarchism based on a shared goal: to fight the dominance of traditionally 
authoritarian power systems. In pursuit of new ways to break apart the rule of men, demagogues, 
centralized leadership, and bureaucratic conformism, “the question how do we organise, rather 
than simply why, had become of great importance.” In pursuing the classically anarchist concern 
with the means of revolutionary organizing, C.S. claims that “it took feminists to show how 
libertarian organisation could look. 'Feminism is what Anarchism preaches', wrote Lynne Farrow 
in 1974. A little simplistic, perhaps, but it was certainly true that the feminist practice of small, 
leaderless groups was an anarchist ideal.”  During the 1970s, the search for new ways of 101
organizing that could transform the powers of traditional privilege and authority led anarchists 
and feminists to adopt common methods and techniques. As the authors of the Formal Consensus 
manual would later reflect, “as recently as the 70s, feminists clearly defined the lack of an 
alternative process for decision-making and group interaction as the single most important 
obstacle in the way of real change, both within progressive organizations and for society at 
large.”  102
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Throughout the 1970s, as the question “how do we organize?” (rather than simply “why do 
we organize?”) took on more importance, the meaning, purpose, and possibilities of how 
consensus decision-making could contribute to the traditions of radical democracy began to get 
framed more explicitly as a matter of what would come to be known as prefigurative politics. 
Consider this passage from the Seeds For Change guide: 
 If we are fighting for a better society where everyone has control over their own 
lives, where everyone has equal access to power, where it’s possible for everyone 
to follow their interests and fulfil their needs, then we need to develop alternative 
processes for making decisions; processes that recognise everyone’s right to self-
determination, that encourage mutual aid and replace competition with co-
operation.   103
From the manuals, we find that the overarching answer to “consensus? — what for?” is some 
version of this “fighting for a better society:” the ideal of radical democracy fighting through its 
own idols. The particular value of consensus in the tradition of radical democracy, however, digs 
itself a little further into the ideal, often to the point where consensus proponents claim that their 
method is the most democratic and the most radical of all radical democratic methods. They 
generally based this claim on some variant of its prefigurative radicalness.  
The literal meaning of “prefigurative” derives from the notion of making that bond between 
means and ends. It goes something like this. People have a vision of the future society that they 
want to build (a vision that is distinct from the way their society exists at present) which we can 
call the “figure” of a revolutionary ends. For a prefigurative politics, this “figure” of the ends 
must be “pre-figured” in the means that people use to strive towards the end figure. From this 
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perspective, any political activity that can properly call itself a prefigurative politics must assure 
that its means match its ends.    
 The introductory pamphlet for decision-making at Occupy Wall Street announces it loud and 
clear as well:  
 consensus is an inclusive and non-hierarchical process for group decision making. 
It is a method by which the input and ideas of all participants are gathered and 
synthesized in order to arrive at a final decision acceptable to all. Through 
consensus, we are not only working to achieve better solutions, but paving the way 
for an egalitarian model of community decision making.   104
This notion of “paving the way” signifies a commitment to treating consensus as a prefigurative 
politics, a way to activate the ideals of a movement in its current practices. A point which 
recognizes the importance of building something up to replace what is being torn down. 
Consensus takes the link between principles and procedures in a utopian spirit, and in so doing 
becomes a unique and special form of political deliberation. This is, in itself, a key point of 
identifying consensus as a prefigurative political pedagogy. Technically speaking, consensus 
aims to produce a synthesis of proposals, weaving together ideas to find the most commonly 
acceptable decision-action for the entire group. As a deliberative method, consensus is 
committed to developing more collective, innovative, and synthetic decisions. But there’s more. 
There is also an explicit recognition that the consensus process weaves together members as a 
way to create a more collective, innovative, and synthetic group identity, and that this practice is 
inherently valuable in itself as a prefigurative activity for learning how to build egalitarian 
community. Randy Schutt, who gives workshops and facilitation training for consensus process 
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in Santa Cruz, California, takes this point as the subtitle of an essay explaining its merits: 
“Consensus is Not Just a Process, but a Valuable Goal.”   105
 For the proponents of consensus, there is nothing more radically democratic than consensus 
decision-making. Emerging from the experience of 1960s activists, the value of the consensus 
process was originally focused on its appeal as a prefigurative method of achieving group unity 
and harmony, as a way of doing politics differently than before. Instead of allowing the same old 
culture to dominate — where men, white folks, and the well-and-loudly spoken have most 
influence over group decisions, the consensus process provided people with a way to structure 
new forms of equality into their own meetings. Consensus was a hit with people who wanted this 
prefigurative factor forefront in their activist work, as a means of practicing the kind of radically 
egalitarian discussion and compromise that would be necessary for building a more holistically 
democratic society. Although (of course), this radical equality doesn’t always works out in 
practice (and there will be much more on the way that this ideal may sputter and fail in the 
chapters to come), the ideal is that consensus provides the means for working together to 
accomplish a collective goal in a manner that works to enhance collective equality in the process. 
As the ActUp manual puts it:  
 consensus is a process for group decision-making. It is a method by which an 
entire group of people can come to an agreement. The input and ideas of all 
participants are gathered and synthesized to arrive at a final decision acceptable to 
all. Through consensus, we are not only working to achieve better solutions, but 
also to promote the growth of community and trust.  106
 The promise of prefigurative politics carries that strong utopian and idealist spirit that owes so 
much to the religious sentiments of the Quakers. Even though we now tend to forget about the 
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Quaker roots of consensus, it is still important to recognize the indelible mark left by the Quaker 
model on the ethical and spiritual pedagogical tone of consensus, even today. One key point of 
influence which owes directly to the Quaker elaborations of consensus is the persistent emphasis 
of nonviolence on which it is premised. Although there are certainly variations of emphasis, 
consensus is still almost universally promised as a means to change social relations of violence 
into affinities of communicative nonviolence, and thereby to grow a fundamentally nonviolent 
culture from the roots of a nonviolent deliberative process.  
Even when practiced in non-religious or even anti-religious cultural conditions, the consensus 
process still tends to carry the idealistic tone of a Christian ethical prerogative to uphold peaceful 
brotherly respect. The prerogative for nonviolent interactive respect was doubled by the feminist 
aim to engage in a non-dominating/non-masculine method of interactive equality, and the 
Movement for a New Society (MNS) can be cited as a key example of this doubled legacy. 
Through the 1970s and into the 1980s MNS gave hundreds of workshops in consensus and direct 
action, and their explicit attempt to promote both prefigurative and pragmatic tactics of 
nonviolence remains an influential ideal today. Until its demise in 1988, MNS grew from its 
roots in Quaker direct action networks to establish a national presence as a network of feminist 
radical pacifist collectives. From Cornell, we hear that  
 MNS popularized consensus decision-making, introduced the spokescouncil 
method of organization to radicals in the United States, and was a leading advocate 
of a variety of practices — such as communal living, unlearning oppressive 
behaviour, and creating cooperatively owned businesses — that are now often 
subsumed under the rubric of prefigurative politics.   107
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The discourses of consensus tell us that our culture does not teach us to be capable of interacting 
in these nonviolent manners, so consensus is supposed to serve as a radical method of changing 
these values, habits, and beliefs so that people can begin to re-learn how they may become equal 
in political organization. The project of prefigurative politics is not simply, however, an “ethical” 
process. It requires that people learn new technical skills and develop different practical and 
strategic capacities. I am studying the discourses presented largely by pedagogical manuals that 
aim to teach consensus decision-making as a technical method, and these sources 
(understandably) tend to emphasize the processes of learning as a key to the success of 
prefigurative political goals. For instance, the Rhizome guide emphasizes that “consensus is an 
upward spiral. No group has all the attitudes and skills needed to do perfect consensus. But the 
struggle to use consensus well helps to build those attitudes and skills so that bit by bit the group 
achieves new heights, overcomes new struggles, deepens its understanding.”   108
  
(1.3.2) Contentious Politics (the Right Hand of Dual Power) 
The pedagogical focus of prefigurative politics is necessarily instrumental as well as ethical: a 
technical method to make egalitarian, inclusive, participatory, anti-authoritarian, and non-violent 
decisions that is at the same time a cultural modality to make egalitarian, inclusive, participatory, 
anti-authoritarian, and non-violent people. Marianne Maeckelbergh reinforces this notion when 
arguing that “prefiguration is something that people do... the alternative 'world' is not 
predetermined: it is developed through practice and it is different everywhere.”  The reason I 109
introduce the relation between ethics and practice into this discussion of pedagogy is because it 
highlights the often ignored and downplayed side to any prefigurative politics. Prefiguring a new 
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way of politics is necessarily always also a fight because it has to struggle against the ruling 
politics that is already ingrained in our beliefs, habits, and practices. We emphasize the 
prefiguring process of asserting our vision of an alternative world, but that can only come 
through the contentious struggle to overthrow the enemy who controls this world. Thus, the 
duality between pedagogical prefiguration and contentious struggle has to be treated as an 
essential bond of radical politics.  
Joshua Kahn Russell’s blog Praxis Makes Perfect is devoted to collecting strategic resources 
for social movement mobilization, asserting its tagline with a quote from Paolo Friere that 
captures this spirit and purpose: “What can we do today, so that tomorrow we are able to do what 
we are unable to do today?”  While noting the importance of participatory democracy for 21st 110
century anarchism, Cindy Milstein points out that egalitarian decision-making  
 is not something that people in most parts of the world are encouraged or taught to 
do, most pointedly because it contains the kernel of destroying the current vertical 
social arrangements. As such, we’re generally neither particularly good nor 
efficient at directly democratic processes. But through them, people school 
themselves in what could be the basis for collective self-governance, for 
redistributing power to everyone.   111
By “schooling ourselves” to become better at collective self-governance we are struggling 
against the grain of our already-ingrained schooling, which has focused largely on how to act in 
hierarchical arrangements of governance. As Milstein notes, this is not something we are 
encouraged or taught to do — because we are encouraged and taught to do the opposite. We are 
schooled in the habits of authoritarian obedience and competitive individualism. These are skills 
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too, not just ethics. And so we will have to un-learn them in the process of learning their 
alternatives.  
 Take, for another case, the Rhizome guide’s point that “consensus is an explicitly non-
hierarchical egalitarian process. That’s what it says on the box, and as such it attracts users who 
already have a commitment to behaving in that way. Of course we don’t always live up to our 
ideals and most of us are brought up with competitive relationships being the norm.”  This 112
statement implies that to learn consensus as a set of beliefs and practices for radical democratic 
practices will require unlearning a different set of beliefs and practices. We must not only school 
ourselves, we must re-school ourselves. In order to re-school ourselves for nonhierarchical social 
arrangements, we will have to fight ourselves, challenge who we are, change what we do. In his 
manual for consensus, anarchist activist and writer Peter Gelderloos claims that “in building our 
resistance, we need to resist our own authoritarian habits. In empowering ourselves, we need to 
become familiar with social power that is based on equality, not exploitation. We need to learn 
consensus.”  These comments show how the discourse of prefigurative politics frames 113
consensus as a counter-pedagogy to the standardized and normative modes of “authoritarian 
habits” which presently rule. Gelderloos continues: “an explicit consensus process serves as a 
crutch or bridge which intentionally reinforces the learning of consensus until a new, 
cooperative, anti-authoritarian society provides that reinforcement as a matter of course.”  114
A counter-pedagogy like this may have a prefigurative focus, but it is also necessarily a 
challenge, a struggle, a fight. As Brandon Grey, a participant in Occupy Toronto, reflects: “we’d 
be fooling ourselves if we thought that by a snap of the fingers we could create a new society 
here in the park. […] We’re still struggling in the old society, and that means racism, sexism, 
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ableism, homophobia and transphobia.”  The process of transformative prefigurative politics is 115
always also a hegemonic activity, always a conflict; always a fight against who we are, who we 
were, and who others want to make us be. To be truly effective in its goals, prefigurative politics 
must also be contentious politics.  
I am working here with the meaning of contentious politics articulated by social movements 
scholars Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, as a political engagement which “involves interactions 
in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts 
on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, 
initiators of claims, or third parties.”  The only part of that definition that I wish to expand on 116
slightly would be the last element, involving “governments.” Contentious politics shall often 
involve governments as “targets, initiators of claims, or third parties,” but they needn’t 
necessarily. It is a practice performed by a group of people who want to change society in some 
way, the basic practice of a “social movement” as contentious collective action to “move” 
society. A social movement strives to move the social: to push around, rearrange, and redeploy 
the system of prevailing social institutions. The move does not need to be directed at 
governments, but could just as well be aimed at moving economic conditions, or at moving 
social relations of gender, or at reconfiguring race relations, and so on.  
The contentious aspects of a social movement means that it does require an antagonist, an 
enemy, or a combatant: someone or group or system that must be moved. For a broader scope of 
reference concerning contentious action, we can recall Alberto Melucci’s basic definition of a 
social movement (to which I referred earlier in this chapter): “first, a social movement is a form 
of collective action which involves solidarity, that is, actors’ mutual recognition that they are part 
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of a single social unit. A second characteristic of a social movement is its engagement in conflict, 
and thus in opposition to an adversary who lays claim to the same goods or values.”  117
Expressing the importance of a radical democratic counter-pedagogy, Jamie Heckert calls upon 
the words of Ursula LeGuin to remember that “all of us have to learn how to invent our lives, 
make them up, imagine them. We need to be taught these skills; we need guides to show us how. 
If we don’t, our lives get made up for us by other people.”  The work we do on ourselves is 118
always a struggle of some kind against the work that others would do to us, and social 
movements are a struggle to define a social order by dual power, inside and outside. 
!
(1.3.3) Radical Democracy and Direct Action (Both Hands Now) 
In order to balance the two poles of “being radical,” anarchist praxis has to manage the tension 
between building equality in social organizations and challenging inequality in social 
organizations. The Seeds for Change manual expresses the appeal of consensus as a way to do 
this. Metaphorically calling the process a “seedling” which must be carefully nurtured into a full-
grown social system, they say that “the alternatives to the current system are already here, 
growing in the gaps between the paving stones of state authority and corporate control. We only 
need to learn to recognise them for the seedlings of the different kind of society that they are.”  119
Such grandiose prefigurative sentiments are common to the rhetoric of consensus, indicating in 
no uncertain terms that consensus has been developed as a vision that is deeply rooted as a 
radical democratic ideal means of “being the change we wish to see in the world.” But if those 
seedlings of a new society are “growing in the gaps between the paving stones,” as the Seeds for 
Change vision puts it, we also have to realize that no matter how much we may “recognize” 
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them, no matter how much we may nurture and train them and nurse them and care for them: 
they are still stuck between paving stones, with no room to grow; they are still going to get 
trampled by rush hour traffic. Without fighting back, without ripping up the pavement and 
contentiously staking out more space to protect those seedlings, they won’t stand a chance. 
 To be an effective technique of dual power for anarchist social movements, the prefigurative 
political focus of the consensus process must ally with its “radical twin,” the other side of the 
coin that we flip in our regular meaning evoked by calling on ourselves to be “radical.” As Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels once said that “in revolutionary activity the changing of oneself 
coincides with the changing of circumstances.”  This idea combining the prefigurative and the 120
contentious can be accessed through many approaches, but one of the most persistent concepts 
that has influenced contemporary anarchist praxis is the notion of dual power. It’s a strange 
lineage, too, since it crosses over from the work of Vladimir Illych Lenin, the distinctly non-
anarchist leader of the 1917 Bolshevik communist revolution in Russia, who became one of the 
European anarchist tradition’s most volatile rivals. Lenin first employed this term as a way to 
describe the special conditions that existed to empower the Russian revolution, using the notion 
to illustrate that “alongside the Provisional Government, the government of the bourgeoisie, 
another government has arisen, so far weak and incipient, but undoubtedly a government that 
actually exists and is growing — the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.”  This “other 121
government” created a situation of “dual power” because it instigated a challenge to the existing 
ruling state of bourgeois government, not by overtaking control of that official institution, but by 
producing its own institution from-below. The Soviets posed an alternative power, thus creating a 
condition of “dual power.” The distinctive features of this “other government” was in its 
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revolutionary purpose and potential, which, according to Lenin’s depiction, was distinct in its 
external aims (it was “a power based directly on revolutionary seizure” ) and also in its internal 122
composition (it was “the direct initiative of the people from below” ).  123
 Much later, revived poignantly by a North American revolutionary anarchist tradition of the 
1980s and 90s, the idea of dual power has been rejuvenated in a different context, but with the 
same idea at heart. Writing for the American anarchist federation Love and Rage — a loose 
networking organization which developed anarchist connections across the continent from 
1989-1998 — Christopher Day and San Christobal explain that 
 in the broadest sense of the term, dual power refers to situations in which a) 
parallel structures of governance have been created that exist side-by-side with old 
official state structures and that b) these alternative structures compete with the 
state structures for the allegiance of the people and that c) the old state is unable to 
crush these alternative structures, at least for a period of time.  124
A project of dual power is at the heart of consensus when it is treated as a method of group 
decision-making that can be used by activists to fight for radical equality in the world while at 
the same time providing those activists with a model of interaction which can model the way 
they envision performing group decision-making in a radically egalitarian world. Anarchist 
activist and author Chris Crass (who worked intensely with the development of the Food Not 
Bombs movement in the 1990s) echoes that basic idea, saying that “the strategy of dual power 
means that oppressed people can simultaneously organize themselves to fight against the state, 
and create democratic institutions that prefigure the new forms of social organization of a 
socialist state.”  125
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 To find this notion of dual power at work in the organizations who have historical promoted 
consensus, we can look back to the critical influence of the Movement for a New Society (MNS). 
MNS first emerged as an offshoot of the anti-war mobilization organization A Quaker Action 
Group (AQAG), as the project of a few members who believed that that Quaker principles 
required increasing their investment in radical political strategies. As Andrew Cornell reports, 
“AQAG presented a proposal to the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) in March of 
1971, arguing that the times, and Quaker principles, called for a broad program to combat 
ecological devastation, militarism, ‘corporate capitalism,’ racism and sexism.”  At that meeting, 126
an appeal was made to radicalize both prefigurative and contentious politics of AQAG.  
 We hope to catalyze a movement for a new society, which will feature a vision of 
the new society, and how to get there; a critical analysis of the American political-
economic system; a focus on expanding the consciousness and organizing the 
commitment of the middle class toward fundamental change through nonviolent 
struggle, often in concert with other change movements; the organization and 
development of nonviolent revolutionary groups and life centers as bases for 
sustained struggle on the local as well as national and international levels; training 
for non-violent struggle; and a program rooted in changed lives and changed 
values.  127
Drawing also on an American tradition of secular socialist pacifism, the recorded statement from 
that meeting exclaims the doubly radical intention of dual power: to challenge established social 
order while also developing new forms of social organization in the process.  
Their motion did not pass, but after that meeting MNS emerged as an independent 
organization that would be devoted to pursuing, well, a “movement for a new society.” The 
founding members of MNS had come of age through the civil rights movements of the 1960s, 
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combining influences from anarchism, feminism, and the Quakers to build a particular blend of 
anarchist dual power that would become quite influential to the developing ideological 
sentiments surrounding consensus decision-making. Betsy Raasch-Gilman, a longtime member 
of MNS, recounts that organization’s goal in step with the balance of dual power:  
 If we’re going to create a power vacuum, if we’re going to take down a structure 
or system, we have to have something ready to go into its place. Because if there is 
a power vacuum, a counterrevolution will start immediately. That’s a given. We 
have to have something that puts the system in place that we really want to live in. 
Whether that’s a government or a nongovernmental system, we still have to have 
the pieces ready to put into effect and in place.  128
Here, Raasch-Gilman expresses the overarching goal of anarchist revolutionary politics as a way 
of trying to make its prefigurative goals develop in tandem with its contentious goals, 
consciously formulated as a combined practice requiring what she calls “parallel institutions.” 
Increasingly for anarchist, feminist, environmental, and social justice movements since the early 
1980s, consensus has been one of the most common and central “parallel institutions” of dual 
power. 
Chris Crass has said that “the tension in anarchist strategy, then, has been one of determining 
how to practice liberatory politics in ways that positively impacts those involved and still has 
real positive impacts for short-term and long-term gains in society.”  In the North American 129
anarchist traditions which inform today’s articulation of consensus decision-making, the balance 
of that dual power has been most clearly engaged by the task of building parallel institutions 
bonded with direct action. When David Graeber reflects that “the original inspiration of Occupy 
Wall Street was the tradition not just of direct democracy, but of direct action,”  he means to 130
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point out that Occupy thrived best when it was treated by participants as both a prefigurative and 
a contentious practice, as an activity with a praxis of radical dual power at heart. Uri Gordon 
works with a summary definition of direct action that perfectly fits the dual mode of “radical” as 
“a dual strategy of confrontation to delegitimise the system and grassroots alternative-building 
from below.”  A movement enacts “direct action” to interrupt the flows of orderly normal 131
business as a way to present an alternative possibility into the structures of American life. 
Parallel institutions aim to build alternative processes that could support the type of system the 
movement aims to institute. Basically, direct action is a contentious political strategy to get in the 
way of business as usual, while parallel institutions are the prefigurative political strategy of how 
to operate an alternative, better mode of “business as usual.”  
 As I have recounted, through its use in large-scale occupations and blockades to deter nuclear 
plant constructions consensus became integral to a wave of activism in the late 1970s that was 
known as “the direct action movement.” From the beginning, organizers in this movement had a 
prefigurative political goal at heart, and placed at least as much emphasis on empowering the 
prefigurative as the contentious aims of their politics. As Barbara Epstein put it, “the direct 
action movement has been about cultural revolution, its aim not only to transform political and 
economic structures but to bring to social relations as a whole the values of egalitarianism and 
nonviolence.”  The aims of fostering change through “cultural revolution” were among the 132
main ideal purposes of consensus decision-making in the 1970s, and they remain primary today. 
Likewise, Noël Sturgeon reflects on her involvement in the direct action movement by pointing 
out that “the political theory of the movement is not just a reflection of, and resistance to, 
contemporary structures of power but also a continuance and critique of the American radical 
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democratic tradition, particularly the sixties movements that are the direct action movement’s 
most immediate ancestors.”  133
 The Clamshell Alliance, founded in 1976, was developed as a network of autonomous 
affinity groups focused on resisting and stopping the construction of a nuclear power plant in 
Seabrook, New Hampshire. The small group of original alliance members adopted consensus 
early on, inheriting the formalities of the model from members were directly linked with the 
direct action traditions of Quakers and the Movement for a New Society (MNS). As reported by 
L. A. Kauffman,  
 the organizers of “the Clam,” as it was often called, were eager to find a process 
that could prevent the pitfalls of structurelessness, without resorting to hierarchy. 
Two staff people from the American Friends Service Committee, the longstanding 
and widely admired peace and justice organization affiliated with the Society of 
Friends, or Quakers, suggested consensus.   134
The Clam implemented a strictly consensus-based decision-making method, under instruction 
and support provided by the MNS "monster manual” that functioned (first for better, and then, 
also ultimately, for worse) to make decisions for large groups of people. Its first major direct 
action was a sit-in at the construction site, during which fourteen hundred people were arrested 
and held at nearby armouries for two full weeks. During their stay in prison, members continued 
to effectively maintain collective solidarity concerning demands and responses to the authorities, 
largely aided, many participants would later affirm, by the consensus process. In the meantime, it 
was successfully delaying the construction plans of the Seabrook plant.   
 Excited by their early success, people began to treat the Clamshell Alliance like a supermodel 
for further anti-nuclear direct action campaigns across the continent. The Clamshell Alliance was 
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particularly influential because it was a successful large-scale demonstration of the dual power 
potency in consensus decision-making — it provided a means of developing prefigurative 
equality among a vast group of diverse members while at the same time clearly articulating a 
special tool to empower the contentious struggle to stop the power plants. Hence, when 
describing the Clamshell Alliance in dual power terms as both an opponent and an opposition to 
the social, economic, and political structures of mainstream America, Gary Downey is 
expressing the common ideal of dual power which so enthused participants.  
 As its opponent, the Alliance was an instrumental actor, actively working to stop 
nuclear power and overcome domination. As its opposite, the Alliance was an 
egalitarian organization, a collectively of equal citizens seeking to avoid 
propagating domination through its own actions. The Alliance thus fought 
domination on both the outside and the inside.   135
The Clamshell Alliance became a particularly influential flashpoint for consensus decision-
making, demonstrating both the possible benefits and the dangers inherent in the process. At 
first, the alliance found great success in its strict use of consensus, but soon became mired in 
endless tactical debates due to that same ideological strictness, bogged down by internal strife to 
the point that nothing could get done. The Clamshell model spread quickly to become the go-to 
decision-making process for a burgeoning anti-nuclear movement, spawning related 
organizations across North America. On the West-Coast, the Abalone Alliance was responsible 
for several successful mobilizations against nuclear power. The same template, drawn originally 
from the Clamshell Alliance, was presented as the central decision-making process in the direct 
action blockade/encampment handbook used at Diablo Canyon in 1981, at the Livermore 
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Weapons Lab in 1982, for the International Day of Nuclear Disarmament in 1983, and during the 
Pledge of Resistance actions in 1986.    136
 By the mid-1980a the antinuclear direct action movement had exposed a generation of 
activists to the direct action, feminist, peace movement, and anarchist tradition of consensus 
decision-making, sowing enough seeds that the process thereafter became distinctly associated 
with a resurgence of North American anarchist-activist culture. One of these seed grew into the 
particularly influential consensus guide On Conflict and Consensus. Published in 1987 by C.T. 
Butler and Amy Rothstein, this manual articulated a more formal and defined set of rules and 
regulations than those which had often been employed in the direct action movement. Explicitly 
and importantly, the authors emphasized their method as a process of Formal Consensus. The 
emphasis on “formal” is distinctive because the manual was intended to correct perceived 
problems with “informal” versions of consensus, problems which the authors had experienced 
first hand in their activism. As Butler recalls from his experience in the antinuclear direct action 
movements of the early 1980s,  
 for almost two years the process of consensus worked well for the Pledge, 
empowering very large numbers of people to engage confidently in nonviolent 
direct action. The forerunner of the model of consensus outlined in this book was 
used throughout this period at spokesmeetings and, particularly well, at the weekly 
coordinators meetings. However, it was never systematically defined and written 
down or formally adopted.   137
Butler’s main purpose in developing a formal method of consensus was to respect the 
prefigurative political power in the process while trying to render it more adept at producing 
contentious political force.  
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 Through their involvement during the late 1980s with the anarchist group Food Not Bombs 
(FNB), Butler and Rothstein’s method of formal consensus was disseminated widely in North 
America, likely becoming the single most influential model for anarchist consensus process 
thereafter. FNB began in 1980 as a network of anti-nuclear activists in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, who wanted to provide free food to homeless and hungry people. The project 
took off quickly, and soon the organizational and procedural methods of FNB spread across 
hundreds of chapters in the U.S. and around the world. By the mid 1990s, FNB had become an 
iconic anarchist organization in North America, serving often as a gateway introduction to 
anarchist politics for young activists who came to it through progressive University and College 
campus-based activism, and the system of formal consensus spread along with FNB. 
 It is notable that Butler and Rothstein’s model removed itself somewhat more distinctly from 
the religious aspects of the earlier Quaker models, maintaining the ethical premises of 
antiauthoritarianism and nonviolence but subduing the religious and spiritual references that had 
still largely animated the direct action movement discourses. By the time consensus became fully 
assimilated into the anarchist political repertoire of the late 1990s and early 2000s alter-
globalization movement, any explicitly spiritual justifications would be decisively erased. It is at 
this point that someone like Chris Crass, an anarchist writer and activist who was particularly 
involved with the late 1980s and early 1990s growth of San Francisco’s FNB, could easily 
construe anarchism and consensus as if they had always been two peas in a pod:   
Consensus is a form of making decisions which is based on anarchist principles. 
Consensus is a decision making process that seeks to empower people to be able to 
participate in the shaping of and implementation of decisions made by the group. 
Consensus aims to create a non-hierarchical, anti-authoritarian, cooperative group 
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structure that decentralizes power and encourages collective participation and 
responsibility. Part of the struggle to create non-hierarchical organizations is to 
confront and eradicate racism, sexism, homophobia, and other forms of oppression 
and domination which privilege certain people, while keeping most people 
powerless and voiceless. Because we seek to create organizations — and 
eventually communities and societies — that empower people and create equality 
we must work against hierarchy. Anarchism and consensus go together like hot 
vegan soup and a good day-old bagel.  138
 The fact that Crass concludes his point with comparative reference to “hot vegan soup and a 
good day-old bagel” shows that he is contributing to a discourse which already presumes a small 
circle of shared cultural reference points within the traditions of anarchist activism. But, however 
obscure, these are anarchist references points hold the same relevance today.  
FNB introduces an era from the late 1990s through to the early 2000s in which anarchism had 
come to be virtually equated with consensus process. Among the manuals that I collected, the 
most commonly repeated diagrams and charts can be referred back to the original Formal 
Consensus sources, and it is apparent that many more short introductory guides are borrowing 
liberally from the same (such as those disseminated by the Public Interest Research Groups in 
Ontario, or as made available through small, usually anonymous, independent anarchist infoshop 
resources). This model was most widely acknowledged throughout the alter-globalization 
movement, finding its particular moment of flashpoint popularity in the fact that it was also used 
to organize mass resistance to the World Trade Organization meetings in Seattle, 1999. Echoing 
the experiences of the anti-nuclear movement, the adaptation of consensus to mass summit 
protest organizing proved to be a challenging and diverse task. Consensus has been applied far 
and wide during this time. On the one hand, it has worked as a means to organize among people 
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who may not know each other and may not immediately understand or share each other’s 
political expectations or goals in spokescouncils and large meetings at demonstration 
convergences, to coordinating movement organizations like the Direct Action Network, Anti-
Capitalist Convergence, Global Action Network, the Mobilization for Global Justice,  or 139
working collective like Indymedia.  And on the other hand, it also became an essential ideal for 140
small group anarchist decision-making, in collective such as bookstores, action groups, and 
community projects  to decide on general organization operations, as well as in affinity groups 141
and street demonstration tactics such as the black bloc, where it helps to determine course of 
action in situations that require the power of assured solidarity.   142
Scattered in exuberant directions the consensus process received another of its popularity 
boosts after the Seattle World Bank protests in 1999, becoming more and more prominent as the 
proper anti-authoritarian decision-making method for the growing alter-globalization movement 
of the early 2000s. During those years the ideals of anarchist dual power also enjoyed resurgence 
in the focus combination of direct action protest events and the prefigurative elements of 
egalitarian interaction, forged in the process that was bringing anarchist tactics and cultures to the 
forefront of North American new social movements.  Generally expressing the ongoing 143
anarchist dual power vision in the language of the anti-globalization movement, John Holloway 
asserted that “we are not just saying No to capital, we are developing a different concept of 
politics, constructing a different set of social relations, pre-figuring the society we want to 
build.”   144
The praxis of dual power anarchist radical democracy was, by most accounts, the animating 
spirit of the alter-globalization movement, its most defining and coordinating feature. The same 
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dual power spirit and consensus process was eventually handed down to the Occupy protestors 
who mounted their prominent campaign in the fall of 2011 and the winter of 2012.  As Occupy 145
Wall Street participant Manissa Maharawal told Al-Jazeera in the fall of 2012: “If you’re going 
to join Occupy, you have to get on board with horizontal decision-making. In my mind it’s the 
reason why this thing has grown so much. Its structure is what allows it to be something that is 
fairly inclusive.”  The fact in the Occupy camps people felt like they had the capacity to share 146
power their political process, rather than suffer under the power of predetermined political 
systems, was a stark contrast to most political experiences people had up to that point. This, in 
itself, was a strong reason for Occupy’s success, and it should be counted as a victory for dual 
power because it opened the door for people to begin to imagine a different mode of political 
interaction. 
Being able to get involved is, however, only the beginning of democratic dual power. How do 
people actually participate meaningfully once they’ve become involved? How does the group 
actually accomplish meaningful things from that involvement? Explaining the process at Occupy 
Wall Street, Justin Elliot explains some of these functions: 
The working groups were run by a consensus or consensus-based process. That 
means rather than just taking up or down votes, you strive to come to some kind of 
agreement, even if imperfect. So even if some people don’t feel fabulous about a 
decision, the vast majority of people will at least feel decent about it — instead of 
having 40 percent of the people hating the decision. There is also sometimes a 
facilitator who pays attention to power dynamics in the group: gender, 
marginalized voices, race and class.  147
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The occupy camps aimed to develop collective action structures which could engage people to 
have some involved control in various aspects of the group’s overall operations. Active attention 
to combating racism, sexism, classism, ablism, colonialism, and any other “ism” which 
contributes to systematic privileging of access to power is an important part of the commitment 
to encouraging radical anarchist dual power. 
When we hear Una Spenser say that the Occupy movement “is a protest, indeed, but it is also 
an offering,”  we should hear the ideal of “dual power.” As a “protest” it tries to cause radical 148
change in the systems of the world around it. As an “offering” it aims to conduct that radical 
change in a radically transformative prefigurative manner. The combination, together, can 
catalyze “an alternative way of addressing our societal need. That way is direct, participatory 
democracy where each person is equitable, responsible and fully accountable for the decisions 
we make about how to govern ourselves. That means getting down to work.”  Getting down to 149
work: the radical direct action of prefigurative and contentious democratic politics. The dual 
power project is a crucial, although often submerged, factor in the historical traditions and 
potential futures of consensus decision-making. It is with these potential futures in mind that I 
endeavour here to apply more critical attention to the way that consensus functions as a tool of 
radical democracy for anarchist dual power.  
Today, movements sharing in the vision of “another politics” (as Chris Dixon calls it) carry on 
the anarchist dual power praxis of radical democracy and consensus decision-making. The best 
articulations of consensus decision-making can still instigate the dual power of radically 
democratic parallel institutions and direct action, as an alternative and an opposition; as the 
possibility of really getting down to the “roots” of what democracy is supposed to accomplish 
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while challenging other elements of society to do the same. These are the traditions of consensus 
that I am addressing in my work. All these thoughts on radical democracy, power, and consensus 
decision-making are built up as a service to movements that still strive to articulate dual power 
praxis. As Dixon says, “when we consciously link ‘against’ and ‘beyond’ in our organizing, we 
create possibilities for collective action that fundamentally challenges what is while practically 
building what we want. This dyad, the two aspects intentionally fused together, is the core 
promise of another politics.”   150
!
(1.4) Empowering Anarchist Radical Democratic Dual Power 
In this chapter I have tracked the modern North American history of the consensus process by 
following a theoretical account of its spirit and ideals. In structuring my account this way, I aim 
to highlight the way that I am not only interested with the technical aspects of its practices, nor 
simply with a detailed story of its purposes, but most specifically I am looking to depict the way 
that people have variously championed and struggled with the purposes built into its practices. 
As a practice of radical democracy performed for the projects of anarchist dual power, the 
consensus process starkly manifests important conceptual and idealistic complexities that are 
inherent in the vision of dual power. This complication is itself, sometimes, a hindrance to 
movement effectiveness and innovations. In particular, I will argue that the task of radical 
participatory democratic dual power which animates the spirit of consensus decision-making has 
had trouble due to its reliance on the standard anarchist concepts of power according to which its 
successes and failures tend to be evaluated. By detailing the concepts of power and democracy 
that are written into manuals and histories of the consensus process, I am focusing on 
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representing a discursive picture of the ideas about dual power praxis which must be challenged 
by the alternative theory of power which I shall present in this project.  
 In the tradition of North American new social movements, how does the historical articulation 
of radical democracy and dual power affect the deployment of power within the particular 
deliberative technique that is consensus decision-making? One especially egregious and glaring 
problem occurs when the dual power prerogative is split apart in such a way that people begin to 
treat it as a mutually exclusive option, and activists are encouraged to act as though they must 
choose between a prefigurative faction and a contentious faction. I’ve seen this happen again and 
again, and it’s always a bad sign. 
 Down at Occupy Toronto, I once met a guy who told me: “we’re all equal here!” I’ve met 
“this guy” before. He believes in a grand utopian vision of radical democratic equality, and he 
believes that we can make it happen right here, right now. We can “be the change.” “All you 
need is love,” he sings. He’s onto something, abstractly. But he’s definitely dead wrong, for real 
and for right now. By radiating such a smug faith in equality, this guy smothers our ability to 
transform real and present inequalities. He’s the champion for only one side of the radical 
duality, idolizing prefigurative politics in a way that all too often ends up shrivelling the capacity 
for direct action, retracting the movement into a self-important and insular caricature of 
egalitarian culture. 
Down at Occupy Toronto, there’s another guy who’ll tell you: “all this preoccupation with 
making sure ‘we’re all equal here’ is dragging us down.” He too believes in a grand vision of 
radical democratic equality, but he thinks there’s too much self-obsessed concern with the 
processes of equality, it’s really just a waste of energy, and we should be organizing primarily for 
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the sake of pragmatic gains, to change the bigger picture, to beat the system. He says it’s going to 
take a long hard struggle. It’s going to take “blood, sweat, and tears.” “Fight the power,” he 
shouts. He’s onto something, abstractly. But he’s also way wrong, for real and for right now. By 
refusing to engage usefully with the difficult challenge of creating equality in our own 
organizations, this guy also smothers our ability to transform real and present inequalities. He’s 
the champion for the other side of the radical duality, idolizing contentious politics in a way that 
all too often ends up discouraging parallel institutions, pushing the movement into just another 
machine for a renewed mode of violent control.  
 Sometime long ago, during a long long meeting, taking part somewhere along the line of this 
long long long political tradition, I first had to listen to these guys commandeer a discussion with 
their counter-blabber. I bet we’ve all had to listen to these guys blab at one point or another. 
Some of us have been these guys (I sincerely apologize: it’s been me at least a few times, for 
sure). They’re usually the type of guys who never shut up. And they’re everywhere. So we also 
tend to get used to them; we try to tune them out, and we keep on carrying on. I remember that 
first moment, though, when I suddenly recognized the debilitating inanity of their ideological 
jousting match. I remember how they distracted the rest of the group from actually doing 
anything, the way we got stuck in our own self-defeating discourses when those guys took over 
and polarized the entire conversation.  
We should call them Scylla and Charybdis, those mythical Greek monsters faced by 
Odysseus: steer away from one, and you’re doomed to the other. Choosing between Scylla the 
narcissistic utopian and Charybdis the hardened strategist is a dilemma particularly deeply 
ingrained in the traditions of consensus. As put by the title of a polemic piece circulated in 
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Occupy, most people are content to ask “to consense or not to consense?,” presuming the issue 
will rise or fall a dichotomous all-or-nothing hinge. This approach gets some people pronouncing 
consensus as “the most democratic of all forms of decision-making for it negotiates conflict 
without the use of force,”  while others detract that it is “the absolute worst idea that has ever 151
been introduced to the activist community.”  The schism between yay and nay concerning the 152
value of consensus is, very importantly, an integral aspect of its practice. For a long time now, 
this hard-edged opposition has drawn the battle lines within anarchist consensus process. Against 
those in Occupy who treated the consensus process as a revolutionary practice in itself, “critics 
blame consensus decision making for contributing to the unnecessarily gruelling and drawn out 
nature of OWS meetings, and a serious impediment towards growing the movement beyond 
activist circles.”  Just as it has gathered historical momentum to become the truly revolutionary 153
path for some people, consensus has also accumulated opponents along the way who claim that it 
stands directly in the way of the truly revolutionary path. When we grandstand for prefigurative 
politics or contentious politics we split our passions down the middle. Facing Scylla or 
Charybdis, we are forced to choose between two monstrous versions of certain doom.  
The tension between these two radical ends of dual power is definitely not unique to 
consensus. In North American social movements today it comes trailing along with a long train 
of baggage. As Francesca Polletta has pointed out in her historical study of democracy in 20th 
century American social movements, the schism has resurfaced again and again where 
“democratic ‘purists’ and ‘pragmatists’ have battled for control of organizations, with each side 
claiming its own version of what truly democratic deliberation requires.”  Over many decades 154
of social movement analysis concerning radical democratic politics in North America, this 
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particular way of framing the problem has resurfaced in various guises. For instance, when C. 
Wayne Gordon and Nicholas Babchuk investigated voluntary organizations in the 1950s they 
highlighted a key contrast between expressive versus instrumental goals.  That is, again, 155
expressive goals which would focus on a prefigurative challenge to the group’s own behaviours, 
versus instrumental goals which would focus on achieving contentious gains in the political 
arena. In Wini Breines’ study of the 1960s New Left she observes a prevalent dichotomy which 
divided that movement between prefigurative versus strategic aims.  Paul Starr’s discussion of 156
the politics of cooperatives and communes in the 1960s and 1970s deployed a framework that 
distinguished between groups with exemplary versus adversary orientations.  Each of these 157
binaries is but a different set of names for “those two guys” and the repetition of their endless 
argument. The traditions of radical democracy are all too often staged according to the demand 
that we choose these sides in absolute terms (“to consense or not to consense?”), demanding a 
stark and final either/or allegiance (“either you’re with us or you’re against us”).  
Why so binary? How do we keep giving up the stage to those two guys? What premises and 
problems, what conditions and characters, what strategies and ethics keep getting us so stuck on 
this duel? No strong line between prefigurative idealism and pragmatic realism needs to be 
drawn, and we should never need to give up the floor to this filibustering blustering. When a 
certain problem happens over and over, there’s something deeply wrong in the productive, 
generative mode of its inter-actions. There’s more at play than tactical demands and analytic 
clarity — this is an ideological problematic, the repetition of a trauma, a symptom of something 
stuck in our collective political psyche. A popular adage comes to mind: “insanity is doing 
something over and over again and expecting different results.”  People like to quote that one, 158
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from Albert Einstein. While we’re calling upon cultural tropes, might as well go the distance and 
remember that it’s also Einstein who famously said “we cannot solve our problems with the same 
thinking we used when we created them.”   159
So my quest(ion) for the anarchist radical democratic dual power project of consensus 
decision-making is this: how can we begin to deal with these problems better by thinking 
differently about what “power” means in the composition of dual power praxis? 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Chapter 2) Surveying Anarchist Power Theory  
!
In the first chapter I outlined how consensus decision-making has been conceptualized in the 
new social movements according to anarchist ideals of radical participatory democracy and dual 
power. In order to lay the groundwork upon which I shall develop my critical interventions, this 
chapter will now deal with the concepts of power which are common in those same anarchist and 
consensus decision-making discourses. 
 In the anarchist traditions of consensus decision-making there is a popular model of power 
that is based on distinguishing between power-to, power-over, and power-with. In this chapter I 
will first address how these terms are used in both anarchist thought and the mainstream 
traditions of 20th century North American social and political thought. The anarchist and the 
scholarly traditions of power theory share many key elements, presumptions, and axioms, which 
I label as an agency perspective on power. The agency perspective treats power as a matter of 
causal influence among individual agents who strive to change one another’s behaviours. In the 
agency perspective, power-to posits the innate basic capacity of agents as an outcome power or 
cause-ability. Power in general is conceived as the originating in individual agency, to which any 
further analysis of social power relations is referenced. This sense of power-to represents an 
essential capacity for action, agency, and freedom, and is treated as basically good. Power-over 
represents the general idea of coercive influence, social power, control-ability: the application of 
power-to by some agents as a means of controlling the power-to of other agents. This sense of 
power-over represents the general idea of arche, the basically evil enemy of an-archist ethics. 
When expressed through the agency perspective, the anarchist ideas of power-to, power-over, 
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and power-with tend to be built upon the following two axiomatic premises:  
 Agency Perspective Axiom #1: Power-to is the capacity for individual agents to act in the 
world; this power-to is the original source of power in general.  
 Agency Perspective Axiom #2: Power-over is a derivative articulation of original power-to 
applied as a means of controlling the power-to of others.  
The third concept in the set is power-with, which is defined by the anarchist tradition as a 
communicative, rational, and democratic means of egalitarian influence. It is the capacity to 
generate collective action through participatory deliberative equality, a conduct power, or 
communic-ability. This form of power is normatively valued as good because it provides the 
political alternative to systemic power-over and motivates the anarchist politics of dual power in 
radical democracy.  
 The agency perspective is the most common perspective taken by both anarchist and liberal 
democratic approaches of North American power theory, but it is not the only available 
perspective, and, in fact, it can only be coherently defined with reference to its main theoretical 
antagonist: the structure perspective on power. In order to better understand how the agency 
perspective treats power-to, power-over, and power-with, I will contrast the agency perspective 
axioms with two equivalent structure perspective axioms.  
 Structure Perspective Axiom #1: Power-over is the capacity for a social system to control the 
actions of its members; this power-over is the original source of power in general.  
 Structure Perspective Axiom #2: Power-to is an effect of original power-over which is caused 
by subjection of individual agents according to the demands and requirements of their social 
systemic incorporation. 
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I will elaborate on important differences between the agency perspective and structure 
perspective by detailing, on the one hand, the “three faces of power” tradition as an exemplary 
case of the agency perspective, and, on the other hand, influential social theorists such as Talcott 
Parsons, Jeffrey Isaacs, and Michel Foucault as common representatives of a structure 
perspective.  
 All of chapter 2 is a survey, an assessment of the situation as it stands. My own theoretical 
interventions must then work on these conceptual contexts by trying to find a new way of cutting 
across a very deeply entrenched dichotomy that is usually presumed to separate the agency and 
the structure perspective. My purpose in breaking down the vast array of diverse power theories 
into these two starkly opposes categories is to represent a key theoretical chasm which defines 
the topic broadly. The distinction between the two perspectives is a method of coding general 
theoretical approaches, and is not meant as a definitive analysis concerning any of the specific 
theorists represented. Certainly, there is more detail in each option than I will be able to articulate 
here. Instead, I want to outline the looming dichotomous conflict that still hangs over most social 
and political thought about power.  
 In explicit theorizations about power, we are still largely stuck on the rusty axis of agency 
versus structure. Is there room for a third option that isn’t stuck on this dichotomous axis 
between agency and structure? That will be the main question for chapter 3, where I will focus 
on exploring how a conduct perspective focused on power-with can get off that axis and provide 
better solutions to the common contradictions which hinder agency/structure power theories. The 
conceptual axiomatic premises of power which I survey in this chapter fixate on distinguishing 
between good forms of power and bad forms of power, relying on a hard dichotomy between 
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agency versus structure theories. The hard line of these theoretical perspectives offer some useful 
viewpoints, but the hard lines tend to cause fixations and blockages in praxis. The opposition 
between agency and structure perspectives does not produce the kind of flexible analytical tools 
that the anarchist radical democratic project so desperately needs. I think a different theoretical 
approach that I will call the conduct perspective on power is much more capable of mobilizing 
dual power with an integrated critique of power that involves both the internal and external 
relations of collective action systems. The concept of power-with plays an important role in 
anarchist power theory, but it has been treated largely as a normative intervention of democratic, 
rational, and communal modes of agentic influence, according to the axioms of the agency 
perspective. It has been less seriously engaged as a crucial theoretical component of 
understanding how power works in general. In order to improve the analytical capacities of 
anarchist praxis, we should put more effort toward developing a conduct perspective based on 
the general concept of power-with. 
!
(2.1) The Theory of Power and the Power of Theory 
The colloquial use of the English word “power” expresses a startling range of intensely 
contradictory meanings. Consider, for example, the difference between these two popular 
political slogans: “power to the people” and “fight the power.” Both are liable to be heard at the 
same rally, read on placards side-by-side, but these two sayings would be contradictory if they 
referenced the same “power.” “Power to the people to fight the power?” — that’s nonsense. 
There must clearly be some commonly accepted distinction between “power to the people” and 
“fight the power.”  
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 I think that there is an important theoretical clue in this equivocal confusion because it reflects 
something about how  the concepts of power actually work in normal everyday thought. It is 
important to take ordinary language seriously as reflecting general conditions of social reality. As 
J. L. Austin has said, “ordinary language is not the last word: in principle it can everywhere be 
supplemented and improved upon and superseded. Only remember, it is the first word.”  So 160
what is the first word about power? The popular source Dictionary.com currently lists seven 
references for “power:”  
1. ability to do or act; capability of doing or accomplishing something. 
2. political or national strength: the balance of power in Europe. 
3. great or marked ability to do or act; strength; might; force. 
4. the possession of control or command over others; authority; ascendancy: power 
over men's minds. 
5. political ascendancy or control in the government of a country, state, etc.: They 
attained power by overthrowing the legal government. 
6. legal ability, capacity, or authority: the power of attorney. 
7. delegated authority; authority granted to a person or persons in a particular 
office or capacity: the powers of the president.  161
The first words on power seem clear enough, but only because we silently attribute clarifying 
contexts that render some of their meanings quite distinct from the others, and if we pry even a 
little bit we will find our assumptions about “power” are hiding a confusing tangle of terms.  
 In most English-language applications, colloquially as well as in the social sciences, “power” 
is so prolifically symbolic that it supports a whole family of related concepts. As political 
philosopher Hannah Arendt once said, it is “a rather sad reflection on the present state of political 
science that our terminology does not distinguish among such key words as ‘power’, ‘strength’, 
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‘force’, ‘authority’, and, finally, ‘violence’ – all of which refer to distinct, different phenomena 
and would hardly exist unless they did.”  While there have certainly been many attempts at 162
clarifying the issue since Arendt’s sad reflection, the concept of power is still mostly used rather 
thoughtlessly in the regular discourse of social and political studies. There is literally a confused 
contradiction in the discursive deployments of ‘power:’ wherein dichotomously antagonistic 
opposed meanings (contra-dictions) are stuck together (con-fused) in the same word. What does 
this suggest about the range of concepts that we tie together within the topic of “power?” I think 
we can improve on a theoretical model of power that takes these contradictory connections more 
seriously than has previously been attempted.  
First of all, I think there is an important clue in the very fact that power covers so much range 
as a confused and contradictory concept, that it can mean both power-to and power-over at the 
same time, and that theorists can call up systems in which it represents the very essence of both 
individual freedom and agency or social structure and subjection. How can we even begin parse 
out the conflict between these polar problematics? Power is one of those massive concepts in the 
social sciences that shoots through almost every other idea in the canon. Anthony Giddens is 
emphatic on this point: “the study of power cannot be regarded as a second-order consideration 
in the social sciences. Power cannot be tacked on, as it were, after the more basic concepts of 
social science have been formulated. There is no more elemental concept than that of power.”  163
Bertrand Russell opened his own study of the topic with a similarly bold assertion that “the 
fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in which Energy is the 
fundamental concept in physics.”  He goes on to say that “power, like energy, must be regarded 164
as continually passing from any one of its forms into any other, and it should be the business of 
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social science to seek the laws of such transformations.”  Also very much like the concept of 165
energy, the concept of power can work to define and describe almost everything else, yet is itself 
a strange and elusive mystery. Mark Haugaard and Stewart Clegg have emphasized this point 
with regard to the study of power, showing that modern social and political philosophies often 
employ concepts of ‘power’ that are both essentially vague and vaguely essential – that is, the 
concept is ‘essentially vague’ when it is nebulously defined, and ‘vaguely essential’ when it also 
plays a fundamental but unclear role in larger structures of thought.   166
Political theorist Steven Lukes represents the concept of power as an “essentially contested 
concept,” basically because the way that it is understood and depicted in political theory is, as he 
says, “ineradicably evaluative.”  Since the concept is so fundamental to the theoretical 167
architecture of all social and political systems of thought, it tends to shifts along with the 
fundamental differences in evaluative perspective that accord with each different system of 
thought. Hence, to the extent that the concept of power does get clarified, it will mean something 
specific to each problematic, taking on an essentially contested distinction equivalent to 
distinction between systems themselves. So, for instance, Marxist theory and Durkheimian 
theory will produce essentially distinct concepts of power which may work for each system but 
will not necessarily be reconcilable with each other. Those two systems of thought have different 
purposes, different projects, and different powers. They evaluate the world according to their 
own historical, political, and intellectual goals, and the fundamental differences in how they 
conceptualize power are just as un/resolvable as the fundamental differences between their 
competing systems of thought.  
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If we accept that the general meaning of power will be “essentially contested” no matter what 
we do about clarifying it, how does this condition affect how we should continue attempting to 
clarify it? Steven Lukes, for his part, accepts the essential contestedness of the concept and yet 
still searches for a way to analyze a single reality hiding behind its many contested masks, 
working to find an “objective determinable answer, such that all reasonable persons will 
converge in agreeing to its truth.”  For Lukes, just because the concept is contested at the same 168
essential level as social theory generally doesn’t mean we cannot make progress towards a better 
and truer definition of the phenomenon. Lukes takes the rational universalist position in asserting 
that there is indeed a truth about power that lies behind all of the shifting sands of its contested 
meaning.  
I agree that we can find better definitions of the phenomenon, but not according to the 
preposterously ambiguous spectre of “all reasonable persons.” Since the concept of power is so 
intimately entwined with its political projects and theoretical articulations, we should accept that 
it is necessarily a critically hegemonic concept, bound up with the moralities, projects, values, 
and politics of its bearers. “Power” is as power does. If we do accept this premise, then it only 
means that we have to be more pragmatic about recognizing the fit between certain concepts of 
power and their practical political articulations. Especially because power and truth are so 
intimately connected with asserting political projects in a conflict of meanings, to claim to a 
single true meaning for the theoretical concept of power is always a way to gain practical 
political power. On this problem of essential contestedness I am more inclined to think with 
Mark Haugaard and Stewart Clegg, who ask us to treat the many different concepts of power as 
different ways to deal with different problems. 
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Power is a conceptual tool not a single essence that is eternally contested. A 
screwdriver can double as a chisel but it is not as fit for the purpose as a 
specifically designed and appropriate tool. So it is with power. Just as both a 
screwdriver and a chisel may generically belong to a category of metal-bladed 
hand tools, so power may collect different devices under its category. Just as a 
specific tool may be fit for one purpose but not so good for another, so it is with 
different conceptual tools of power. Different tools arise from overlapping 
perceptions of power each of which is shaped by particular local language games, 
which function much as if they were paradigms, shaping certain problems and 
questions surrounding the concept.  169
This line of thought leads not to the ultimate discovery of “true power,” but to a self-reflective 
pragmatism about useful conceptual tools.  
 There may certainly be some common rational acceptance to be debated among peers who 
agree to specific meanings of a particular concept, but those agreements are always articulated in 
the context of political projects that also gain or lose “power” based on how the concept 
circulates and functions in actual social relationships. Truth is to power as theory is to practice: 
bonded in praxis. I believe that the projects of anarchist dual power will actually benefit from 
this kind of conceptual ambiguity about power. Any theory which aims to empower the anarchist 
project must itself be a part of that project’s power; the means should match the end; the practical 
tools should match the ideals of the project. To devise a theory of power which is empowering to 
the anarchist project, the theory itself has to be treated as a technical engagement that does not 
establish and assert a truth code for abstract order but rather contributes to a project of 
developing and applying tools which can expand, somehow, into the real world. Michel 
Foucault’s perspective is useful here: the political-theoretical problem of power “is not a matter 
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of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is 
already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, 
economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.”   170
 The traditionally rigid arguments about universalized truth leave us with one big truth and an 
empty toolbox. Treating concepts of power as tools which can be variously applied for different 
purposes forces us to accept viable contrasting truths from what may seem to be diametrically 
incompatible perspectives. But we also need specific tools, powers that are designed for the 
specific jobs we need to accomplish. In building theories that can act as powerful tools, we must 
always connect the truth of a concept to the values and projects which it is supposed to serve. In 
to develop new and innovative tools, therefore, my following investigations aim to survey how 
anarchist ideas of power fit with the values and ideals of radical democratic dual power. As it is 
with tools, there are powerful truths that help to understand certain problems but fail entirely to 
illuminate others. I am concerned with making concepts that are pragmatically true and 
instrumentally powerful specifically for their quest(ion)s: we need concepts of power that are 
true like tools. We will need assemble a more diverse toolbox of power concepts. 
!
(2.2) The Anarchist Project and the Agency Perspective on Power 
So what is “power” in anarchist thought? The contemporary North American anarchist tradition 
has developed a particular interpretive model that distinguishes between three different ideas of 
power: power-to (which I will also call cause-ability), power-over (which I will also refer to as 
control-ability), and power-with (which I will also name as conduct-ability). The terms of power-
to and power-over tend to be presented as a dichotomous opposites, in a way that is also well-
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established in mainstream North American social and political theory.  Jonathan Hearn, for 171
instance, has recently redrawn this dividing line when distinguishing between theories that focus 
on “power as the capacity to realize ends, whether individually or collectively” and those that 
focus on “power as the control of one agent over others:”  that is, between a focus on power-to 172
or a focus on power-over. Power-with is a concept that enters into that opposition from another 
angle, originally developed by feminist theorists as a way to name a social and non-oppressive 
type of power that could be mutually relational and egalitarian. Among the first to articulate this 
idea, in the 1940s Mary Parker Follett suggested the need for a “conception of power-with, a 
jointly developed power, a co-active, not a coercive power.”   173
 Developed most influentially by feminists in the 1970s who wanted to depict a different sort 
of power from that which was commonly assumed by a male-driven authoritative-centric 
perspective, the concept of power-with is now associated generally with alternative, egalitarian, 
and anarchist political practices. In her 1987 book Truth or Dare, Starhawk explains a three-way 
distinction in the terms of power that she developed through involvement with the feminist, 
anarchist, and environmentalist movements that I have traced all the way from the anti-nuclear 
1970s through to the 2010s Occupy movement: “power-over is linked to domination and control; 
power-from-within is linked to the mysteries that awaken our deepest abilities and potential. 
Power-with is social power, the influence we wield among equals.”  By the time Starhawk 174
presented this particular version of the conceptual layout, those three terms had already become 
widely popular within feminist and anarchist movements. In the 1970s and 1980s, feminist 
accounts of power needed some way to challenge the “bad kind of power” with a “good kind of 
power,” an “alternate power,” an “our power.” The distinction between power-to, power-over, 
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and power-with provided feminists with a counter-language on power, a way to speak about the 
power-over of authority and coercive control as essentially different from the power-to of 
personal action capacity and empowerment, and especially compared to the power-with of 
mutual aid and collective action capacity. As feminist writer Jean Baker Miller wrote in the 
mid-1970s, the concept of power has  
acquired certain connotations [that] imply certain modes of behaviour more typical 
of men than women. But it may be that these modes are not necessary or essential 
to [its] meaning. Like all concepts and actions of a dominant group, “power” may 
have been distorted and skewed. It has rested almost solely in the hands of people 
who have lived with a constant need to maintain an irrational dominance; and in 
their hands it has acquired overtones of tyranny.  175
The point for feminism is the same as that for anarchist consensus decision-making: power has to 
be somehow reclaimed from its distorted references in a world premised on domination, 
violence, inequality, and exploitation. What kind of different power-with can we make in the 
struggle against the ruling models of power-over?  
 Contemporary North American anarchist discourse commonly employs these three concepts 
of power, using them to elaborate on key anarchist values and political ideals. From an 
anonymous pamphlet entitled Fundamentals of Anarchism, for instance, we are given a call-to-
arms that applies all three meanings of power in one sentence: “Although those with authority 
use coercion to maintain power over our lives, we have something more powerful than their 
coercion: That is our refusal to obey them, to accept their system or to believe what they tell us. 
But it only works if we work together.”  This passage begins with the idea of power-over 176
(“those with authority use coercion to maintain power over our lives”) but then slides into power-
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to (“we have something more powerful than their coercion”) in a way that makes that power-to 
dependent on power-with (“if we work together”). Here we have the general conceptual model 
laid out in a neat package: three types of “power,” each intentionally differentiated from the 
others, which focuses on the task of  building an alternative “politics of power-with.”  
 Common models like this tend to privilege the theoretical opposition of power-to and power-
over, but I think that the anarchist politics of power-with would be better supported by a theory 
that roots its thought in the concept of power-with. A theory that truly builds from the emphasis 
on power-with can only be developed if we take on a conduct perspective on power. However, 
the anarchist theoretical approach to power remains largely tied to an agency perspective and its 
association with an opposite and antagonistic structure perspective. Now, first things first. In 
order to figure out how to build a theory of power-with in alliance with the politics of power-
with, we must first understand how current anarchist political values conform to the theoretical 
assumptions of the agency perspective.  
 
(2.2.1) The Agency Perspective: the Origin of Power-To 
Agency Perspective Axiom #1: Power-to is the capacity for individual agents to act in the world; 
this power-to is the original source of power in general.  
The agency perspective is rooted in the concept of power-to. In anarchist and liberal discourses, 
“power” is originally located in the individual person’s ability to cause effects in the world, to 
exert cause-ability through their free, active agency. Martin Luther King Jr. — a person who 
spent a good amount of time thinking about “power” in the strategic contexts of social justice 
movements — once wrote that “power properly understood is nothing but the ability to achieve 
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purpose.”  Bertrand Russell treated power in the same way when he defined it basically as “the 177
production of intended effects.”  And in another famous definition from Thomas Hobbes we 178
hear that “the power of a man (to take it universally) is his present means to obtain some future 
apparent good.”   179
Conceived in this way, power-to is the “cause” in “cause-and-effect.” Thomas Hobbes put this 
point directly: “Power and Cause are the same thing.”  A simplifying statement, no doubt, but a 180
few centuries later Robert Dahl’s attempt to define an empirically-centred methodology for 
studying power in decision-making forums brought back to the same point: “our way of thinking 
about power or influence is analogous to the concept of force in mechanics. In mechanics object 
A exerts force on object B if A produces a change in the velocity of B.”  In Dahl’s thinking 181
Power refers to an agent (say, even a social agent or a chemical agent) which is to be held 
responsible for a consequence that it has been deemed to have had the power to cause. Dahl 
made this explicit, as I have already noted. Herbert Simon, another noted American social 
theorist prominent during the mid-twentieth century, also expressed the general tenor of this 
popular mechanistic-causal philosophy, saying that for “the assertion, ‘A has power over B,’ we 
can substitute the assertion, ‘A’s behavior causes B’s behavior.’ If we can determine the causal 
relation, we can define influence, power, or authority, and vice-versa.”  Jean Baker, from a 182
perspective rooted in feminist politics, treats power fundamentally as “the capacity to produce a 
change — that is, to move anything from point A or state A to point B or state B.”  183
To say that one agent has the power to cause effects in the behaviour of another agent is the 
same as saying that agent has power over the affected agent. In this framework, therefore, power-
to and power-over are polar concepts which arise at either end of any event in which an agent 
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can exert external causal influence over another agent. The concept of power-to is essentially 
entangled with the basic notion of causality, which is why I also sometimes label it cause-ability. 
The axiomatic association of power with causal force is commonplace in social theory, where 
power-to defines the special kind of intentional cause-ability. Rocks may physically cause 
changes in each others’ velocity, regardless of their intentions. Humans, however, strive to 
generate intended outcomes. According with the common English expressions about having the 
“power to do” something or other, this concept of power-to represents the natural capacity to 
achieve some goal or cause some effect in the world. The idea of cause-ability power-to can 
name the “power” of almost anything, but it always relates back to human goals, serving the 
purpose of some human motivation. For instance, “battery power” is the power to energize a 
machine to produce intended effects. “Horse power” is a measure of the torque pressure 
produced by an engine, related to a number of abstractly standardized equines: the power to push 
forward a vehicle in achieving the purpose of getting somewhere fast. “Purchasing power” is the 
capacity to pay for whatever needs to be bought, to obtain some future apparent “goods.” In all 
of these cases, the term power refers to the means for accomplishing some projected end: it is 
ability, capacity, potency, the power-to _____(fill in the verb).  
By including intentionality in the concept of power, by treating power to as a verb, the 
physical logic of cause and effect shifts into the agentic logic of intention and outcome, where 
the power-cause connection is fundamentally crucial to modern Western ideals like subjectivity, 
freedom, and agency. Anthony Giddens, whose contributions have had a lasting effect on the 
Anglo-American sociological concept of power, conceived of agency as immediately and 
irrevocably linked to power. They both refer basically to the same thing: the ability to cause 
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effects in the world. In this way, the concepts of power and agency are equally linked to the idea 
of ‘action,’ another key concept in the social sciences which Giddens holds is “logically tied to 
that of power […] Action intrinsically involves the application of ‘means’ to achieve outcomes, 
brought about through the direct intervention of an actor in the course of events […] Power 
represents the capacity of the agent to mobilize resources to constitute those ‘means’.”  In this 184
passage, the idea of action is attached to an idea of ‘power’ that is essentially power-to (“the 
‘means’ to achieve outcomes”). The presence or absence of agency in a particular circumstance 
can be determined, according to Giddens, “upon the capability of the individual to ‘make a 
difference’ to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events. An agent ceases to be such if he 
or she loses the capability to ‘make a difference’, that is, to exercise some sort of power.”   185
Any model that begins from the assertion or assumption that the natural and essential source 
of power comes from the power-to of individual agents is taking on an agency perspective. 
Considering power-to as the axiomatically essential source of power is a theoretical premise that 
reaches far and wide, contributing to a variety of conceptual traditions that may be otherwise 
quite distinct or even antagonistic. For instance, Torben Bech Dyrberg builds a postmodern 
philosophical analysis of power that is quite different from Giddens', but nevertheless similar in 
this foundational respect because he treats “the higher-order structure of power as ‘the ability to 
make a difference’.”  Most of these perspectives do share a basic point which arises from 186
essentializing power-to: when treated as the radical origin of power, the concept of power-to is 
valued as essentially good — in naturalistic, humanistic, spiritual, or philosophical terms. For 
instance, Starhawk’s anarchist-feminist-pagan account of power introduced to the concept of 
power-to as power-from-within, explicitly expressing a spiritual and innate animating force of 
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action whence we derive the personal, individual, and natural “power that emerges from within, 
that is inherent in us as the power to grow is inherent in seed.”  Starhawk imbues this definition 187
with the explicit sentimentality of sacred origins, treating it as a mysterious life force that enables 
creatures to act freely in the world. Feminist author Sarah Lucia Hoagland also picks up this 
notion of power coming “from within,” describing this as “the power of ability, of choice and 
engagement. It is creative; and hence it is an affecting and transforming power but not a 
controlling power.”   188
 
(2.2.2) The Agency Perspective: The Birth of Power-Over  
Agency Perspective Axiom #2: Power-over is a derivative articulation of original power-to 
applied as a means of controlling the power-to of others. 
I will not generally use the term power-from-within, because the term power-to is more 
commonly employed today in the anarchist discourses that frame my critical concern. However, 
the emphasis on the from-within does highlight a key ideological aspect of these power concepts. 
That is, power-to is commonly treated as the original, generative, internal, natural source of 
power — as a power that does indeed come “from within” and belongs inalienably to each free 
individual human agent. Such notions of power-to depict an active capacity to make a difference 
that emerges from-within the individual agent. From this originating point of reference, further 
manifestations of power are then understood to arise when the original cause-abilities exerted by 
separate individual agents come into conflict or cooperation with each other, exerting power-to 
upon each other so that some agents’ inherent power-to ends up “over-powering” other agents’ 
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inherent power-to. This then, for the agency perspective, is where we situate the birth of power-
over.  
 When Starhawk speaks of power-over she means to define a general category of socially 
coercive actions such as command and obedience, force and threat, authority and subordination, 
control and exploitation. “In its clearest form,” she says, “power-over is the power of the prison 
guard, of the gun, power that is ultimately backed by force. Power-over enables one individual or 
group to make decisions that affect others, and to enforce control.”  The notion of power-over 189
as a coercive application of power-to is common in social sciences as well. As we hear from 
Jonathan Hearn, power is relayed between “power as the capacity to realize ends, whether 
individually or collectively, and power as the control of one agent over others.”  Power-over is 190
a social power by which Agent A can coerce the activities of Agent B; or, in other words, it is a 
control-ability which enables Agent A to control the actions of Agent B.  
 The distinction between a broader sense of outcome power as a general concept of any 
causation and a more limited range of power manifesting in a specific concept of social 
causation is a consequence of the agency perspective’s prioritization of power-to as individual 
agency, action, or freedom. Thomas Hobbes has been especially influential in blazing this 
conceptual path between an original power-to and its secondary manifestation as a conflicting 
power-over. In Leviathan Hobbes’ first and most basic definition deals with the sense of power-
to as original and natural: “the power of a man (to take it universally) is his present means to 
obtain some future apparent good.”  In this statement Hobbes is self-reflexively aware of 191
“taking it universally” when thinking of power as a desocialized definition that draws on the 
model of causation borrowed from scientific methodological logic and the principles of physical 
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force. However, when treating the question of power in a definitely political context, Hobbes 
switches tone to prioritize a socio-political analysis of power-over which is concerned with a 
social event where “power” is a relational competition among plural actors. Then, as he begins to 
shift his focus from the individual power of natural agents onto more political questions, the 
individual and universal ‘power of a man’ must be considered according to its relations with the 
powers of other men who are likewise freely empowered. The definition of power therefore 
appropriately shifts, such that “because the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects 
of the power of another: power is simply no more, but the excess of the power of one above that 
of the other.”   192
 Hobbes begins from a philosophically abstract sense of power-to which then transforms into 
the politically analytic sense of power-over. This manner of treating power-over as a relational 
conflict between agents of power-to depends on the premise that power-to and action belong 
originally to a pre-constituted individual agent. It’s an approach to social relations that is based 
the billiard-ball notion of causal mechanics, where atomic particles are the presumed basic 
material of reality and their relations can then be described by cause-effect interactions. This is 
an ideologically deep presumption about power which pervades Western philosophy in general: 
power is initially and originally derived from individual agents, and any analysis of social power 
therefore returns to a final consideration of the individual agent. The following passage from 
moral philosopher Hannah Pitkin offers a good example of how this analytic position impels 
theorists to believe that it is vitally important to “distinguish between the expressions of ‘power 
to’ and ‘power over’.” Pitkin reasons that  
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if ‘power’ were a label for certain phenomena, such a distinction could not be of 
great importance, since the two expressions would necessarily involve the same 
idea of power simply set in different verbal contexts. But if the concept of power is 
built up out of, abstracted from, its various characteristic expressions and 
occasions of use, then the idea of power in ‘power to’ may be significantly 
different from the idea of power in ‘power over.’ That is, indeed, the case. One 
man may have power over another or others, and that sort of power is relational, 
though it is not a relationship. But he may have power to do or accomplish 
something by himself, and that power is not relational at all; it may involve other 
people if what he has the power to do is a social or political act, but it need not.  193
Pitkin here differentiates power-to and power-over based on the claim that power-to can be 
attributed to an independent asocial cause-ability concerning people and/or things, while power-
over is necessarily defined in terms of the social relations among people. The essence of power is 
therefore “being able to do things,” whether they apply to people or not.  
 For the agency perspective the meaning of power-to is the more encompassing concept, from 
which power-over is derived as a secondary and more limited case. Keith Dowding, an American 
philosopher who approaches the topic of power from a liberal perspective focused on rational 
choices, has also been especially explicit about this popular position. Observing that power-to is 
usually “thought of as the most basic use of the term ‘power’,” he builds upon a rudimentary 
dichotomy wherein “‘power-to’ and ‘power-over’ may be described as ‘outcome power’ and 
‘social power’ respectively, the first because it is the power to bring about outcomes, the second 
because it necessarily involves a social relation between at least two actors.”  In a similar vein, 194
it is also very common to frame this difference between power-to and power-over as depicting a 
‘wider’ and ‘narrower’ scope. French political philosopher Raymond Aron makes this same 
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explicit point, arguing that power should be understood “in the broadest sense of the capacity to 
do something or in the more limited sense of the capacity to influence the behaviour of 
others.”  The same conception can be found in Anthony Giddens as well. As I quoted above, 195
Giddens’ more encompassing concept of power is the capacity of an actor to intervene in reality 
to cause a difference, while a more specific application of that power in social contexts is 
understood as “the capability to secure outcomes where the realization of these outcomes 
depends on the agency of others.”  Peter Morriss presents another version of this perspective, 196
highlighting that “it is far more common to say that someone has the power to do something than 
it is to say that they have power over someone.”  Morriss elaborates on the priority of power-to 197
by noting the difference between affecting versus effecting. As Morriss puts it, “to affect 
something is to alter or impinge on it in some way (any way); to effect something is to bring 
about or accomplish it.”  Morriss argues against allowing power to depict any case of 198
“affecting,” claiming that this dilutes the concept until it represents little more than the general 
notion of making an influence. Rather, we should limit the concept of power to the stronger 
concept of “effecting,” in cases where it refers to bringing about or accomplishing an end. To 
make an influence is much more vague and general — we are affected by and we cause affect to 
many things, all the time, simply by existing in an environment. But to cause effects is more 
specific, more directed, and more rare. For Morriss, this is the more important and encompassing 
way to think of power because, as he says, “everything that needs to be said about power can be 
said using the idea of the capacity to effect outcomes — unless we are mesmerized by a desire to 
get the notion of affecting into ‘power’ at all costs.”  Power is the power to cause general 199
effects (inherently a forceful cause), not to have a general affect (inherently a social relationship) 
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upon another human. That is, even social power comes from the origin of power-to; power is 
once more rooted in an individualized and naturalized concept of directed cause-ability. 
In each of these articulations, “social power” is a limited application of the more fundamental 
nature of “outcome power.” Where power-to is outcome power as the general ability to cause 
effects (to do something — anything! — to secure outcomes), then power-over is social power as 
a more specific situation that involves causing effects in other people (to do something to others, 
securing outcomes through influencing others). The Italian sociologist Gianfranco Poggi takes 
this orientation so far as to explicitly draw a mythical image of outcome power as the inherently 
special capacity of human beings. Humans are specialists in outcome power, who, in order to 
survive, must  
make a difference: make a difference to nature, which will not sustain it unless 
intervened upon by the members of that species themselves; and make a difference 
to itself, for the manner of that intervention will in turn shape the mode of 
existence of those men and women, impart to it a more or less distinctive bias, and 
differentiate it from the mode of existence of other men and women. The widest 
meaning of ‘power’, then, is the ability to make such a difference; and this ability 
must be seen as belonging to the very essence of the species.   200
“Homo potens,” we are dubbed: this species who base their survival on that ‘widest meaning of 
power,’ the ability to make a difference. But this widest sense of power is only the focus of 
Poggi’s attention while he is introducing his opus. The rest of the book is almost entirely focused 
on the forms of social power (political, military, cultural, economic). For a specifically social 
scientific analysis such as Poggi’s, the focus of his work is understandably on social power, 
power-over. So why is the source of power mythologically granted to outcome power, when it is 
not even the focus of his analysis? As the British political philosopher Steven Lukes believes, for 
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sociological and political investigations the notion of power-to is often thought to be “out of line 
with the central meaning of power as traditionally understood and with the concerns that have 
always preoccupied students of power.”  This may be true if we take social scientists’ stated 201
objectives at their word. For instance, as Thomas Wartenberg says, “a theory of power has, as a 
first priority, the articulation of the meaning of the concept of power-over because social theory 
employs this concept as a primary means of conceptualizing the nature of the fundamental 
inequalities in society.”  C. B. Macpherson expresses the same stance, shared by many social 202
and political theorists of power, when he notes that “most of the literature of modern political 
science, from its beginnings with Machiavelli and Hobbes to its twentieth-century empirical 
exponents, has to do with power, understood broadly as men’s ability to get what they want by 
controlling others.”  203
 That same perspective is common for anarchist and feminist traditions, where power-over is 
the specific focus of critical attention, and especially when it comes to contentious action we 
focus our analytic strengths on understanding power-over in order to strategize against opponents 
who threaten to over-power us. I will return more specifically to issues of anarchist praxis 
shortly, in the following section. The present point is simply this: insofar as we assume the 
axiomatic premises of the agency perspective, even though we may analytically focus on power-
over the concepts of power-to are nevertheless usually privileged as the basic materials of that 
investigation. Social theorists often ignore or forget about power-to, even while it remains 
essential to the logic by which their concepts of power-over are explicated. To say that agent A 
has power-over agent B is basically to say that A has the capacity to control the actions of B; that 
is, power-over occurs when A has the power-to exert control over B. The concept of power-to is 
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always essential to such formulas for social power. So, I both agree and disagree with Lukes on 
this point: on the one hand, yes, power-to is not the explicit focus of most social studies of 
power. But on the other hand, no, it is not simply ‘out of line’ with that study. It is, rather, quite 
often silently fundamental to many analyses of social power. Wherever a concept is the most 
fundamental it is most likely to be taken for granted: just as the foundations of a building are 
buried and forgettable, but nevertheless continue to support the entire edifice, the category of 
power-to still usually operates as the crucial basis for analyses of power-over.  
 The party of statements that I have addressed to illustrate this point (from Giddens, Pitkin, 
Dowding, Aron, Dyrberg, Poggi, Morriss, and Lukes) all emerge from the traditions of 
contemporary Western social science which rely, more or less explicitly, on a concept of power 
rooted in the agency perspective. This is the most common perspective for liberal theory and 
politics, as well as for radical democratic and anarchist ideologies. These perspectives are 
oriented by a basic set of modern preoccupations with a concept of natural freedom based on the 
coherent agency of individual actors, and with the forms of a society that can allow for that 
notion of freedom to flourish. That is, they represent a theoretical construction which supports 
and reflects specific ethical values and political projects based in a modern Western 
enlightenment paradigm. In the next sections I will trace how these aspects of the agency 
perspective are used to depict anarchist ethical and political values according to the concepts of 
power-to, power-over, and power-with. 
!
!
!
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(2.2.3) The Anarchist Ethics of Power: Power-To Versus Power-Over 
The general ethical and political stance upon which consensus decision-making has been 
designed holds strongly to the same liberal enlightenment paradigm that supports the agency 
perspective: power-to is a natural source of individual agency, originally free from the clutches 
of power-over conceived as the social power by which some agents take advantage of the power 
of others. Power-over is essentially evil while power-to is essentially good. This ethical stance is 
stark: it obliges resistance to all forms of power-over, wherever it rears its head. “No Gods, no 
Masters,” as the old anarchist slogan has it. This, in a nutshell, defines the ethical project of 
anarchism: power-to versus power-over.  
 Social and political theorists working in a broad agency perspective generally conceive of 
power-over in two main forms. In the first form, power-over represents the event of one agent’s 
power-to over-powering another’s. In the second form, power-over represents the 
institutionalization of this over-powering relationship, to the extent that one agent has the 
legitimate authority and/or the structural support to command and/or control the power-to of 
another agent. We can illustrate these two versions of power-over paradigmatically by looking at 
Max Weber’s classic sociological definitions of Macht (as “might,” the power of conflictual 
over-powering) and Herrschaft (as “authority” or “domination,” the power of a command-
obedience as a direct cause-control form of social influence).  
In the first case, says Weber, “Macht is the probability that one actor within a social 
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the 
basis on which this probability rests.”  Mainstream North American social science has 204
especially circled around this type of definition of power-over as Macht, which can be translated 
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as “might,” and refers in this way to the power of the sword, where the strongest prevails. In a 
conflict of “wills,” the contest of power-to between opposed social agents, power-over is thus a 
depiction of the victor, the one who demonstrates the truth of their power in overcoming 
resistance. Power definitions that reflect the concept of Weber’s Macht played a very influential 
role in American political science during the 1950s and 1960s, circling first around C. Wright 
Mills’ assertion that “by the powerful we mean, of course, those who are able to realise their will 
even if others resist it.”  Robert Dahl then launched a methodological critique that recast that 205
idea from an angle more suitable to his behaviorist approach, stating that “A has power over B to 
the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”  In each of these 206
cases, the subject of the sentence is an active agent: Weber’s “one actor within a social 
relationship,” Mills’ “the powerful,” and Dahl’s “A.” These active agents are presumed to exist 
as active before the equation of their power vis-a-vis some other opponent is posed; that is, there 
is an active agent who then enters into power relations with some other forces, other similarly 
endowed agents, and treats that relation therefore as a strategic dimension of achieving their 
presupposed “intended outcomes.” As Steven Lukes put it in his now classic text Power: A 
Radical View,  
Power was here conceived as intentional and active: indeed, it was ‘measured’ by 
studying its exercise — by ascertaining the frequency of who wins and who loses 
in respect of such issues, that is, who prevails in decision-making situations. Those 
situations are situations of conflict between interests, where interests are conceived 
as overt preferences, revealed in the political arena by political actors taking policy 
stands or lobbying groups, and the exercise of power consists in overcoming 
opposition, that is, defeating contrary preferences.  207
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Lukes develops his own theory in the same vein, once again adapting the same power formula to 
argue that “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests.”  208
All of these definitions are oriented around the potency or capacity of predetermined agents 
acting in conflict, influencing each other’s behaviours, wills, actions, and interests. As I outlined 
in the previous section, these theorists build up from the origin of power-to of individual agents 
to then explain power-over as the capacity whereby a social agent causes another agent to do 
something they would not otherwise do, or the capacity of a social agent to get their own way in 
a contest with others who also wish to get their own way. Either I get you to do something that is 
beneficial to me, or I succeed in achieving an outcome beneficial to me despite your attempts to 
advance your own benefit.  
Weber balances the definition of Macht, understood as the “might” to over-power others and 
get what one wants in a social situation despite resistance, with another concept that he calls 
Herrschaft, “the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a 
given group of persons.”  The concept of Herrschaft has been variously and controversially 209
translated into English, most commonly as “domination” or “authority.” Either way, Herrschaft 
differs significantly from Macht in that it represents an institutionally socialized position of 
power-over. Consider how we often say “Power” with the implied capital P, using it as a noun to 
name a “position of authority.” If I am “Power” it means that I have institutional support that 
increases the probability that I can command others and be obeyed. I will treat the idea of 
Herrschaft as my basic definition of  “authority:” the structured predictability of A’s ability to 
cause B to act as commanded. I think authority is the more specific term to use here, because the 
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word “domination” tends to have a wider and more encompassing scope. Jonathan Hearn, for 
instance, treats the concept of domination as the main concern of power in political theory:  
When we talk about ‘power’, often what we mean more specifically is domination. 
Domination refers to a situation where an agent exercises relatively stable, ongoing 
control over the actions of other agents (‘agents’ taken broadly to mean anything 
from individual persons, to social groups, to organizations and institutions). 
Domination is not episodic. Relations of domination are, by definition, firmly 
established, and often naturalized and taken for granted.  210
This sense of domination can be applied more broadly than Herrschaft, since it needn’t refer 
specifically to the command-obedience relationship. The key notion to remember is that 
domination is a stable, ongoing condition of power-over whereby the power-to of some agents 
are systematically privileged at the expense of others.  
 The condition of authority is clearly involved in asserting a stable relation of control. In the 
case of Macht, we also find that the contest of powers between certain agents can be firmly 
established as lop-sided and rigged to benefit one side of the relation. In this sense, social and 
political theories often focus on power-over as a matter of social positioning, privilege, the 
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, access to resources and economic influence — all of which 
amount to different means whereby some agents hold power-over as systematic privilege, 
oppression, or exploitation over other agents in society. The classic sociological topics 
concerning ‘class/race/gender/privilege/status’ belong to this extended conceptual realm of 
power-over as various forms of domination.  
 Steven Lukes also chose to focus his critical energies on a concept of power as domination. 
For him, this choice reflects on the purposes of critical activity as a way to usefully interrogate 
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the ways that power comes to coerce people into actions that are against their own real interests. 
“Power as domination is the ability to constrain the choices of others, coercing them or securing 
their compliance, by impeding them from living as their own nature and judgement dictate.”  211
For Lukes, this sense of domination must be present to properly name “power,” such that either 
Macht or Herrschaft can only properly be called power if they adversely affect the ‘interests’ of 
the over-powered. That is, “to speak of power as domination is to suggest the imposition of some 
significant constraint upon an agent or agents’ desires, purposes or interests, which it frustrates, 
prevents from fulfillment or even from being formulated. Power, in this sense, thus marks a 
distinction between an imposition, thus understood, and other influences.”  Domination must 212
also be considered as possibly occurring in less obvious forms, as the impact not only of 
authority and events of over-powering, but also in the ways that people’s interests and desires 
may be manipulated. That is, power can also be considered to exist in the manipulations of 
ideology and the controls of social structure, whereby agents can be tricked or secretly coerced 
into accepting domination as natural, normal, and inevitable.  
The general model of power-over as domination holds an intimate relationship with violence 
and the threat thereof. All dominant power holds recourse to the violence of punishment as a 
means of securing the compliance of its subjects. Even if that punishment is held in bay and 
remains only latently influential, the threat of a violence that could be imposed serves to 
maintain power-over those who are subject to it. As Weber also noted in his famous definition of 
the modern State, any exertion of authority that demands obedience to complex governing bodies 
must have special recourse to “a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force.”  The 213
authority of the states, the kings, the politicians, the leaders, the bosses, and all the rulers will 
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rely always, in the end, on the threat of a poised sword. This is the kind of relation between 
power and violence that Mao Ze Dong had in mind when he famously said that “political power 
grows out of the barrel of a gun.”  To break political power requires breaking its hold on the 214
monopoly of violence; for most revolutionary programs this is accomplished at some point by 
over-powering the violence of power with the counter-violence of resistance. This is also the 
kind of forceful power that Frederick Douglass was speaking of when he counselled that “power 
concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will.”  Domination holds onto 215
what it has; it takes a fight to break anything loose. This is where we find “Power” —  that 
personified and capitalized institution of domination, gun-toting, pomped-up, and obstinately 
authoritative. And the liberal tradition that I have identified in the agency orientation of power 
considers this “Power” to be directly antagonistic with the notion of power-to as representing the 
essential origin of individual human freedom. 
The political philosophy and historical tradition of anarchism is defined in stark opposition to 
this meaning of power. I’ve already referenced Uri Gordon’s contemporary depiction of the 
anarchist project as a political movement that specifically works to fight against domination of 
all kinds. Anarchism, as he says, is 
attached to a more generalized discourse of resistance, gravitating around the 
concept of domination. The word domination today occupies a central place in 
anarchist political language, designating the paradigm which governs both micro- 
and macro-political relations. The term ‘domination’ in its anarchist sense serves as 
a generic concept for the various systematic features of society whereby groups 
and persons are controlled, coerced, exploited, humiliated, discriminated against, 
etc. – the dynamics of which anarchists seek to uncover, challenge and erode.   216
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This anti-domination stance is essential enough to call it a fundamental tenet of anarchist ethics, 
and it can be worked into a general definition of anarchist power ethics as a working for the 
enhancement of power-to as individual freedom by fighting against all forms of power-over as 
social domination. Howard J. Ehrlich, an avowed anarchist and sociologist who worked with the 
anti-nuclear and disarmament movements in the late 1970s, wrote that “for anarchists, power is 
the central issue,” because “to be free from coercion means that one has to live in a society 
where institutionalized forms of power, domination and hierarchy no longer exist. One should 
neither submit to nor exercise power over other people.”  This statement is perfect for framing 217
the anarchist’s ethical duel between of power-to and power-over: refuse to be over-powered — 
refuse to over-power (“one should neither submit to nor exercise power over other people”). This 
is an essential ethical quest(ion) of anarchism: without this basic point (variously phrased as it 
will be in different circumstances, different movements, and different traditions), the grouping of 
political philosophies that can be called “anarchist” would lose the main thread of their 
conceptual continuity.  
 This anarchist ethic calls upon people to resist being dominated and to resist exerting 
domination, to resist being exploited and to resist exerting exploitation, to resist having power-
over imposed upon them and to resist exerting power-over upon anyone else. The idea of power-
over normally functions as the ultimate anarchist enemy, the “anarchist arch enemy.” Being an 
anarchist means being the power-to that fights a battle against the abstract enemy of power-over: 
it is a subjective investment written as an ethical prerogative. Nothing good can come of power-
over; everything good comes from power-to. It’s a battle: power-over has to be killed in order for 
anarchism to survive. As found scrawled on the back cover of the 1980s anarchist journal Open 
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Road: “whatever doesn’t kill power is killed by it.”  The anarchist ethical imperative is to kill 218
power. Paul Goodman, an anarchist writer popular in America during the 1960s, wrote that 
anarchism is grounded in a rather definite proposition: that valuable behavior 
occurs only by the free and direct response of individuals or voluntary groups to 
the conditions presented by the historical environment. It claims that in most 
human affairs, whether political, economic, military, religious, moral, pedagogic, 
or cultural, more harm than good results from coercion, top-down direction, central 
authority, bureaucracy, jails, conscription, States, preordained standardization, 
excessive planning, etc. Anarchists want to increase intrinsic functioning and 
diminish extrinsic power.  219
And here is another version of that basic anarchist ethical dichotomy: increase intrinsic 
functioning (power-to) and diminish extrinsic power (power-over). Humanity must abolish 
power-over from its own repertoire by removing the structural constraints of unnecessary 
‘extrinsic power,’ thus allowing the natural intrinsic forces of power-to shine unimpeded.  
 The form of this ethical dichotomy is also deeply rooted in the utopian sentiments of 
consensus decision-making. Kenneth Boulding, a scholar of nonviolent direct action, employs 
the the same opposition between power-to and power-over as a key depiction of the 20th century 
progress in both nonviolent activism and feminism. He sees the story as a zero-sum game, a 
balance of forces, and optimistically claims that “there has been a decline in ‘power over’ or 
dominance, which is largely though not entirely the power of threat, and the rise of ‘power to do’ 
or ‘empowerment,’ which is the ability not only to get what we want, but to change what we 
want, when we find that what we want is not really worth having.” Boulding sees this shift 
represented especially in “the rise in feminism and the shift from male domination of women 
into mutual partnerships between the sexes.”   220
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From the Quakers, from the nonviolence peace activists, from the feminists, and from the 
anarchists — the consensus process has inherited vehement ethical opposition to power-over. In 
consensus discourses, the ethical opposition of power-to versus power-over goes right to the 
essence of power-over, declaring that any coercive activity at all is considered not only 
dominating, but violent. As the Vernal Project expresses, “in this environment, it is considered 
violent to use power to dominate or control the group process. It is understood that the power of 
revealing your truth is the maximum force allowed to persuade others to your point of view.”  221
Or, as we hear from the Rhizome guide, consensus has to fight off the very principle of 
competition itself:  
For some reason there’s a tendency in groups to be oppositional. We hear a few 
ideas, the group narrows them down and then we’re asked to choose between 
them. It’s either/or. We’re attached to our own thinking which often means that we 
state our ideas with certainty, we reiterate, we lobby. We don’t trust the group to 
hear all ideas as equal and take them into equal consideration. This breeds 
competition — a real obstacle to genuine consensus.   222
“Competition” is understood broadly as equivalent to Macht, the conflictual situation where 
agents over-power other agents. This is exactly the kind of official democratic assumption that 
consensus perceives as rooted in power-over, focused in conflicts that must be resolved by 
accepting a concept of power that is essentially antagonistic and conflict-oriented — “simply the 
power of one above the other.” The Formal Consensus manual makes the same point against 
voting as a form of power-over, because “often voting occurs before one side reveals anything 
about itself, but spends time solely attacking the opponent! In this adversarial environment, one’s 
ideas are owned and often defended in the face of improvements.”  223
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 It is necessary to conceive of this division between power-to and power-over for ethical and 
practical purposes, but if we base the entire theoretical analysis of power solely in this modality 
we will be reducing our understanding of power to a sorely limited and intractably binary 
perspective. This ethical division between power-to and power-over will be the focus of further 
criticism in chapter 3 when we begin to explore the alternative viewpoints of a conduct 
perspective.  
!
(2.2.4) The Anarchist Politics of Power: Power-With Versus Power-Over 
The traditions of anarchism, feminism, and non-violent direct action that converged into the story 
of consensus decision-making all share a general belief in the anarchist ethic of power: that the 
dual power of prefigurative and contentious politics must combine in a praxis that enhances the 
“freedom” of every individual human’s power-to and resists the “domination” of any power-over 
wielded by some humans over others. But how can we build a power-to that can fight the forces 
of power-over without reapplying our own versions of power-over in the process? Uri Gordon 
asserts this essential anarchist political question, explicitly in the language of power: “The entire 
premise of anarchist ideas for social change is that society can and should be altered ‘without 
taking power’ — without building a new apparatus of power-over that would impose different 
social relations from above.”  How can we create systems of interaction that don’t resort to 224
power-over, but can still generate collective power-to? How can we actually work for that ethical 
goal of making all people’s power-to equally empowered and equally free from power-over? 
This is, in another nutshell, the political quest(ion) of anarchism: how to generate collective 
power-with that can both resist and avoid reproducing power-over? 
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 In the Seeds for Change manual, consensus decision-making is described as a politics “based 
on the idea that people should have full control over their lives and that power should be shared 
by all rather than concentrated in the hands of a few.”  This is where power-with comes into the 225
equation presented by the anarchist ethical contrast of power-to and power-over. Power-with is a 
concept that evokes interactive equality, a means by which people can have full control over their 
lives (individual power-to) by sharing power (collective power-with) instead of concentrating it 
in a few hands (dominating power-over). For the anarchist discourse of power, t concept of 
power-with represents the way that we can organize our collective actions without power-over 
and against power-over. Without power-over equals prefigurative power. Against power-over 
equals contentious power. The combination of without power-over and against power-over 
equals the dual power formula for a politics of power-with.  
 Individual power-to cannot easily stand against the massive institutions of dominating power-
over; only the collective action of power-with can manage to effectively resist and oppose them. 
The politics of power-with therefore comes to represent the practical possibility of actually 
practicing an ethical ideal of being “without and against power-over.” This general ideal of a 
politics based on power-with is essential to the values of consensus decision-making, a point 
which is especially clear in its philosophy of nonviolence. The proponents of consensus tend to 
consider themselves as peaceful rather than violent, cooperative rather than competitive, and 
interactive rather than oppositional. On Conflict and Consensus, first published in 1987 by C.T. 
Butler and Amy Rothstein, is a particularly influential manual on consensus which is posed as a 
way to achieve cooperative rather than competitive relationships. Consciously adapting from the 
Quaker tradition of ethical nonviolence as well as their experiences in the early 1980s direct 
 133
action movement, Butler and Rothstein tend to present the value of consensus decision-making 
based on the claim that it is “the least violent decisionmaking process.”  They go on to 226
elaborate the frameworks of violence and nonviolence as a means of transforming power: 
“traditional nonviolence theory holds that the use of power to dominate is violent and 
undesirable. Nonviolence expects people to use their power to persuade without deception, 
coercion, or malice, using truth, creativity, logic, respect, and love.”  In this passage the term 227
power is posed in an ethically neutral manner, referring to a general capacity for influence, or, a 
social cause-ability. First it is noted that power can be used to dominate (the power-over of 
coercive dominating influence), but then the term shifts to express power-with as a natural inter-
active condition of human relationships, a more general concept of influence that humans can 
‘use’ either violently or non-violently. The Formal Consensus manual is full of contextualizing 
references like this, and it is clear that Butler and Rothstein created their model with a concept of 
power-with forefront in mind.  
The politics of power-with also draw heavily from second-wave feminist traditions. In those 
discourses, the debate over the meaning of power is usually posed as a problem: how to create 
social arrangements in a properly feminist mode, such that the traditionally masculine and 
dominating types of power-over can be supplanted with what are deemed more egalitarian 
feminist forms of power derived from mutual and equal empowerment? Feminist author Virginia 
Held, for instance, writes that the usual sense of power we accept in patriarchal society is 
equated with power-over: “the power to cause others to submit to one’s will.”  The 228
presumption that “power” is power-over comes from a socially conditioned acceptance of 
masculine dominance as the model for how mutual influence is supposed to be organized as a 
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competitive and conflictual interaction. To equate power with power-over is a product of the 
patriarchal society in which we live. But there are alternative feminist models of power, and Held 
therefore promotes the idea of power-with as a kind of feminist counter-move against the 
masculine-derived prevalence of power-over, proposing instead that we could organize our 
mutual influence according to power-with, conceived as something like “the power of a 
mothering person to empower others, to foster transformative growth, is a different sort of power 
from that of a stronger sword or a dominant will.”   229
A “different sort of power.” What is this different power made of? As Jean Baker writes, “it’s 
certainly not the kind of power we tend to think of,” because instead of gaining control by 
coercive commands and dominant orders “the one who exerts such power recognizes that she or 
he cannot possibly have total influence or control but has to find ways to interact with the other 
person’s constantly changing forces or powers.”  The clearest distinction is right there in the 230
language: this is a power that functions with others, not over them. This is a power that 
coordinates mutual empowerments, rather than a power that is used by some to oppress or 
exploit others. In Nancy Hartsock’s words, the feminist concept of power-with derives from 
“women’s stress on power not as domination but as capacity, on power as a capacity of the 
community as a whole,” which ultimately “suggests that women’s experience of connection and 
relation have consequences for understandings of power and may hold resources for a more 
liberatory understanding.”   231
Power-over engenders relationships of obedience and fear. By way of power-with, collective 
action can avoid any recourse to authority or domination, if it can be built on direct 
communicative respect. In Starhawk’s account, “respect for authority is fear of power-over;”  232
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“where there’s fear there’s power,” and “where there’s power there’s fear.” . Instead of relying 233
on the fear of authoritative command and the threat of forced coercion, power-with tries to evoke 
positive, compelling, and integrative reasons for bonding the activities of people’s individual 
power-to into common patterns of collective organization. Kenneth Boulding, historian and 
theorist of the non-violent direct action movements, calls this idea of “power-with” an 
integrative power because it is supposed to coordinate, involve, and engage people in mutually 
beneficial interaction. It is “the capacity to build organizations, to create families and groups, to 
inspire loyalty, to bind people together, to develop legitimacy.”  The politics of power-with 234
provides a means of integrating the power-to of individual agents in positive bonds. This is a 
political power built from the connecting force of power-with as an influence-bonding 
relationship, rather than by the separating force of power-over as a command-fear relationship. 
The politics of power-with nurtures equal power-to influence the collective decision-making 
outcome, treating the power-to of influence as a shared resource among its individual 
participants that can generating a collective power-to for the group as a whole. “Consensus is 
about active participation and sharing power equally. This makes it a powerful tool not only for 
empowering individuals, but also for bringing people together and building communities.”  To 235
recall Starhawk’s description, the individual level power-with is referred to as the “the power of 
a strong individual in a group of equals, the power not to command, but to suggest and be 
listened to, to begin something and see it happen. The source of power-with is the willingness of 
others to listen to our ideas.”  That is, power-with thus appears as a concept of communic-236
ability: the capacity for an agent in a group of people to influence the collective actions of that 
group through communicative deliberation. The politics of power-with aims to enhance 
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communic-ability as a means of individual and collective power-to, as a resistance to and a 
replacement of power-over. 
The anarchist project of consensus decision-making draws from these traditions of feminist 
and nonviolent philosophies to articulate its main purpose: as a tool for building collective action 
based on power-with, so as to resist and replace power-over as the main political tool for 
organizing collective action. I’ve now introduced a new notion with this latest definition of 
power-with that will be integral to my continuing analyses of the anarchist dual power project. 
What does “collective action” mean? In the next chapter I will develop this question more 
thoroughly, but have based by basic definition on social movements scholar Alberto Melucci’s 
concept which is usefully oriented toward representing the complexity inherent in attempts to 
organize dual power mobilizations for social change. For Melucci, collective action is: 
the product of purposeful orientations developed within a field of opportunities and 
constraints. Individuals acting collectively construct their actions by defining in 
cognitive terms these possibilities and limits, while at the same time interacting 
with others in order to ‘organize’ (i.e., to make sense of) their common behaviour. 
Collective action is not a unitary empirical phenomenon. Whatever unity exists 
should be considered the result and not the starting point, a fact to be explained 
rather than assumed. When actors produce their collective action they define both 
themselves and their environment (other actors, available resources, opportunities 
and obstacles). Such definitions are not linear but are produced by interaction, 
negotiation and conflict.  237
This concept of collective action is intimate with the concept of power. In all three of its 
meanings, occurs in the contexts of collective action. Power-to as the cause-ability of an agent, 
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we must remember, should apply not only to the individual agency of personal actions, but also 
to the collective agency of group actions.  
 Collective action occurs when different sources of power-to are organized together into a 
collective power-to, to create a collective agent of power-to that is capable of performing actions 
assembled from the collectivity of its individual parts. This view requires that we accept a 
systems persecutive on power that sees organizations as actors and actors as organizations. As 
Richard Scott has reflected, “only with the advent of open-system models did organizations 
themselves become the subject of investigation, viewed variously as responsive systems shaped 
by environments, as collective actors themselves shaping their context, or as component players 
in larger, more encompassing systems.”  In the case of power-over, the same phenomenon of 238
collective power-to is also at work, but the means for assembling the collective power-to is 
distinctly different. Power-over is the organization of powers performed in hierarchically and 
authoritatively coercive modes of connection for the sake of a more powerful agent. The agent 
with power-over, A, may have coerced or commanded B into performing an action for A’s own 
benefit in way that is contrary to the benefit of B, and in that case we can say that A has collected 
the power-to of B into their own power. The process of coercing someone else’s action sin to 
conformity with my own projects is a way of making their actions serve my own, and in this 
process I have made a collective action out of our combined independent actions. Power-over is 
conceived as a particular way of creating collective action by means of domination, command, 
coercion, exploitation, and so on. Indeed, most forms of collective action in which we partake 
every day are of this type: they are systems of archic collective action. But, there are also ways 
to bond the powers of different agents together in more integrative, mutually responsible, and 
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reflexive manners, without resorting to coercions and authority of power-over. This is the 
possibility presented by the concept of power-with: to create collective action by means other 
than power-over. These are systems of anarchic collective action. 
One of the most popular names for the activity of constructing anarchic collective action by 
means of the politics of power-with, of course, is participatory radical democracy. In radical 
anarchist and participatory democracy, each individual involved has an equal power-to capacity 
to influence the decisions that will drive collective actions, no one who has a stake in what is 
being decided shall be turned away, and everyone who is present is supposed to be able to voice 
their opinions and be heard before a final decision is made. No one agent is given power-over all 
the others, and each person’s capacity to impact upon the collective’s actions  is premised on a 
participatory radical openness, a demand that the process of deliberation be as inclusive as 
possible of all people’s interests, concerns. Consider Iris Marion Young’s assertion that “the 
normative legitimacy of a democratic decision depends on the degree to which those affected by 
it have been included in the decision-making processes and have had the opportunity to influence 
the outcomes.”  Inclusion must be met with active participatory equality. A properly radical 239
democracy, we are told, will articulate a formal arrangement of inclusive and egalitarian 
participation in decision-making power, such that, as C.T. Butler claims for consensus decision-
making, “everyone has access to power and every position of power is accountable to 
everyone.”  These aims require a praxis for generating collective actions by the politics of 240
power-with. 
Butler and Rothstein’s Formal Consensus is particularly described in these terms as a method 
for equalizing “effective outcome power” in collective action decision-making. They treat radical 
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democratic equality as something that can be “accessed” from the sources of power-to and 
developed in more inclusive manners by power-with. This is explicitly developed in a section of 
the Formal Consensus manual that Butler and Rothstein entitle “Equal Access to Power,” where 
they assert:  
Because of personal differences (experiences, assertiveness, social conditioning, 
access to information, etc.) and political disparities, some people inevitably have 
more effective power than others. To balance this inequity, everyone needs to 
consciously attempt to creatively share power, skills, and information. Avoid 
hierarchical structures that allow some individuals to assume undemocratic power 
over others. Egalitarian and accountable structures promote universal access to 
power.   241
Here a concept of power-to is first depicted in personal differences as well as political disparities. 
It is tied with a notion of various “effective” cause-abilities, as well as with the idea of natural 
“inequity” in people’s capacity to be effective. It is then framed as a resource that is often 
accessed unevenly or made inaccessible to some people, and is associated with either democratic 
or undemocratic governmental structures. To balance a (seemingly natural) inequity of personal 
differences, “power, skills, and information” must be creatively shared and made universally 
accessible and those who would exploit them must be limited. The language of “sharing” and 
“access” in discussing power, skills, and information suggests that all three are considered to be 
resources.  
 This perspective is the common position taken in the consensus manuals. For instance, Diane 
Leafe Christian also identifies “equal access to power”  as a precondition of consensus process, 242
as something that must be structurally assured for a good process to proceed. An uneven and 
guarded distribution of the power-to affect collective actions creates situations of domination and 
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inequality, while an even and accessible distribution of resources generates an egalitarian and 
nonviolent situation. Power-over is a guarded and uneven method of organizing the power-to 
affect collective actions, while power-with is an even and accessible method of organizing the 
power-to affect collective actions. This is a definition of radical democracy according to the 
mechanisms of accessible participation. Equality in a participatory inclusion and anti-
authoritarian system means that no one can be coercively over-powered into performing actions 
they do not wish to perform, no one is bound by coercive capacity of the institutional practice to 
“do something they would not otherwise do,” no one is compelled to act “against their own 
interests” (as Lukes and the liberal perspective would have it).  
 In attempting to exorcise power-over from its own operations, the consensus process is 
proposed as a method whereby everyone involved is free to engage in the decision-making 
process, where everyone’s perspective is equally valued no matter their status in the group, 
where each individual has the power to express their final say and potentially to call a ‘block’ or 
‘veto’ on the proposed decision. All of these aspects are oriented towards accomplishing 
collectively united actions, where “decisions should reflect the integrated will of the whole 
group.”  The greater the egalitarian evenness of group unity, composed by open and equal 243
involvement in decision-making, the less there is any need for power-over in that group. Of 
course, equal access does not automatically mean that everyone can get at the power.  A great 244
many problems remain for the politics of power-with, some certainly manageable, some 
probably intractable. It takes constant work and ongoing communication to break through a 
culture steeped in the practices of power-over and based on fundamental and categorical social 
inequalities, but the politics of power-with provides a vision of the anarchist radical democratic 
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praxis for overthrowing those systems of power-over that control people’s lives by coercive 
domination and systematic exploitation. 
 
(2.3) The Power Theory Duel: Agency Versus Structure 
So far, I have traced how the popular categories of power-to, power-over, and power-with can be 
articulated based on modern theories of power that generally align with an agency perspective. In 
those traditions, the three terms tend to be used to categorically differentiate between three 
interrelated but ultimately distinct phenomena, and they can also be used to formulate two key 
normative values of anarchist ethical and political philosophy: ethically, that power-to should 
always stand against power-over, and politically, that power-with should provide the collective 
means of fighting against and organizing without power-over. Taken altogether, those normative 
formulas define a general anarchist value of power that can be phrased something like this: the 
empowerment of power-with and power-to will disempower power-over, and (vice versa) the 
empowerment of power-over will disempower power-with and power-to.  
 In this section I will now delve deeper into the classic theoretical opposition which 
underwrites the agency perspective axioms (and the anarchist philosophical values which they 
support) by contrasting the agency perspective on power with its primary theoretical competitor, 
the structure perspective on power. As political theorist Mark Haugaard has explained, most 
approaches to the theory of power reproduce the essential dualisms of modern social theory by 
presuming and reiterating a divide “between subject-centred social thought, in which the 
individual is central, and object-centred theory, where the individual exists as an effect of the 
social world.”  Subject-centred social thought leads to a concept of power based on the agency 245
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perspective, beginning from the individual agent’s power-to and treating social power as 
relations of power-over that may happen between those agents. I have already explored these 
points in detail. Object-centred theory, on the other hand, supports a structure perspective on 
power that treats individual agents as the product of social systemic constraints and structures, 
beginning from a concept of power-over as the social force that controls and shapes how 
individuals are enabled with specific capacities of power-to that ultimately serve to reinforce the 
social system as a whole. The structure perspective treats power-over as the primary origin of 
power, from which all individualized manifestations of power-to are then derived, and thus 
understands the concept of power-with only as representing the social relational bonds that are 
used to mould agents into action regimes that conform with the power-over systems for which 
those agents have been designed.  
 In North American traditions of social theory, there is an ingrained contrast between subject-
centred and object-centred thought, whereby agency and structure are usually taught as if they 
dichotomously oppose one another. The mainstream agency perspective on power treats any 
structure perspective as a threat to freedom and liberty of the individual agent’s capacity for self-
determination. No matter how diverse the structure perspectives may be in actual content, they 
are unilaterally treated as enemies to any position that respects and affirms the freedom of 
individual agents. This dualistic feature of the agency perspective is especially poignant in the 
“three faces of power” debates, as Steven Lukes famously coined the three perspectives in the 
“American power debates.” By focusing on how the three faces of power model opposes some 
key structuralist and functionalist concepts of power, this section will situate the theoretical 
terrain as a battle between the agency perspective and the structure perspective.  
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 In the process of assessing the points of conflict between the two agency perspective axioms 
and two equivalent structure perspective axioms, I will also address some ways that both the 
agency and the structure perspectives can be usefully applied to analyze anarchist ethical and 
political problems in consensus decision-making. However, the limitations of the essential 
dichotomy that separates the two perspectives makes it difficult to reconcile their distinct 
applications into a common harmonious frame of reference. I believe we have to think about 
what each perspective offers, and try to understand how their intractable differences could be 
connected, if only we could see them as interrelated from a different vantage. And so, the 
following sections are still intended as a surveying project, laying out the theoretical landscape, 
gathering reconnaissance for chapter 3 where I will then shift toward constructing a conduct 
perspective on power that can integrate both the agency and the structure perspective in a model 
that could be more empowering for anarchist praxis.  
!
(2.3.1) Applying the Agency Perspective: Privilege and Position in Consensus Decision-
Making 
As a foray into how the agency perspective can provide useful analysis of power in anarchist and 
consensus decision-making praxis, I will focus on Steven Lukes’ account of the debates about 
democracy and power that emerged from American political science in the 1950s. The so-called 
“American power debates” provide an exemplary case of the agency perspective and also serve 
as a useful point of reference for considering the values and limitations inherent in that tradition. 
Lukes treats Robert Dahl as the keystone figure of the debates, calling his position the “first face 
of power.” Dahl’s initial foray into the question of power was triggered by C. Wright Mills’ 
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controversial assertion that American society was, despite its ostensibly democratic and 
egalitarian institutions, in fact run by a privileged group, or, as he put it, a “power elite.” As Mills 
defined it (roughly repeating Max Weber’s classic definition), “by the powerful we mean, of 
course, those who are able to realise their will even if others resist it.”  Mills was concerned 246
with addressing a broad social question of inequality, trying to explain the ways that “power” 
becomes concentrated and controlled by groups of “higher circles,” which he describes as 
“simply those who have the most of what there is to have, which is generally held to include 
money, power, and prestige—as well as all the ways of life to which these lead.”  Mills was 247
interested how power framed the social processes by which such “higher circles” coordinates and 
maintained their own status as elite groups who are “able to realise their will even if others resist 
it.”  
Robert Dahl’s most popular definition of power is drawn from a critique that Mills had 
irresponsibly defined power as a vague feature of social structures that could be properly 
observed with any scientific accuracy in terms of linear cause-effect relationships. As Richard 
Merelman expressed, Dahl’s approach to power was distinct because it defined a concept of 
power that “studied actual behavior, stressed operational definitions, and turned up evidence.”  248
As Lukes also emphasizes, “the stress here is on the study of concrete, observable behavior.”  249
Dahl suggested in most influential article The Concept of Power, published in 1957: “A has 
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”  250
However, later in the same article, Dahl transformed this definition subtly, so that it no longer 
referred to the capacity of one agent to cause a behaviour in another agent, but rather refers to 
the effect of such influence on behaviour, such that power must be observed only in the effects of 
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“a successful attempt by A to get b to do something he would not otherwise do.”  The second 251
definition is the more precise version, since it is more in keeping with the behaviourist 
prerogatives which animated Dahl’s work.  
As Lukes says, Dahl’s power is necessarily “conceived as intentional and active: indeed, it 
was ‘measured’ by studying its exercise — by ascertaining the frequency of who wins and who 
loses in respect of such issues, that is, who prevails in decision-making situations.”  The 252
concepts applied by Dahl and others in the original “American power debates” are specifically 
oriented to define and observe “influence” in the democratic decision-making of official 
American institutions. Nelson Polsby, one of Dahl’s intellectual allies in these debates, asserts 
that “one can conceive of ‘power’ — influence and control are serviceable synonyms — as the 
capacity of one actor to do something affecting another actor, which changes the probable pattern 
of specified future events. This can be envisaged most easily in a decision-making situation.”  253
These statements clearly reveal their axiomatic reliance on an agency perspective that is rooted 
in a fundamental source of individual cause-ability when they treat power as synonymous with 
influence or control, or as “the capacity of one actor to do something affecting another actor.”  
 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz opened up a second dimension to the American power 
debates (or, as Lukes calls it, a “second face of power”) by arguing against Dahl’s insistence that 
the power of A to get B to do something that B would not otherwise have done must always be 
observable in an explicit event of conflict-and-victory. Accepting that power should be defined 
generically as “A affecting the behaviour of B,” Bachrach and Baratz first of all agree with 
Dahl’s limited assertions. “Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of 
decisions that affect B,” they concede. But:   
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Power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing 
social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the 
political process to public consideration of only those issues which are relatively 
innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all 
practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their 
resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences.   254
Evoking E. E. Schattschneider’s sociological concept of mobilization of bias to elaborate their 
interjection into the debate, Bachrach and Baratz wanted to find out how power works where “all 
forms of political organization have a bias in favor of some kinds of conflict and the suppression 
of others because organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics 
while others are organized out.”  Institutions inevitably become coordinated in such a way that 255
their normal operation construes privilege to some people and some positions at the expense of 
other people and other positions. There is always a structural propensity of organizations that 
allows some agents to advance certain decisions and repress other decisions, and this will result 
in cases where power of A affecting B can occur as a kind of silent and hidden form of conflict.  
The first face of power manifests in an observable measurement showing that A has overcome 
the opposition of B to achieve a desired outcome in a decision-making situation. The second face 
of power occurs when it can be shown that A has actively maintained dominance by conditioning 
the terms of what problems are even brought up as possible decisions. As military strategists are 
eager to note, it’s best to win a battle before the fighting begins. That is, while it may be fair to 
say that “A has power over B” when A has won a battle against B, the condition of “being in 
power” may be better described by those cases where A can preemptively maintain advantage by 
avoiding an explicit event of power struggle.  
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The capacity to exercise this second face of power is more generally in the hands of “the 
powerful,” those whom Mills referred to as the power elite, increasing the capacity to regulate 
conflicts which could be a danger to your interests and to avoid unnecessary or dangerous fights. 
This kind of power is what people actually mean when they speak of “Power” with a capital-P: 
not only the outcome power that is proven by success in an event of conflict (the kind of power 
that is expressed by being able to win a vote or not), but the socially arranged condition where 
some agents have the access and ability to define the rules of the game, or, at the very least, a 
situation in which some agents can disproportionately benefit from the rules of the game (the 
kind of power that is expressed by being able to call a vote or not).  
An important way to think about this type of power is to note that those who already benefit 
from a situational arrangement of power are those who will most likely benefit from doing 
nothing. This is a key distinction that should help to reveal certain fault lines of privilege-power 
within a given organizational situation: For the powerful (A) doing nothing can be a coercive act 
of power-over, whereas for the power-less (B), this is not the case. In contemporary anarchist 
culture, the notion of privilege has gotten a lot of attention as a concept that considers these types 
of power dynamics that prevail in anarchist collective action systems. Marilyn Frye has 
elaborated on the idea of privilege when stating that “total power is unconditional access; total 
powerlessness is being unconditionally accessible. The creation and manipulation of power is 
constituted of the manipulation and control of access.”  Someone is privileged when they can 256
get what they want without doing anything (a power-to achieve an end experienced with no 
resistance). Someone without privilege in a specific circumstance will have to do something to 
get what they want (a power-to that always has to overcome power-over to achieve its end). That 
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is, privilege is manifest by a superior’s ease with power, by their apparent lack of any need to 
exert power in the process of getting what they want and their lack of recognition for the possible 
barriers that they do not face (but that others certainly do) in achieving their intended outcomes. 
From the agency perspective, this definition see privilege as manifest by the lack of resistance to 
accomplishing one’s own interests: where A gets what A wants, regardless of what B wants and 
with no intervention or resistance from B at all. Privilege is all about A. There is no concern for 
B, and that’s the point. B simply does what it “would otherwise have done,” what it was already 
supposed to do, plays its small part in the greater system of normalcy, in a way that contributes to 
the smooth operations of A’s agenda. A’s privilege is in the capacity to ignore B altogether and 
still have its agenda fulfilled as a matter of course.  
From the other side of the equation, privilege is experienced by the inferior position as a 
system that makes resources accessible to the superior, and which allows the superior to call 
upon the inferior as a resource but not vice versa (“total powerlessness is being unconditionally 
accessible”). James C. Scott’s anthropological analysis of “domination and the arts of resistance” 
offers a good example of this manifestation of power as privilege. In a broad study concerning 
how superior and inferior social positions develop ritualized interactions, Scott suggests that “the 
impact of power is most readily observed in acts of deference, subordination and ingratiation.”  257
These “acts of deference, subordination and ingratiation” are precisely the type of behaviour that 
cannot be represented as events of observable conflict. They do not rupture normal relations, 
rather the contrary. They are normal relations; they are the ritualized everyday behaviours which 
maintain a smooth consistency of social activities. While the inferior position is required to 
perform rule-bound acts of deference, the superior relates back by exhibiting power as the 
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privilege of “not having to act or, more precisely, the capacity to be more negligent and casual 
about any single performance.”  Privilege is power-over operating “casually,” such that the 258
superior-position does not have to act in order to have their goals met, and the inferior-position 
has to act out, no matter whether or not their goals are being met (either the subordinate has to 
enact some form of conflict in order to achieve their own goals, or they must act out a ritualized 
subordinative performance in order to empower their superior’s goals. 
If the in-group wants to be more egalitarian, they will try to incorporate an out-group. The 
out-group is invited in. This seems like A is making a move to increase equality with B, but the 
move is down a one-way street: it makes B accessible to A’s system of power without granting B 
the powers of privilege which coordinate that system. Therefore, if B wants to actually do 
anything within A’s group, it will inevitably incite a conflict. When the out-group raises their 
grievances, the in-group always groans. The men rolls their eyes, tell the women to speak up, 
then shut off their ears. The white folks talk up inclusivity, then they do nothing about 
rearranging racist patterns of structured accessibility. The in-group wants access to their 
inferiors, but if the inclusion of B does not radically alter the very conditions of political capacity 
in that collective action system, then A has incorporated B into the already established positions 
of A’s system, gaining the power of access to a new subgroup of inferiors without giving 
anything back.  
From an article about Occupy posted on the Toronto Media Coop website, we hear that amidst 
the excitement for egalitarian process “there have been a lot of people… who are using their 
sense of entitlement to make their voices heard over those of others.”  Within the history of 259
consensus, gender has been the most popular source of criticism concerning how the egalitarian 
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principle of speaking and listening tends to be subverted. This is mainly because consensus was 
developed explicitly as a feminist method intent on correcting masculine dominance in political 
decision-making forums. The dominant literatures of consensus since the 1970s have drawn 
almost exclusively from a largely white and class-blind context, where, as opposed to race or 
class, gender tends to be addressed much more frequently as the key issue of inequality. Gender 
training in speaking and listening produces culturally dominant traits of masculinity that already 
encourage masculine-identified people to exhibit the self-confidence, willingness to exert 
influence, and rationalized eloquence that are implicated in effectively “expressing desires and 
needs.” People come from different inherited patterns of communication which might place them 
closer or further away from attaining the particular patterns of actions that circulate among the 
power elite. People also inhabit different social roles based on socio-economic inequalities such 
as gender, race, class, education, and ability which prepare them differently for the challenges of 
speaking powerfully. These dynamics of power are, of course, more common than most people 
want to believe. Writing about the experience of being “a girl in an anarchist boys’ club,” one 
anonymous author says: “Everything I say out loud in a group is pre-planned, composed. I'm not 
spontaneous 'cuz yeah I'm shy but mostly I don't trust you to listen without interrupting, treat 
what I say as valued if I'm not rehearsed.”   260
Today, the cultural environment of consensus silently encourages and rewards white, middle 
class, masculine style of confident rhetoric, implicitly augmenting the voices of some people 
while diminishing the voices of others, thereby structuring an in-group/out-group division of 
non-decision-making power that often overrides the formal equality of participants. The in-group 
will always tend to privilege power skills which they themselves are already particularly good at, 
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and so the members of the anarchist boys club don’t have to make decisions about how they 
speak and they don’t have to worry about how they’re heard. They can take it for granted. They 
set up their own forms of expressive power-to as the model for empowered expression in 
general. “Meetings are often a great bastion of subtle manarchism, particularly in regards to 
space. Privilege teaches us to find space and fill it.”   261
It’s a classic self-centred, colonizing, white guy move to assume that his own reality is the 
universal model for all of reality and everyone else. This was a problem widely recognized 
during the Occupy movement, where critiques of such biased essential assumptions flew at the 
centre from every marginalized perspective, and for good reason. As these authors of an anti-
racist and feminist pamphlet on Occupy Baltimore write:  
Whiteness and maleness have been duly reinforced as the not-so-secret standard at 
this occupation, in many ways. One example: an announcement made by a young 
white man at a GA [General Assembly] that ‘everyone is accountable when they 
speak to media, because they represent the occupation as a whole.’ […] The 
countless snaps and twinkles in support of such a statement demonstrated clear 
consensus. Those twinkles expressed a range of assumptions that people who are 
largely comfortable in their own skin tend to make: being present in a space makes 
you in charge of its representation; most everyone agrees with you (and should). 
Those of us that have to daily prepare ourselves for an imminent bash; imminent 
fight with hostile, privilege-denying strangers; an imminent insult (intended or not), 
we take issue with this coercion into representation. We don’t ask you to represent us 
(please god no); don’t fucking assimilate us to your views, and then make us 
responsible for them.  262
This power of privilege is more than merely common in consensus process, it is structured into 
the process. The consensus process funnels power into positions of implicit cultural privilege. 
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This is evident when we consider privilege as the power of doing nothing. What do I mean by 
this? To explicate the point, let’s take a moment to consider the dynamics of the “the block.”  
Consensus gives the smallest minority the power to stop a decision from being ratified by 
allowing any one to block a decision, whereas the positive assent to a decision involves singing 
with a chorus. You can say nothing and still technical assent to a decision, whereas opposing it 
requires standing out, speaking up, and causing a problem. Someone who opposes a decision 
based on an outsider’s perspective must act out to be heard, and risk the exposure that this 
expression brings upon them. Those who do act out again the consensual tide will usually have 
to face a group condemning them as rude, violent, arrogant, and oppositional — stigma that is 
disproportionately born by categorical positions of social powerlessness delimited by race, class, 
gender, ability, eduction, facility with speech, and so on. This is what happens to people like 
Sonny Singh, who recalls the backlash from an Occupy group concerning problems brought 
forward by a People of Colour (POC) caucus to the general assembly:  
As soon as I opened my mouth with our concern, dozens were down-twinkling with 
looks of disgust on their face, muttering sarcastically to each other, and even 
shouting out loud, shocked and appalled that I would even ask such a question. The 
sense in the room was, “There goes POC again causing trouble and holding us up 
from moving forward.” People assumed we were condoning the actions of the 
“violent” people in question simply because we raised a question about what 
violence means.   263
The majority holds the silent and normal power of consensual uniformity which holds the power 
of privilege as a silent confirmation of normal routine, as a matter of natural uninhibited flow 
from debate to decision.  
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Everyone can hear the first face of power: it speaks loud to the crowd, it happens when people 
listen to you. The second face of power turns some people’s voices into background noise: it is 
the overwhelming din of the crowd; it happens when people cannot hear you. Shouting and 
swearing and still, no one listens. In the second face, power has changed from discrete event of a 
coercive conflict to the social privilege of a coercive normalcy: we have gone from as concept of 
power as causal to a concept of power as casual! This is a structural technical problem with 
consensus decision-making — we have to recognize how privilege is built into the concept of 
consensus itself, such that consensus processes tend especially to magnify the silent power for an 
in-group. I will address this issue more thoroughly in the analyses of chapter 4. For the moment, 
suffice it to note that the three faces model of power does apply usefully as a way to expose how 
consensus does not erase power entirely, but rather promotes a specific shift in its modality: the 
casual power of privileged no-decision-making is in fact often heightened by the consensus 
process, perhaps even in proportional adjustment to they way that the process reduces the causal 
power of conflicting decision-making. In the first case power is an intervention in the ongoing 
arrangement of things in the world which achieves the purpose of the agent.  
The second dimension of power reveals an important nuance in power relations: to do nothing 
is an act of power for the already-powerful. So how to combat the casual concentration of 
privilege and position — ethnocentric, colonialist, sexist, genderist, racist, ableist, and any other 
version of self-centred blindness to the disempowerment of others? For the power-less, resistance 
is manifest by disruption, loudness, conflict — the only way to be heard over the regular buzz of 
normalized silence is to cause a ruckus, raise a stink, or protest a problem that radically alters the 
constellation of power. And for the power-full, a basic first step is to challenge the silent 
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eminence of their own ease.  Do something that rattles the normalized privilege to do nothing 264
and still hold power. The author who wrote of their experience in the anarchist boys club 
suggests a pointed bit of advice, at the very least: “Just shut the fuck up a little. Once in a 
while.”  265
!
(2.3.2) Agency Versus Structure: Coercive Domination or Systemic Subjection 
In his philosophically deconstructive treatise on power, Torben Bech Dyrberg illustrates a 
classically defined separation between those who focus on power as agency and those who try to 
understand power from the vantage-point of structure. As Dyrberg explains:  
The basic assumption of agency conceptions of power is that the relation between 
agent and structure has to be external. […] The external relation between agency 
and structure implies, in other words, that agency is internal to itself — that it is 
fully constituted, so to speak. The subject is viewed as constitutive, and this means, 
more concretely, that it is defined apart from, or as prior to, structure, which, again, 
is one of the main reasons why the latter is usually conceived in terms of external 
constraints on action.  266
From the agency perspective, power begins with agents who express power-to (as cause-ability 
or outcome power), and these agents are conceived as the original source (the atomic particle of 
power, so to speak) from which of all other power phenomena are derived as various types of 
interactive combinations (the various modes of power-over or power-with — control-ability 
social power, or integrative power). Each individual human independently and naturally possess 
the capacity and the right to exert power-to, and power-over is a relationship of counter-influence 
between two or more opposing agents, thereby creating social power as the asymmetrical 
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condition where one agent achieves their own power-to in conflict or consensus with the power-
to of any other agent(s).  
 We can recall Keith Dowding’s succinct statement as a contemporary expression of this 
position on power that is especially common to the North American traditions: “‘power-to’ and 
‘power-over’ may be described as ‘outcome power’ and ‘social power’ respectively, the first 
because it is the power to bring about outcomes, the second because it necessarily involves a 
social relation between at least two actors.”  In the “first face” of power, as developed by Dahl 267
and company, power is most clearly a causal ability to influence or control decision-making 
outcomes. The priority is given to outcome power as a more fundamental or natural state of 
power, and is derived explicitly from the classical empirical idea of causation. Agency 
Perspective Axiom #1: Power-to is the capacity for individual agents to act in the world; this 
power-to is the original source of power in general. Power-over occurs when the causal 
outcomes of power-to inhibit or adversely effect the decision outcomes that someone else may 
have preferred. In other words, power-to happens when someone gets their way, and power-over 
over happens to someone else who therefore doesn’t get their way. Agency Perspective Axiom 
#2: Power-over is a derivative articulation of original power-to applied as a means of 
controlling the power-to of others. 
For the agency perspective, power-to comes first, associated with a foundational concept of 
cause-ability. Since I’ve already treated this tradition more thoroughly earlier in this chapter, we 
can now compare these axioms to their theoretical alternatives presented by the structure 
perspective. Dahl was concerned that Mills was failing to accept the causal standards of the 
agency perspective by trying to think of power-over as a product of social codes and systems of 
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resource distribution. And he was right. Mills was ultimately concerned not with how 
independent actors influence reach other in open conflict or competition, but rathe with how 
conflict and competition is rigged to benefit some groups instead of others. But Mills is not 
simply promoting a “wrong” idea of power. It is a very different idea of power which has more 
allegiance to a structure perspective. This idea of “power” thinks of it more like an economic 
medium of social functioning rather than as a specific contest that may occur within the terms of 
that medium. So, for instance, whereas the agency perspective thinks of power as a matter of 
who wins in a soccer match, the structure perspective thinks of power as defining the rules of 
“soccer” which structures how the teams are able to operate. This sense of power does not 
describe qualities and acts of agents; it is responsible for coordinating the categories and 
activities which are available to describe agents.  
This alternate concept of power can be described according to two equivalent and inverted 
axioms. First, power must emerge originally from the control-ability of power-over, working to 
coordinate and reproduce the particular collective structures of a social project. Structure 
Perspective Axiom #1: Power-over is the capacity for a social system to control the actions of its 
members; this power-over is the original source of power in general. Many a critical theorist has 
argued that the idea of a universal pre-social natural individual is an idea generated by a 
particular social arrangement: the individual is not a natural original category, but is rather a 
historical and social construction. Likewise, we may say that the idea of a pre-social natural 
power-to is the product of a particular arrangement of social power-over: power is not of natural 
origin, but is rather a historical and social construction of particular arrangements of social 
structural power-over. One of the most well-travelled of such criticisms derives from Karl 
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Marx’s analysis of the self-serving assumptions made by classical political economists concept 
of the natural individual as a basic a prior category. As he argues,  
Smith and Ricardo still stand with both feet on the shoulders of the eighteenth 
century prophets, in whose imaginations this eighteenth century individual — the 
product on one side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of society, on the other of 
the new forces of production developed since the sixteenth century — appears as an 
ideal, whose existence they project into the past. Not as a historic result but as 
history’s point of departure. As the Natural Individual appropriate to their notion of 
human nature, not arising historically, but posited by nature. This illusion has been 
common to each new epoch to this day.  268
Marx was interested not in a kind of power that emanated from the natural individual, but the 
kind of power that constructed a certain type of individual agent as if it were natural, as a way to 
empower a modern capitalist system in need of the legal, mythological, and economic premises 
supported by that naturalized individual.  
 At its most intense, this approach leads to a view that there are no agents prior-to or 
independent-from of the controlling structures of power-over that constitute and coordinate 
certain illusions as internal components to serve specific functions within their collective 
organizational systems. As Michel Foucault once put it, the agency perspective derives from its 
own particular social structural formulations which require a distinctively penal and legal notion 
of power:  
Confronted by a power that is law, the subject who is constituted as subject — who 
is ‘subjected’ — is he who obeys. To the formal homogeneity of power in these 
various instances corresponds to the general form of submission in the one who is 
constrained by it — whether the individual in question is the subject opposite the 
monarch, the citizen opposite the state, the child opposite the parent, or the disciple 
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opposite the master. A legislative power on one side, and an obedient subject on 
the other.  269
Foucault’s various theoretical excursions (stretched across a wide range of topics and 
problematics) all depend on a basic premise common to structure perspectives: what we call 
“power” cannot be simply restricted to the models provided by such juridical, legislative, or 
authoritative commands. These models provide an agency perspective on power which limits the 
framework of power to relationships which it itself controls and defines. That is, a belief in 
agency perspective is itself criticized as being a function of the modern legislative and judicial 
structures of power-over that strive to create individual agents as disciplined obedience subjects. 
To break through such monotonous representations of power, we have to begin thinking of it as a 
much more pervasive social force according to which various relations of conflict and 
coordination are established among social forces. The structure perspective is understandable 
only if you accept that the concept of power can be extended to more territory than what is 
permitted by the contrast between legislative authority and obedient subject, or, inversely, 
between the power-to of an agent who is originally free from any legislative authority and the 
power-over of coercive control and dominating subjections. 
 Instead of assuming that power is a matter of external relations between originally 
independent agents, the structure perspective treats all the effects of power as internal relations of 
organizational coordination that take place within a delimited zone of social order. This is a 
perspective that looks at social phenomena from the top-down to understand power relations as a 
function of complex coordination for a functioning social totality. As Dryberg puts it, “whilst 
agency conceptions are solidly rooted in the subject/object dualism, structural conceptions of 
 159
power eliminate this dualism by getting rid of the subject. This is done by reducing the subject to 
subject positions within a structural totality, and this implies that the relation between subject 
position and structure must be internal.”  That is, the structure perspective asserts that power 270
can be creative phenomenon that conditions and assembles subjective agents in the first place, 
rather than as an external imposition applied upon them after they have already been established. 
Mark Haugaard describes the structure perspective as perceiving “the ways in which given social 
systems confer differentials of dispositional power on agents, thus structuring their possibilities 
for action.”  And so we come to Structure Perspective Axiom #2: Power-to is an effect of 271
original power-over which is caused by subjection of individual agents according to the demands 
and requirements of their social systemic incorporation. 
 Talcott Parsons, an American scholar famous for his adaptation of Max Weber’s work into a 
system of “functionalist sociology,” is one of the most classically cited representatives of a 
general structure perspective on power, and brief assessment of his concepts should offer a good 
introductory illustration of this alternative approach. For Parsons, power is conceived as “a 
facility for the performance of function in and on behalf of the society as a system.”  Power 272
refers to a special kind of influence that is produced by socially legitimized authorities, norms, 
laws, beliefs, and other forms of structural coordination. Of course, depending on your position, 
these sources of power-over could certainly be conceived as coercive and dominating in 
particular instances, but Parsons insists that they are not necessarily so, as a general rule. A social 
system uses power to construct shared values, shared patterns of behaviour, and shared social 
identities. In one of his most oft-quoted definitions, we hear from Parsons that power is the  
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generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a 
system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with 
reference to their bearing on collective goals, and where in case of recalcitrance 
there is a presumption of enforcement by negative situational sanctions — 
whatever the actual agency of that enforcement.  273
Power of this sort works to the extent that a social project can integrate an agent into its 
socialization programme, such that the agent will consent with the goals, purposes, and interests 
of the social order and act willingly to reproduce them.  
 For the agency perspective, power-over is a matter of influential control exerted by agents 
upon other agents; for the structure perspective it is a matter of determining the controls that 
structure agents themselves as influential. A key point in this shift, and this is evident in Parsons’ 
systemic view, is that power-over is therefore not an inherently evil or bad phenomenon. It can, 
quite to the contrary, actually be considered as a positive function, even when it is coercive and 
dominating, because it coordinates social organizational roles in order to garner power-to for the 
social system as a whole. The various concrete mechanisms of social controls are supported and 
authorized by a symbolic ideological system of beliefs, rituals, roles, and routines. Clegg, 
Courpasson, and Phillips express that “symbolic legitimacy is the orderly background within 
which Parsons’ view of power is embedded.”  Parsons’ theoretical venture is concerned with 274
the task of collective unity and stability where power-over is considered as an ethically neutral 
means of social coordination. “The range within which there exists a continuous system of 
interlocking binding obligations is essentially that of the internal relations of an organized 
collectivity in our sense, and of the contractual obligations undertaken on behalf of its 
boundaries.”  Parsons is talking about how collective agencies are made through the systematic 275
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organization of the social relations which take part within them. The connection of obligations 
and constraints, sanctions and inducements may be taken as foundational (if we accept Parsons’ 
account) to the power-to which is available to individual agents within that system. 
 So, to recap: the first difference between these two opposing conceptual perspectives can be 
posed by the question of origins: where does power come from? The agency perspective says 
influential causation of power-to while the structure perspective says the structural 
determination of power-over. According to each, the other cannot be right. The second difference 
I want to discuss refers more to the second set of axioms, which defines the linkage between 
power-to and power-over in each case. The second set of axioms focus on another question of 
manifestations: what are the social effects of power? The agency perspective says coercive 
domination while the structure perspective says systemic subjection. Again: according to each, 
the other cannot be right. 
 From the agency perspective, power always manifests socially as a matter of how agents exert 
causation upon each other by external relations. Agents apply power upon each other, it is 
experienced as something that comes “over” one’s own agency, or is imposed “over” another 
agent’s power. Power of this sort occurs in external relations of cause and effect, but these 
relations are not always as explicit and obvious as Dahl wanted to maintain. By taking the 
agency perspective premises upon which Dahl’s project was based through permutations of less 
obvious manifestations of power, Lukes articulates the “second” and “third” faces of power as 
progressively more covert and more systematically instituted instances of coercive domination. 
This journey takes us to the cusp of a structure perspective, but not over the edge. Lukes remains 
committed to treating agents as the central protagonists in power theory, explicitly asserting that 
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his approach “will not attribute power to structures or relations or processes that cannot be 
characterized as agents.”  By following Lukes along his journey to the edge of the agency 276
perspective, we can define another dividing line that constitutes the battle between the two 
perspective on power (and discuss a few useful details about the various ways to think of power 
along the way). 
 The final “third face of power” presented by Steven Lukes suggests a way to go deeper into 
the covert operations of power than these previous two faces. For the third face, Lukes proposes 
that power will also be active as “the imposition of internal constraints,” whereby “those subject 
to it are led to acquire beliefs and form desires that result in their consenting or adapting to being 
dominated, in coercive and non-coercive settings.”  Power is active in its third dimension when 277
any social process intentionally or unintentionally operates by “securing the compliance to 
domination of willing subjects.”  In the cases I discussed concerning the second face of power, 278
A and B were always treated as at odds; there was a recognized conflict between them, even if it 
was buried or deflected. Lukes introduces the third face of power by proposing the need to 
account for how power coordinates a covert conflict whereby A manipulates B’s interests and 
beliefs so that they accord with A’s benefit as opposed to B’s.  
Lukes’ journey through the American power debates culminates in his own definition of 
“power as domination” that expresses a similar critical orientation to the anarchist ethical 
philosophy whereby power-over is the derivative evil imposition, oppression, coercive control, 
or otherwise external impediment to an agent’s own “real interests.” While a detailed discussion 
of how Lukes employs the concept of “real interests” is crucial to fully elaborate his theory, that 
discussion would take me too far afield from my current focus on illustrating the contrast 
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between the agency and structure perspectives. At the moment, it will suffice to consider how 
Lukes’ concept of power as domination holds close affiliation with the axiomatic anarchist 
concept of power-over. As he explains it, “power as domination is the ability to constrain the 
choices of others, coercing them or securing their compliance, by impeding them from living as 
their own nature and judgement dictate.”  How can we identify, analyze, and apply this concept 279
of power as domination? Answering this concern in the essay Three-Dimensional Power (which 
was added to the second edition of his Power: A Radical View in 2005) Lukes clarifies that “to 
speak of power as domination is to suggest the imposition of some significant constraint upon an 
agent or agents’ desires, purposes or interests, which it frustrates, prevents from fulfillment or 
even from being formulated. Power, in this sense, thus marks a distinction between an 
imposition, thus understood, and other influences.”  Power, for Lukes, must always still be 280
defined as a conflict of interests, even if it is a conflict that is fully hidden within some form of 
coerced consensus. We should identify power only where we can identify that there has been 
some case of coerced interests. Consequently, power conceived this way simply cannot occur in 
in consensual relations. As Terence Ball restates it, “the sort of significant affecting specified by 
the concept of power involves one agent’s ability not only to affect another, but to do so in a way 
that adversely affect’s the other’s interests.”   281
The problem of operationalizing a deeper analysis of “power as domination” pervades Lukes’ 
approach to the three faces of power, but the third dimension addresses a power that never even 
shows its face at all. “Indeed,” as Lukes asks, “is it not the supreme exercise of power to get 
another or others to have the desires you want them to have — that is, to secure compliance by 
controlling their thoughts and desires?”  Indeed, it may be so, but this “supreme exercise of 282
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power” is also more supremely difficult to define, identify, and observe, giving Lukes’ third 
dimension of power a much more complicated problem then its forebears. In a case where “the 
dominated,” B, may not even recognize or express any resistance or opposition to the desired 
outcomes of A, there may not be any way to observe it. You have to go looking in the shadows in 
order to discover the places where, according to Lukes, “power is at its most effective when least 
observable.”  As Lukes says, “the three views we have been considering can be seen as 283
alternative interpretations and applications of one and the same underlying concept of power, 
according to which A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s 
interests.”  The point I wish to emphasize here is that the models which take on the parameters 284
of the “A causes B” form generally articulate the analytic possibilities inherent an agency 
perspective on power by treating the concept as a matter of external relations of behavioural 
causation among individual and independent agents, from the influence of control and conflict to 
the coercion of systematic domination. On the other hand, the structure perspective cannot 
support the hard and fast differentiation between individual freedom and structural domination 
which is a consistent tenet for agency perspective theorists. Jeffrey C. Isaac, for instance, is 
another influential power theorist who tries to open the concept into those realms of analysis that 
are more concerned with structural determination than with individual agency. He exclaims his 
difference from Lukes explicitly by arguing that power should in fact be understood as a function 
of holding agents’ interests together, rather than as an instance where agents’ interests are posed 
in conflict. He says:  
For Lukes the concept of interest is necessary to the discussion of power insofar as 
it answers the question of the counterfactual: What would B do were it not for A’s 
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behavior? I have argued that this way of thinking about power is mistaken and that 
rather than treating A’s behavior as the cause of B’s behavior, we should focus on 
the structural relations that bind A and B together, viewing these as the material 
cause of both A’s and B’s conduct.  285
For Isaac, power is precisely about what B would do normally, as a matter of everyday course, as 
a production of personality, role, and rule: power as a function of socialization. By addressing the 
power of socialization we must recognize that power as control-ability no longer has to work 
through an active agent who initiates responsibility for the conditions of its control.  
 From the other side of the power theory divide the causal formula so central to the three faces 
debates — “A causes B” — is no longer necessary because power is thought of as a conditioned 
situation in which A and B are synchronized into a common pattern of behaviour which neither 
the superordinate nor the subordinate position must willfully enact in order for it to be 
situationally active. Isaac’s critique of the three faces debates leads to a concept of power that is 
fully integrated into social roles and responsibilities. Isaac explicitly names his approach a theory 
of social power, in order to distinguish it from the causal sense of power that governs the agency 
perspective orientations. As he says, “rather than A getting B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do, social relations of power typically involve both A and B doing what they ordinarily 
would do.”   286
Moving across the border into the structure perspective means that we cross the limit of 
identifiable coercion of interests. On this side, power is not necessarily about conflict and 
coercion. It can instead be entirely constructive of capacities and abilities, and goes as deep as 
social relations themselves. For instance, social roles and networks of intersecting constraints are 
coordinated not only by social codes, but also by the concrete demands of concrete objects, 
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physical buildings, and material tools. The physical things in a human environment are built up 
by social-economic activity — things are full of materialized power, substantiating the influence 
of plans, controls, purposes, goals, roles, rules. The buildings we live in, the ways we are incited 
to move, sit, and sleep; the tools we use, the ways we are enabled to act, communicate, do and 
think — these are the conditions through which people’s actions are controlled by the structured 
form of socially produced material things. As Marja Gasterlaars explains in a study concerning 
how health care establishments manifest templates of proper health, “buildings, things (and 
rituals) materialize health morality. They ‘make’ people move, and, above all, they embody the 
identification, separation and finally the removal of ‘dangerous’ dirt; moreover, they ‘show’ 
people what is healthy.”  Of course, to state that social power works through the material 287
organization of our social existence is nothing new. For instance, this is also the basic thesis 
behind Louis Althusser’s concept of the ideological state apparatus: “an ideology always exists 
in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices. This existence is material.”   288
Michel Foucault is also usually depicted as a prime representative of an extreme structure 
perspective that tracks the influence of social and physical structures on how people adopt 
particular belief systems and types of agency. From Terence Ball’s perspective, “Foucault’s focus 
is not upon isolated individuals but upon individuals as role-bearers implicated in the production 
and reproduction of relatively enduring and systematically structured social relations.”  Such a 289
project squares precisely with the orientation of the structure perspective. In Foucault’s work the 
notion of a “subject of power” is a key feature which elaborates on the premise that individual 
agents are a product of the social systems which control and manage them. As Foucault notes, 
“there are two meanings of the word ‘subject:’ subject to someone else by control and 
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dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience of self-knowledge. Both meanings 
suggest a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to.”  The word “subject” has a dual 290
meaning, colloquially and theoretically and in both French and English. First, as the agency of 
power-to: to be a subject is to be one who can “act” in the sense presumed by the agency 
perspective. And second, as the control of power-over: to be a subject is also to be one who is 
subjected to a greater power, as in the sense of being subject to a King. The word subject denotes 
agency of power-to (the one who can act) and also denotes the impact of power-over (to be 
subjected to one who acts). In Foucault’s many and varied analyses of power, the individual 
subject is consistently displaced from its classical position as the naturally predetermined 
originator of agentic power-to. The subject is rather considered as a position generated by a 
system of social processes, and the agency born by individual subjects must always be 
understood as derived from the codes and constrictions organized by social relations and systems 
of social power. This perspective on power considers that “the individual is an effect of power, 
and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its 
articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle.”  Thus 291
a subject is the agent of any particular capacity for power-to only as an effect of the coordinated 
structures of power-over in which it lives. Power-over creates and uses individuals as subjects 
with agency, ultimately to constrain a system of societal relations, to produce its own 
organizational, cultural, economic, and political ways of life. 
A far cry from the agency perspective’s insistence that social power can only act as a 
constraint or domination upon agents, in these approaches social power is what enables and 
directs the interaction of agents. The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu describes power in 
 168
another vein of this perspective, treating power-with as the means or medium of control when he 
appeals to the concept of social capital as functioning in a “field” of possible activities and 
values. As he says, a field of power “is the space of the relations of force between the different 
kinds of capital or, more precisely, between the agents who possess a sufficient amount of one or 
the different kinds of capital to be in a position to dominate the corresponding field, whose 
struggles intensify whenever the relative value of the different kinds of capital is questioned.”  292
This concept of relations of force is an engagement with a very different idea of power-with. For 
Bourdieu, the field of power represents an essentially hegemonic competition between different 
social systems, or between different forms of capital, as he says. Power occurs because society is 
built from competing and cooperating factions who must each aim to establish their own systems 
of social organization by assuring that their own circuits of power are operating effectively. 
When one power system does dominate a social scenario it is by establishing an economy of 
power relations, or a set of relations of force which pervade and are accepted as the proper rules 
of engagement for all parties involved. 
As Bourdieu puts it, the dominant system of power is therefore “not the direct and simple 
action exercised by a set of agents (“the dominant class”) invested with powers of coercion. 
Rather, it is the indirect effect of a complex set of actions engendered within the network of 
intersecting constraints.”  That is, the dominant social coordination of powers relies on a set of 293
controls that normally elicit and constrain action paradigms. The structure perspective sees 
power as coordinating social integration, legitimating authority, and as defining the roles and 
rules of a consensual social order. These functions of social control-ability represent the very 
point at which Lukes draws the line for his definition of power based from the agency 
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perspective, and in that contrast we find one of the inexorable antagonisms of modern social 
theory. According to Lukes, the key operable question of power has to ask: “when can social 
causation be characterized as an exercise of power, or, more precisely, how and where is the line 
to be drawn between structural determination, on the one hand, and an exercise of power, on the 
other?”  The agency perspective wants to understand power in contrast to “structural 294
determination,” whereas the structure perspective treats power as a capacity of structural 
determination. For the agency perspective, power exists as a conflict between the social demands 
and the way that individual agents integrate into those demands, whereas for the structure 
perspective power exists as a condition in which individual agents will be defined by social 
demands.  
So what is the social effect of power? The agency perspective says coercive domination of 
power-over and the structure perspective says the systemic subjection of power-to. According to 
each, the other cannot be right. They are directly opposed at the limit between coercive 
domination and systemic subjection. The battle over which side of the line power theory should 
reside upon has been long and arduous, and shows no sign of abating. In the next chapter, I will 
propose that we should understand how power always functions across the line, as a bridge that 
can connect these two conceptual traditions rather than a choice which separates them. Presently, 
before moving on to that impending project, I wish to address one way that the structure 
perspective can analyze another side to power analysis, a side which the agency perspective 
cannot see and which must also be acknowledged as an important way of assessing power in 
anarchist radical democratic praxis.  
!
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(2.3.3) Applying the Structure Perspective: Rules and Roles in Consensus Decision-Making 
One of the key points of interest for the structure perspective is how power can be located in the 
normal social authorization of organizational rules and roles. Critiquing Robert Dahl’s agency 
perspective on power, Stuart Clegg has insightfully addressed an example of power presented by 
Dahl wherein people must respond to a police officer directing traffic. Dahl originally argued 
that the officer’s power to direct traffic should be considered according to three necessary 
circumstances: 1) the police officer must instigate the action, shown by a measurable time delay 
before the driver responds; 2) there must be a direct connection between the event of the officer’s 
action and the event of the driver’s response; and 3) the act of the officer must then be shown to 
have caused the driver to do something they would not otherwise have done.  Generally 295
speaking, no one questions the common sense premise that the police officer “has power” in this 
situation. A key difference between the agency versus the structure perspectives can be 
determined by how people explain this scene. Dahl’s criteria are a textbook case of the basic 
agency perspective in action: treating power as a causal relation enacted by one agent to impact 
upon another. Clegg, on the other hand, proposes a structure perspective by emphasizing that 
power of causal influence should be thought of as inhered in the roles played by the agents, not 
in any specific actions that they take as individuals. Clegg argues the point by suggesting we 
think about where the power would go if the police officer was replaced with a random 
bystander. People would certainly respond differently to the efforts of a bystander directing 
traffic. Likely, drivers would be less inclined to accept the directives of the bystander, avoiding 
and ignoring the person’s appeal to control their actions in that situation. Hence, the bystander 
loses the power of influence which the police enjoyed in the operation of the same act. But, 
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imagine what would happen if the police officer was in plain clothes and the bystander was 
dressed up in a cop’s uniform: then the drivers would obey the apparent police officer and ignore 
the apparent bystander. They see the roles of those people and afford them certain power 
accordingly. The power of the police officer and the impotence of the bystander is not an 
essential natural quality of their agencies; it is rather a relative social characteristic of the roles 
they take on relative to other social roles.  
 The relative relationships which individuals take through their social roles situates the most 
common way that the concept of power-with fits into structure perspectives. Here, power-with 
refers to a medium or means of power-over, defining the systemic relationships, roles, and 
routines which are accepted and enacted by individuals in the daily practice of their power 
relations. The role of a police officer is, in this sense, defined as a structured code of power-with; 
or, in other words, a structured code of role-relationship parameters. The “police” is a role which 
demands certain codes of interaction from “citizens,” a type of code for the appropriate and 
available range of interactions between “citizen” and “police officer” as social categories. As 
Clegg says: 
The uniform acts as a symbol which displays a role. The role serves as a shorthand 
expression for what every motorist knows: motoring is a rule-guided activity, and 
policemen represent the power of the rules. The rules would be the basis of the 
policeman’s power and not Dahl’s three necessary conditions, which are mere 
occurrences of the rules. Policemen have certain powers because motorists 
recognize them as embodying certain rules. Just like pieces in a chess game.   296
The power of A to cause the behaviours of B resides in the expectations and performances people 
have concerning their social roles; the options of power are rule and role bound opportunities for 
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action that are laid out for each individual to conduct their influence on each other. Power is, 
clearly in this representation, a positive elicitation of actions rather than a coercive control or 
authoritative domination delimiting actions. People accept that driving is governed by rules, and 
according to those rules the police officer represents a social position of ‘power’ that can control 
drivers. The police officer therefore has a certain role to play within the context of the rules of 
traffic, which is why there is power-over relayed through that position of power-to.  
 In consensus decision-making the ideal goal is to remove any power differential between 
individual participants — when considered from the agency perspective this means that there are 
no As who can coerce the actions of other Bs. Everyone is an A influencing the action of the 
collective group, C. But the collective group itself has rules which assure that this equalization of 
power occurs in a formal and procedural manner. There are rules and roles which define 
consensus decision-making as a structural code of power relationships. This is, fundamentally 
speaking, why it is useful at all to review manuals and guides, processes and procedures. In this 
project I have studied the rule books of consensus process only because they presumably show 
something about how the process structurally arranges power relationships. The more power is 
removed from individual competitive coercion or even from causal privilege, the more it will 
reside in the normative and normal rules and roles of conduct.  
 In consensus process roles such as facilitator, vibes-watcher, and stack keeper are meant to be 
filled on a rotating basis so that no individual is ever associated directly with the structural power 
they manifest. The power of a rotating role is clearly in the structured position, not in the 
individual actor. The power in these roles is not associated with individuals themselves, and is 
not intended to serve anyone’s individual coercive influence, but are meant to make the system 
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work as a collective formal process. However, on a deeper level the structure perspective on 
power requires that anarchist egalitarian radical democracy grants people access not only to 
inclusive and participatory decision-making, but also to the capacity for defining and regulating 
the rules of inclusivity and participation and decision-making. That is, if power exists in the way 
that rules and roles structure our action patterns, then egalitarian power should provide an 
egalitarian capacity for structuring those rules and roles. Randall Amster has lucidly asserted 
this point as a crucial principle of anarchist social organization: 
The appearance of power in the anarchist setting is "diffuse" in the sense that every 
member of the group is equally entitled to be a direct and active participant in the 
creation of community "norms" and in the entire decisionmaking process itself. In 
this way, individuals acquire a deeper sense of the meaning and purpose of the "law" 
extant in the community, rendering superfluous the need for institutionalization and 
even codification. The benefits of conceiving the "social contract" as an organic, 
ongoing agreement derived through direct participation and consensus 
decisionmaking are manifold, not the least of which is to encourage an environment 
in which cooperation and not competition becomes the predominant aim of both the 
group and its individual constituents.   297
Consensus demands that participants have equal power in determining the nature of their 
collective decisions, but can it also allow for equal and deliberate power in determining the 
collective structures of their social contract? This is a more difficult task. It is the task of self-
reflexive structuration: not a question of having structures of power-over or not having structures 
of power-over, but a question of how to build the structures of power-with.  
To truly organize an anarchist social structure would require treating all expert opinions and 
distant controls, all sacred beliefs, traditional roles, and accepted rules as matters of immediate 
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power which are always revisable. Nothing can be simply left to pre-established order, and 
everyone has to be presumedly qualified to consciously engage with restructuring the collective 
pattern of group relations. As the French philosopher Jacques Rancière explains  
the canonical distinction between the political and the social is in fact a distinction 
between those who are regarded as capable of taking care of common problems and 
the future, and those who are regarded as begin unable to think beyond private and 
immediate concerns. The whole democratic process is about the displacement of that 
boundary.   298
Rancière suggests a radical notion of democracy as a government conducted by those who have 
no qualification to govern. He continues to explain this radical conception of democracy with 
reference to the Greek concept of arkhêin, which means “to walk at the head,” “to lead,” or in a 
political context, “to rule.” The determination of political right is traditionally categorized 
according to various forms of arkhê: will a political system be ruled by birth-right, by expertise, 
by virtue, by wealth, by strength? The question of the arkhê is the question of what will “rule,” 
or “be the rule of,” the organization of political power. The choice between which quality has the 
best right to rule will determine the ranking of classic political distinctions: monarchy, 
technocracy, aristocracy, oligarchy, tyranny. Democracy, however, holds the special place of 
being specifically anarchic, that is: “democracy is the specific situation in which it is the absence 
of entitlement that entitles one to exercise the arkhê.”  Democracy means that no one is given 299
the title to rule, not even in the name of the people. Therefore, argues Rancière, “the ‘power of 
the demos’ referred to the fact that those who rule are those whose only commonality is that they 
have no entitlement to govern.”   300
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No rules and no roles can entitle people to qualify for democratic governance. But there are 
always rules and roles which operate within the structures of democratic governance. Simply 
allowing everyone to take part does not mean that the formal operations of deliberation have no 
rules and no roles. The difficult task of levelling out structural access to power while also 
managing the egalitarian arrangement of social rules and roles requires wholly different 
strategies and analyses than the problems preoccupying the agency perspective’s attention on 
equalizing influence and rooting out domination. All social structure of deliberative method, 
even anti-authoritarian and democratic ones, organize power capacities which create differential 
abilities and capacities in the subjects whom they direct. Serious problems of power can arise if a 
group has too little structure, as Joreen famously examined in her seminal essay on the tyranny 
of structurelessness in early 1970s feminist movements.  Serious problems can also arise from 301
too much structure, or structures which are too strict. Too much structure leads to overwhelming 
stiffness of process and a barrier to inclusive participation, a problem which Hannah Appel has 
labelled “the bureaucracy of anarchism.”  In a study comparing Occupy Wall Street with the 302
German Autonomen movement, Darcy K. Leach argues that simply the amount of rules and roles 
active in a particular radical democratic process can have a significant effect on the deployment 
of power therein. Speaking of Occupy, Leach notes that “in complex systems like this, activists 
often fetishize “the process” they have so painstakingly devised (or as one activist called it, the 
“bureaucracies of anarchy”), and end up facing unintended and ironically elitist consequences, 
namely that people get silenced in the name of efficiency and adherence to process.”  303
Yes, social structures code all the rules and roles, the subjections and the systems, in which we 
develop our sense of self as independent agents and as social actors in relationships. But that 
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doesn’t mean that there is no reciprocal effect, that agents do not also structure their structures. 
The problems of structural power is broader than the problems of agentic power because it poses 
a deeper and more fundamental task: how does a group of people power the structures that 
empower them? What determines the rules of our game, and how can we alter those rules when 
we need to?  
          
(2.4) The Possibility of a Conduct Perspective 
“In this corner, the agency perspective:” treating power as a matter of external relations of 
conflict and coordination between independently powered agents. “And in this corner, the 
structure perspective:” treating power as a matter of social structures coordinating their internal 
relations by defining and encouraging subjects to take on roles and act in certain established 
systems of behaviour. These two dominant strains of thought about power in modern Western 
social and political theory are locked inside the ring. Their respective proponents spend a lot of 
critical energy trying to pummel each other into submission. It seems to be an endless duel, 
however. Neither team appears to be giving up anytime soon. 
 These days, Michel Foucault tends to be a favourite punching bag for testing out the power of 
both sides. Agency perspective proponents like to treat Foucault as a straw man for all the weak 
and evil foibles of the structure perspective, and all that animosity is egged on by hoards of 
scholars who set him up as a caricatured idol of their own pet structure perspective. Both 
academics who are sympathetic and those who antagonistic to Foucault’s concepts of power 
often treat him as the banner-bearer for a totalizing structuralist vision of power that leaves no 
room for the free capacity of individual agents or for liberation projects that could overcome the 
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many forms of structural domination which rule over people’s lives. Ultimately, I believe there is 
much more nuanced approach to power in Foucault than either his most popular acolytes or his 
enemies tend to promote, and this promise is best approached from a new perspective that 
doesn’t start in either corner. “And, in the middle of the ring, twirling in circles…?”   
 Foucault’s general contribution to power theory is much more appropriately associated with a 
third approach that draws alliances between agency and structure, finding bonds between them 
which neither perspective on its own can bring itself to accept. Admittedly, Foucault’s flashy 
language and aggressive approach do often play right into the agency/structure dichotomy’s 
script, particularly when he says things like this: “power is co-extensive with the social body; 
there are no spaces of primal liberty between the meshes of its network.”  That quote, 304
contextually adrift as it is, certainly sounds like he’s saying that power works for the social body, 
as a means of creating fully internalized network of power relations apart from which we cannot 
even imagine the possibility of a free individual agent. If the structure perspective is interpreted 
this way, then any notion of individual agents finding autonomy and freedom in an escape or 
retreat from power is (depending on who you ask): either 1) simply an illusion; or 2) simply 
impossible. Neither one is really the answer we want if we’re going to keep fighting. So where 
does a theoretical position like this leave our sense of praxis? 
In the North American context, there is a popular refrain that points out Foucault’s failure to 
account for how true resistance can function when power operates so pervasively to condition 
everything we do. Critical resistance to a supposed “lack of resistance” in Foucault’s theories of 
power applies especially to what has been called his “middle period,” lasting roughly from 1970 
to 1977 when he focused most emphatically on the study of prisons, sexuality, disciplines, 
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surveillance, statistics, and governmentality. It is often suggested that during this time Foucault 
gets himself caught up an idea of power from which no one could escape, an idea of power that 
totally encompasses all possibility for resistance and therefore within which we would all have to 
passively accept subservience to the social controls that shape our subjectivities. For instance, 
prominent American feminist critics such as Nancy Hartsock and Nancy Fraser fear that 
Foucault’s concept of power represents such an omnipresent and micro-normative bond between 
power-over and power-to that it leaves no room for true freedom, no place for the independence 
of individuality, and (most importantly) no space for coordinated resistances — so much that, as 
Jana Sawicki tells it, “the difference between autonomy and internalized domination is 
erased.”  Sheldon Wolin says basically the same when lamenting that, despite Foucault’s 305
innovations, “not only does he give us a vision of the world in which humans are caught within 
imprisoning structures of knowledge and power, but he offers no hope of escape.”   306
 These points may indeed constitute fully coherent arguments, but only insofar as the 
axiomatic principles of the agency perspective are taken for granted. In fact, I believe, the 
antagonism presented by this brand of statements reveal an important built-in blindspot of the 
agency perspective: when you posit the essential source of power in individual agents, it 
generates a hard barrier between power-to and power-over, between those atomic individuals and 
the social constraints in which they then find themselves, in the conflicts which they wage 
against others, and in all the hidden possibilities of being coercively duped into accepting the 
chains of power (the cause of so much furrow in Lukes’ brow). But Foucault’s approach requires 
that the distance between power-to and power-over be effaced; it requires that we think about 
what it means if we are always empowering power-to via structured capacities of power-over, 
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and if our involvement in any power-over is always producing some form of power-to. So when 
he says that there are no spaces of primal liberty between the meshes of power, it is indeed a 
condemnation of the agency perspective but it is at the same time a condemnation of the 
structure perspective. Foucault is also quite consciously aiming at promoting a theory of power 
which does not rely on the control of structures and systems of authority. His project involves 
one of the most prominent (although, of course, certainly not the only) theoretical endeavours to 
understand power from a perspective in between power as agency and power as structure.  
 As Foucault said, “to say that one is never ‘outside’ power does not mean that one is trapped 
and condemned to defeat no matter what.”  Rather, as he later expressed, “it would not be 307
possible for power relations to exist without points of insubordination which, by definition, are 
means of escape.”  But how? What does this mean? The conduct perspective is tasked with 308
elaborating on this question about how we can still act, resist, and strive for revolutionary praxis 
in the face of a concept of power that affords for no primal spaces of liberty. From the conduct 
perspective, one is never outside of power because one is never able to step away from the 
complex relations of individuality and structurally according to the conditions of conflict and 
cooperation which are composed in a given circumstance of collective action and social 
movement struggles. For, as Foucault put it, conjuring some of the essential concepts required 
for a conduct perspective, “every power relationship implies, at least in potentia, a strategy of 
struggle, in which two forces are not superimposed, do not lose their specific nature, or do not 
finally become confused. Each constitutes for the other a kind of permanent limit, a point of 
possible reversal.”  The conduct perspective begins from a position within relations of struggle, 309
thus treating power-with as the original concept of power.  
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 In the following chapter I will elicit some key concepts and diagrams which I think can help 
to clarify how a conduct perspective can work for the anarchist praxis of power. The anarchist 
project has established a concept of power that is in sync with agency perspective ideals of 
freedom, individual responsibility, and a politics of anti-hierarchical and anti-domination. A basic 
weakness of this association has been the way that the agency perspective and the structure 
perspective are determined dichotomously, in favour of a sentimental attachment to the concept 
of power as independent freedom, cause-ability, natural volition. As Judith Butler has argued, “if 
power is not reduced to volition, however, and the classical liberal and existential model of 
freedom is refused, then power-relations can be understood, as I think they ought to be, as 
constraining and constituting the very possibility of volition. Hence, power can be neither 
withdrawn nor refused, but only redeployed.”  The trick with this move is not to think about it 310
in a way that simply re-articulates the agency perspective in reverse so that power is simply a 
constraint upon the same concept of volition. When treating power-to as the original, natural, and 
good origin of individual agency, power-over is pitted as a derivative and evil enemy that must 
be expelled from anarchist practices, and anarchist praxis is then all about eradicating a 
simplified caricature of evil power-over, identified solely with its monstrous manifestations. 
When we split the nature of power into good and evil, everything gets blown up into black-and-
white, us-versus-them, virtue-against-vile, freedom-versus-power. 
 As Todd May has expressed: “that the anarchist a priori regarding power is convergent with 
the nineteenth century’s general conception of the nature of power can be explained, then, as a 
politically significant failure that bars anarchism from completing the journey down the tactical 
path along which it traveled.”  In order to best empower anarchist praxis, an anarchist theory of 311
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power has to get beyond the analytic poverty of theory that resorts to the binary of good and evil. 
As Deleuze and Guattari said it: “good and bad are only the products of an active and temporary 
production, which must be renewed.”  The presumptions that settle us into an eternal either/or 312
choice between agency and structure universalizes good and evil as essential opponents, but this 
format does little to actually help adjust our collective action strategies. In fact, it reproduces a 
systematic mechanism of oppression that aims to conceal the workings of power. As Judith 
Butler wrote, “the effort to identify the enemy as singular in form is a reverse-discourse that 
uncritically mimics the strategy of the oppressor instead of offering a different set of terms.”  313
The dual power of radical democratic direct action which is available in consensus decision-
making can be useful, if we learn when and where to use it appropriately. In the next chapter I 
will elaborate on the conduct perspective as a way to reframe the agency and structure 
perspectives in a way that helps to better conceive of consensus process as a tool of dual power. 
From the conduct perspective, we can develop a more analytically flexible conceptual toolbox 
that will help to better understand the challenges we face when practicing the anarchist politics 
of power-with. The master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. We need to redesign 
the tools of power analysis so that they can help us to build a different kind of house. 
How? The conduct perspective… 
!
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Chapter 3) Constructing a Conduct Perspective to Diagram Power in 
Anarchist Collective Action Systems  
 
In the previous chapter I argued that the most common North American discourses of power — 
colloquial and scholarly, radical anarchist and liberal mainstream — share a focus that is 
predominantly rooted in an agency perspective on power. Considered according to the popular 
anarchist terminology of power-to, power-over, and power-with the agency perspective sees 
power essentially as originating in a natural individual power-to which is then secondarily 
articulated in social relations of power-over. This perspective is logically contrasted to a 
structure perspective on power, which sees power as essentially originating in a systemic power-
over exerted by social structures, and then secondarily expressed as the individual agency of 
power-to by the subjects who act according to the rules and roles which their social structures 
determine for them. The two perspectives are determined according to a strictly dichotomous 
opposition so that each resists integration with the other. Each one treats the other as, quite 
simply, wrong. I contend that the agency and the structure perspectives are both useful, and both 
can provide valuable analyses. We just need to reorient our analysis of power in a way that can 
manage to shift between these perspectives. In this chapter I aim to find a way to build that 
bridge by conceiving of an integrative perspective that originates from their middle, between 
them, linking them, drawing them together. This is what I will be calling the conduct perspective: 
a way of thinking about power as based on the conduct that bonds collective action systems into 
expressions of agentic structures and structured agencies.  
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Chapter 3 is more abstractly theoretical than my other chapters because it is a theoretical 
construction project, a research and development practice of designing new conceptual tools 
which should be applied to analyze anarchist consensus decision-making, but may also be 
applicable to other analyses. The tools I am constructing here are not totally specific to the 
anarchist projects of consensus decision-making, although I aim their development specifically 
in that direction. In the first section I introduce some basic concepts and principles of the conduct 
perspective that treat power-to and power-over as produced by a dialectic polarity rather than a 
dichotomous opposition. This requires that we shift conceptual focus away from power-to or 
power-over in order to see power-with as the most important theoretical element of power in 
general, from which power in general originates.  
In the second section I work on a general model of power systems diagrams, where I will 
draw upon what we have learned thus far about the agency and structure perspectives’ emphasis 
on external versus internal relations to argue that power should be considered as a concept that 
moves across the boundary between external relations and internal relations of collective action 
systems. For the conduct perspective, power is always a relation between power-to and power-
over that occurs through the composition and conflicts of collective action systems. In the 
internal relations of collective action systems, power-to is composed for the system as a whole 
by the power-over controls that organize the collective action system. External to the system, that 
power-to is met with resistance and/or alliance by other collective action systems that are also 
organizing their conduct by way of power relation compositions. The relations are fractal and 
interactive in a process of constituting collective action systems that always have an inside and 
an outside, with internal and external relations that code a dynamic and invertible bond between 
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power-tos and power-overs that are co-produced by the modes of conduct that arise through 
power-with.  
The third part of this chapter will apply those power systems diagrams to analyze the unique 
kind of collective action system that consensus decision-making is capable of empowering. 
Collective action systems organize certain modes of power which coordinate internal power-over 
for external power-to, and collective internal power-to that is applied in relation to external 
power-over. This sounds confusing, I know: that’s what the diagrams are for. The visual 
representation makes these inverting formulas far more clear. The diagrams depict the abstract 
model of polarity between power-to and power-over by representing power in a three 
dimensional relationship that passes across the internal/external boundaries of collective action 
systems.  
This particular conceptual construction is supposed to challenge us to think of anarchist 
projects not simply as an opposition to power-over in general, but as a project that also 
reconfigures and reinvents its own specifically anarchist modes of power-over. The project of 
dual power is a challenge to make collective action systems that use collectively internal 
anarchist modes of power-over (prefigurative politics) to empower collectively external anarchist 
acts of power-to (contentious politics). Consensus decision-making is a process that has the 
potential to generate this kind of collective action system. To conclude this chapter I will contrast 
the type of anarchist power-over that consensus decision-making can generate with a more 
commonly accepted authoritarian model of power-over, in order to reframe the discussion about 
how power is considered in anarchist dual power praxis so as to think of consensus decision-
making in more tactically sensitive capacity.  
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(3.1) A Conduct Perspective on Power 
In this section I will elaborate a conduct perspective on power by explaining two new conduct 
perspective axioms that contrast with the axioms I introduced earlier in chapter 2 for the agency 
and the structure perspectives.  
 Conduct Perspective Axiom #1: Power-with is the conduct-ability of inter-active social 
relations; this power-with is the dialectically original source of power in general. 
 Conduct Perspective Axiom #2: Power-to and power-over are a polar manifestation of power-
with; neither power-to nor power-over are derivative or secondary, they are dialectically 
generated together and there can never be a situation where one exists without the other.  
 A theory of power-with has to conceptualize conduct-ability as the relation between agents 
who are created through the difference of their power interactions within the conditions 
determined by social power structures. Power exists from the middle out, through the 
conjuncture between individual inter-actions (an agency perspective view of power-to and 
power-over as wielded by agents over other agents) and social systems (a structure perspective 
view of power-over controlling power-to through determined social roles, scenarios, and 
structures).  
 In this section, I will address some conceptual terms which help to establish the idea that 
power originally emerges between the poles of power-to and power-over, growing front he 
middle of power-with to simultaneously create both individual agencies and social structures as 
interrelated phenomenon, such that the interrelated complexity of power phenomena can be 
understood by situating power as a concept that depicts the conduct of collective action systems. 
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(3.1.1) Power-With as Conduct-Ability 
Conduct Perspective Axiom #1: Power-with is the conduct-ability of inter-active social relations; 
this power-with is the dialectically original source of power in general. 
 I begin from the premise that power-with is the “origin” of power. Everything about power 
theory changes when we reject the presumption that the concept must refer originally to power-to 
as the capacity of individual agents’ causal motivations, or, alternatively, that it must refer 
originally to power-over as the mechanism of social control, subjection, and domination. The 
conduct perspective treats power as primarily a condition of social communicative relations, the 
mode of inter-action as a means to assemble and dissemble socially collective actors who can 
affect the actions of each other, themselves, and their common social groupings.  
 Consider, for instance, Robert Litke's statement that “our ability to interact with each other is 
obviously dependent upon our (logically prior) capacity as individuals to act.”  This is a classic 314
representation of the agency perspective on power that asserts a logical priority to the concept of 
power-to. Against this statement, a conduct perspective asserts that humans are always already 
socially integrated, and therefore the ability to act is in fact dependent upon our (logically prior) 
capacity to interact. That is, for the conduct perspective power-with conditions the possibility of 
power-to, rather than the other way around. One of the most explicit and formulaic cases of the 
conduct perspective on power can be found in Michel Foucault’s 1984 essay The Subject and 
Power. In this piece Foucault begins with a retrospective on his career’s journey of theorizing 
power, admitting that his earlier work tended to efface questions of individual agency and then 
proposing a model based on the concept of conduct. When I call on the concept of power-with as 
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conduct, I am following Foucault’s point that power is not simply to be located in coercion and 
control , but in so many more ways that people can communicatively influence one another: 
perhaps the equivocal nature of the term “conduct” is one of the best aids for 
coming to terms with the specificity of power relations. To “conduct” is at the 
same time to “lead” others (according to mechanisms of coercion that are, to 
varying degrees, strict) and a way of behaving within a more or less open field of 
possibilities. The exercise of power is a “conduct of conducts” and a management 
of possibilities.  315
From this perspective, power always occurs as a relationship of influence that happens 
“with” (power-with), between relating actors, from the middle of a relation where actions 
conduct other actions. To conduct is to lead or drive actions in a way that does not entirely 
foreclose the effect of those actions, but rather moulds and influences their possibilities. 
Foucault’s definition also highlights the way that conduct is localized in two ways that reflect the 
agency and the structure perspective at once:  power occurs as a communicative causation in 
discrete events of inter-active influence (a conduct of conduct, whereby A’s actions affect B’s 
actions); and power also denotes the collective control-ability to shape the milieu of collective 
action systems (by managing the possibilities of a social system so that the actors who occupy 
various social roles within that system are enabled with certain capacities to affect each others’ 
actions). 
In Foucault’s words: “the term ‘power’ designates relationships between ‘partners’ (and by 
that I am not thinking of a game with fixed rules but simply, and for the moment staying in the 
most general terms, of an ensemble of actions that induce others and follow from one 
another).”  This is the basic distinguishing feature of a relationship of power-with: “in effect, 316
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what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action that does not act directly and 
immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on possible 
or actual future or present actions.”  The idea that power exists in the relationships between 317
mutually active subjects can, of course, be found in many theories other than Foucault’s. For 
instance, we may note when Talcott Parsons frames power in a similarly broad manner as the 
“generalized medium of interchange,”  or when Jeffrey C. Isaac defines power as “those 318
capacities to act possessed by social agents in virtue of the enduring relations in which they 
participate.”  Terence Ball describes this approach as a “communicative or linguistic 319
perspective,” which articulates a sense of power that “can best be characterized, pace Hobbes, 
not as an agent-patient but as an agent-agent relation. In this respect, at least, relations of power 
are relations between (ontological) equals.”   320
In each of these approaches, the origin of power is in conduct, generally speaking. Now, a 
moment of caution. A great danger in this approach is that it can devolve into treating almost 
every social phenomenon as a matter of power, and in this chapter I shall aim to be as specific as 
possible about the concept of power-with as conduct, such that it may ultimately serve as a 
detailed tool. A tendency towards meaningless generalization is also present in the broad analytic 
meaning of power-with that are manifested in the common anarchist concepts of power 
dynamics. For instance, in his manual for consensus decision-making Peter Gelderloos asks 
specifically about the meaning of group dynamics. He answers himself by involving power in the 
mix: “the dynamics of a group are its patterns of interaction, communication, power, and 
responsibility.”  At the conditional level of power-with, this should seem redundant. Patterns of 321
“interaction, communication, power, and responsibility?” This is all power, we might argue! But 
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in this phrase Gelderloos is deploying “power” as one term in a list because he uses it as a 
reference to the more limited and value-inflected sense of power-over as nefarious manipulations 
achieve by way of authority, domination, manipulation, exploitation (and the list goes on). 
Earlier in his manual Gelderloos uses the term power dynamics as a way to explain “group 
dynamics,” in such a manner that we can clearly see the overlap between the two dynamics. 
Concerned with way that groups who are using consensus decision-making can sometimes 
develop insular and unwelcoming habits, he notes that 
people who attend a consensus meeting and come away with a bad impression 
frequently report one of two complaints. Sometimes they feel like they have 
entered a tight-knit social club with rules that are secret and inscrutable and power 
dynamics that are cliqueish and impenetrable. At other times, newcomers get the 
impression that a particular consensus-based group is hyper organized to the point 
of inefficiency, and almost bureaucratic in its rules and procedures. Both extremes 
are disempowering.  322
In this sentence the meaning of power in the term “power dynamics” is significantly specific. 
The mention of “power” in the earlier quote actually means power-over, and the use of 
“disempowering” in this case is a way of speaking about the frustration of power-to. “Power 
dynamics” is a way of describing the inter-active conditions of a group, a map of its institutions, 
interrelations, and influences.  
The focus on power dynamics orients analysis towards investigating the relationships of 
actions. A power dynamic is always present in the normalized pattern of practices that coalesce 
to condition any group’s system of operating processes. Those normal processes can be formed 
as closed or open, impenetrable or penetrable, cliqueish or welcoming — among myriad other 
possible characteristics. They could very well be empowering for those on the inside of that 
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dynamics while disempowering for those on the outside, or vice versa; they could be 
empowering for some positions within the group, while disempowering for others. This 
perspective orients towards a vision of power as a dynamic system or a capillary network. Power 
dynamics do not belong anywhere or emerge from anyone. Power it is not situated in a particular 
authority or place, but rather must be conceived in the way Foucault expressed as “the 
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute 
their own organization; as the processes which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, 
transforms, strengthens, or reverses them;…thus forming a chain or system.”  In the sense of 323
“power dynamics” the status of power-with is not merely held by an individual agent’s power-to, 
nor is it simply ruled by a social structure of power-over. Rather, power here refers to the 
conditions of a particular arrangement of inter-active conduct within the context of specific 
collective action projects. With the notion of power dynamics we can see one of the more 
common colloquial expressions of a conduct perspective that first and foremost understands 
power as a condition of relationships between social creatures who engage in communicative 
inter-actions within a particular collective action system.  
The Livermore Direct Action Handbook, distributed to direct action protesters at the 
Livermore Weapons lab blockade in July of 1982, expresses the power of nonviolence in terms 
of power-with by stating that “power lies in social dynamics. We can withhold cooperation from 
those who abuse power, and remove power from them.”  Power, understood as inter-active or 324
collective action, signifies a dynamic of assembled relations, social organizational systems, or 
established roles and rules of conduct. To remove those relations is, in principle, simple enough 
(although usually not very easy): just refuse to take part in the collective action, and you can 
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remove the conduits of conduct which support that collective construction of power 
relationships. Like Etienne de la Boétie famously asserted: “Resolve to serve no more, and you 
are at once freed. I do not ask that you place hands upon the tyrant to topple him over, but simply 
that you support him no longer; then you will behold him, like a great Colossus whose pedestal 
has been pulled away, fall of his own weight and break into pieces.”  The voluntary nature of 325
authority as a consensual relationship of social influence is a concept rooted in the inter-activity 
of power-with, and underwrites the strategic power of civil disobedience. If enough people resist 
the normal operations that sustain a certain social organizational system, then that system will 
grind to a halt: because it is essentially built on the dynamics of power-with. 
!
(3.1.2) Power-With as the Middle, Medium, and Milieu of Power Relations  
Conduct Perspective Axiom #2: Power-to and power-over are a polar manifestation of power-
with; neither power-to nor power-over are derivative or secondary, they are dialectically 
generated together and there can never be a situation where one exists without the other.  
 From the vantage of a conduct perspective we can think of power as a process of collective 
action that always involves the mutual coordination of agentic structures (social structures that 
must be recognized as capable of individuated agency) and structured agencies (individual agents 
who must be recognized as being conditioned by social structures). By blending the terms of 
agency and structure, we can start to address a perspective that cannot discount one or the other, 
but also cannot rely too heavily on one or the other. For a conduct perspective we have to begin 
understanding power from the middle of power-to and power-over: in the dialectic origins of 
power-with as a milieu of collective action.  
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 All the rusty old dichotomies that hinge on the opposition of agency/structure, freedom/
domination, and power-to/power-over tend to fixate social theory in the same interminable 
either/or debates. To deal with these debates we don’t need to answer their questions, we need to 
ask different questions. We don’t need a solution. We need a solvent. We need dialectic 
formulation of power that can dissolve the dichotomous answers and fixations of the agency and 
structure binary, that can break down the rust that has stiffened the machine so that it can no 
longer do anything.  
 What does this mean: a dialectic formulation of power? I am calling upon a certain concept of 
dialectics insofar as it relates to thinking from the middle between opposites. Generally speaking, 
a dialectic approach means engaging with a set of concepts that are constructed according to a 
contradictory interaction, attending to the way that opposites are held together in a common 
structure, the way that a phenomenon can be explained as coordinated by the difference of a 
unity. Like Vladimir Illych Lenin once summarized it, “the splitting of a single whole and the 
cognition of its contradictory parts is the essence of dialectics.”  Dialectics is a conceptual 326
technique I associate with a wide range of practical theoretical methods, but they all must share 
this characteristic approach towards understanding the way that certain phenomena exhibit an 
essential contra-diction where two opposed terms have to be understood as existing only because 
of their interactive opposition.  
This is only one basic dialectic theoretical premise: focusing on the relational polarity 
between opposites, compared to dichotomous theories which consider a binary duality of 
opposites. One way to frame the difference between a dialectic and a dichotomous theoretical 
stance is to note the way the two models differently configure “contradiction.” For a dichotomy, 
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contradiction separates - it drives the two sides apart, erects walls between them, sets them 
against each other in a battle of zero-sum combat. For the dichotomous approach it is either/or: 
either power-to is fundamental or power-over is fundamental. It can’t be both. They don’t get 
along. For a dialectic conception, contradiction is the condition of integration: the two sides are 
differentiated by their relationship, as their relationship is what differentiates them. So, for 
instance, the question of how phenomenological experience occurs cannot be settled by positing 
the original priority of the subjective or the objective side of experience. Neither the subjective 
experiencing cogito nor the objective material world is “originally” responsible for the condition 
of experience: that would be to premise the problem dichotomously: literally, in a way that cuts 
the two sides apart so that they are fundamentally opposable in a zero-sum manner, such that one 
could destroy or do without the other, such that one could have existed prior to or beyond the 
influence of the other. A dialectic explanation and method of analysis has to begin from the 
premise that a dualism between two terms originates from the distinction itself, such that the one 
and the other are constituted through the design of the differentiation between them — they are 
not this, not that, but this-and-that or this-not-that: posited by a polar relationship as mirrored 
sides of the same phenomenon.  
A theory of power-with has to build conceptual tools that can see power relations in this kind 
of dialectic way, such that, as Louis Althusser put it: “there is no longer any original simple unity 
(in any form whatsoever), but instead, the ever-pre-givenness of a structured complex unity.”  327
The task of a dialectic theory is to deal with the contradiction and magnetic tension of opposed 
and conflicting forces that arise from an inter-active common origin. Abstractly, this means that a 
dialectic relationship between elements (things, agents, entities) is not to be premised on the 
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grounds that there is “this one” and then there is “that one.” This does not occur separately from 
That, growing up apart only to romantically cross paths some day. There is an original difference 
that comes from the “ever-pregivenness of a structured complex unity.” This — AND — That 
have to be thought of as part of the same relational unity, from which the identity of “This” and 
the identity of “That” are derived by juxtaposition. The two elements are already a set right from 
their inception. The relationship itself constitutes both sides of the polarity. 
French philosopher Jacques Derrida famously coined a concept that depicts this sense of 
dialectic origins as emerging from “differance,” wherein the relation of this one and that one 
doesn’t begin from either one, but from the constitutive differentiation that separates both ones 
from each other:  
What is written as differance, then, will be the playing movement that ‘produces’ – 
by means of something that is not simply an activity – these differences, these 
effects of difference. This does not mean that the differance that produces 
differences is somehow before them, in a simple and unmodified – in-different – 
present. Differance is the non-full, non-simple, structured and differentiating origin 
of differences. Thus the name ‘origin’ no longer suits it.   328
The agency perspective and the structure perspective both try to locate the origin of power in a 
lopsided split. For the agency perspective, power-to is the primary  cause and power-over is a 
secondary articulation, a derivative case. For the structure perspective, power-over is the primary 
cause and power-to is its secondary moment, an intended effect. Power-with is always already in 
the middle like the differance of power-to and power-over, originally differentiating between 
agency and structure so that the independent individual and the social whole are drawn together 
as a condition of their contrast.    
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I am working to build a conceptual association between power-to and power-over that grows 
out towards both poles at once, from the middle, from the dialectic differance of power-with. In 
the same spirit as the work Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, I strive for a theoretical process 
that both expresses and enacts this dialectic process, a way of seeing power as “proceeding from 
the middle, through the middle, coming and going rather than starting and finishing,”  to 329
“establish a logic of the AND, overthrow ontology, do away with foundations, nullify endings 
and beginnings.”  According to the “logic of the AND,” a dialectic differance is properly a 330
trinity that takes into account the This, the That, and the relation which posits This and That as 
mutually constitutive. Power-with is that bond. It is the “AND” which generates a relation 
between the poles of power, power-to and power-over.  
  Power-with provides the conceptual ‘and’ between ‘this’ power-to and ‘that’ power-over. 
This relationship can be conceived in several different modes, and in order to track some of its 
variations I will make use of another conceptual twist offered by Deleuze and Guattari in their 
use of the word “milieu.” As Brian Massumi explains, the French word “milieu means 
‘surroundings,’ ‘medium’ (as in chemistry), and ‘middle.’ In the philosophy of Deleuze and 
Guattari, ‘milieu’ should be read as a technical term combining all three meanings.”  In treating 331
power-with as a crux of my conduct perspective, I will analyze its nature as the milieu of power 
theory in these three different modes: 
1) Power-With is the Middle of Power  
 Power-To <— (Power-With) —> Power-Over 
As a middle, power-with is the conceptual bridge between power-to and power-over, the 
condition of connection and communication which links and spans those two poles of power. 
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Power-to and power-over are always dialectically constituted in an original differance through 
the middle of power-with.  
2) Power-With is the Medium of Power 
 Power-To —> …Power-With… —> Power-Over (Agency Perspective) 
 Power-To <— …Power-With… <— Power-Over (Structure Perspective) 
Power-with is the medium by which power-to and power-over are implemented. As the conduit, 
the means, and the method by which power is exerted, power-with is the mode of passage 
between one active point and another in a power relation. Like media through which information 
is transmitted, like the copper wire through which electrical power travels towards its effective 
goal, like economic practices which conduct wealth from one place to another: power-with is the 
medium the conducts the capacities and consequences of power’s actions and reactions.  
3) Power-With is the Milieu of Power 
 (PW: PT <—> PO :PW)  
Power-with is also a concept that represents a collective action environment, a milieu or place in 
which particular codes of power are prevalent. Power relations are organized in systems that hold 
space and that have limits. To think of power in a systemic way is to determine how power-with 
shall coordinate the interactions of power-to and power-over in a particular scene, space, or 
place. Thus, the concept of the milieu defines a patterned system of inter-actions, the 
environment or scene which conditions a specific inter-action, the set of assembled social 
structures which serves to conduct relations of power-to and power-over according to 
institutionalized, habitualized, and codified communicative patterns. To think of power-with as 
depicting a milieu of power can highlight the way that power should be understood as a set of 
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complex structured relations which organize regular systems of inter-active power-to and power-
over.  
I will elaborate now on this framework of power-with as middle, medium, and milieu of inter-
active organization as a way to recalibrate the conceptual relations of power-to, power-over, and 
power-with, so that we can be more prepared to apply these concepts in the coming analysis of 
collective action systems. 
let’s begin with the first point: power-with is the middle of power relations. This means that 
power-to and power-over are always bonded opposites, polar forces generate simultaneously as 
dual terms of an influential interaction. The middle is magnetic: it generates power-to and power-
over as polar manifestations of the same phenomenon of a power-with interactive relationship of 
influence. The magnetic polarity of the power relation can be inverted. Looking out, into external 
relations, an agent experiences power-to as a positive cause-ability acted into a social milieu 
where it must meet externally resistant forces, which are labelled as a negative power-over 
insofar as they present an oppressive control or a hindrance (PT+ —> PO-). From the other 
direction, looking internally to consider how an agent maintains their own coherence, power-
over is the positive capacity to control and coordinate internal collective power dynamics, which 
may have their own capacities to control and coordinate and/or to resist control and coordination 
(PO+ —> PT-).  
One important point of treating power-with as the middle of a invertible magnetic relation 
between power-to and power-over is to always consider that power and resistance are bonded. If 
we accept that power can only be acted upon agents who retain a baseline capacity for liberty in 
relation the controls which are imposed upon them, then it makes perfect sense to say, as Michel 
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Foucault often does, that power and resistance is a relationship which is built into the 
phenomenon of power. In the History of Sexuality—Volume I, for instance, Foucault calls on 
resistances as the “odd term in power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible 
opposite.”  Astoundingly (to my understanding at least), critics often say there’s no room for 332
“liberty” or “freedom” or “resistance” in Foucault’s concepts of power; that his is a totalizing 
structure perspective from which the only possible conclusion is that we are all subjugated 
automatons. But it is only by failing to recognize or understand the essential axiomatic difference 
between the standard agency perspective and the alternative conduct perspective that this 
interpretation is possible.  
Jeffrey T. Nealon, in his own defence of Foucault against the variety of criticism, quotes a 
representative snippet of the prevailing agency perspective dogma from the English translators’ 
introduction to Alain Badiou’s Infinite Thought. It bears repeating here as a representative sample 
of the way that those who are wedded to the agency perspective tend to misinterpret Foucault’s 
approach:  
In his middle period, Foucault argued that networks of disciplinary power not only 
reach into the most intimate spaces of the subject, but actually produce what we 
call subjects. However, Foucault also said that power produces resistance. His 
problem then became that of accounting for the source of such resistance. If the 
subject — right down to its most intimate desires, actions, and thoughts — is 
constituted by power, then how can it be a source of independent resistance? For 
such a point of agency to exist, Foucault needs some space that has not been 
completely constituted by power, or a complex doctrine on the relationship 
between resistance and independence. However, he has neither. In his late work, he 
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deals with this problem by assigning agency to those subjects who resist power by 
means of an aesthetic project of self-authoring.  333
This kind of criticism reflects more upon the critic’s own presuppositions than it does upon the 
actual purpose and process of Foucault’s work, entirely missing Foucault’s sense of describing 
power as a complex structured relation of interactions which is coextensive with the human 
capacities for freedom, agency, and resistance. They are reading Foucault in a foreign conceptual 
language, and they end up expressing an intellectualized version of the childish retort: “I know 
you are, but what am I?” Claiming that Foucault fails to offer an adequate account of an agency 
located outside of power relations it is like criticizing modern art for failing to paint believably 
realistic portraits. It entirely misses the point by passing judgments of worth according to a set of 
qualifications external to the thing judged. Yes, of course if you consider a Kandinsky or an 
O’Keefe painting against the terms by which a Rembrandt or a Michelangelo are judged, then 
there’s no contest. That’s my point: there no comparable contest between these two positions, 
they represent different perspectives, different orientations. What if the one does not invalidate 
the other? There’s no reason why my appreciation of Rembrandt discredits any parallel 
appreciation of Kandinsky. Rather the contrary: my aesthetic life will be far richer for 
appreciating them both. What if the theoretical perspectives on power could also make room for 
multiple visions? 
 I want us to think of the agency and the structure perspectives in this way, to recognize the 
differences in value they each offer without reducing the one to the other. The notion that there is 
no power without resistance is a famously mis-interpreted point when its logic is treated only 
from either the agency or the structure perspective, when the special dynamics of the conduct 
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perspective are ignored. Elaborating on the terms of resistance and power in a very different 
frame of reference than he applied in the History of Sexuality — Volume I, but with the same 
conduct perspective logic, Foucault states again in The Subject and Power that there is “no 
relationship of power without the means of escape or possible flight. […] It would not be 
possible for power relations to exist without points of insubordination which, by definition, are 
means of escape.”  Resistance is mounted not from “outside” the complex relations of these 334
competing powers, but as another alternative and opposing collective action assemblage that 
must strive to over-power and out-manoeuver its competitors. Any agent who wields the freedom 
to act as a conduit of power can mount resistance to others or to a dominant collective action 
system, but only to the extent that they can mount the power of an alternative collective action 
system. Resistance is “another power.” Which is also to say that power-to is always performed in 
contrast to the power-over that can support and/or resist it, and vice versa, power-over can only 
be performed upon agents with the power-to acquiesce and/or resist it. This is the condition of 
power-with as a concept of interactive magnetism: there are always powers. What is experienced 
as power-to for me is felt by my enemy as an imposition of power-over; what is my power is 
their resistance. And vice versa, the power-over imposed upon me is a successful exertion of 
power-to for my enemy; my resistance reacts to their power. It is essentially perspectival flip that 
requires us to uproot the fixation on any one point of reference. Whether I consider a certain 
relationship of power in terms of power-to or power-over can be switched, but what never 
changes is that the middle of that magnetic opposition is power-with, the means of 
communicative conduct.  
 The invertible magnetic relationship between power-to and power-over is central to the 
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conduct perspective’s analytic and strategic capacity. For one, the abstractly utopian sentiments 
of anarchist radical democracy (as so loudly expressed in the discourses of consensus decision-
making) cannot be maintained in the face of the conduct perspective. The concept of radical 
democracy has to adapt accordingly. Chantal Mouffe’s concern with the idea of agonistic 
democracy is an important case of this adjustment. As she says, from a perspective that accepts 
the ubiquity of power as a process of division and coordination in all social relations,  
the main question of democratic politics becomes then not how to eliminate power, 
but how to constitute forms of power which are compatible with democratic values. 
To acknowledge the existence of relations of power and the need to transform them, 
while renouncing the illusion that we could free ourselves completely from power — 
this is what is specific to the project that we have called ‘radical and plural 
democracy.’   335
The conduct perspective requires such conceptual reviews, treating power as constitutive of 
every type of organization and the modes of social conflict which they inevitably evoke as 
reversible relations of power-with must always be the focal point of analysis. This is especially  
true for the radical democratic politics of power-with where we aim to form relations of radical 
equality. Relations of radical equality are not going to be free from power, they are not neutral. 
They too will pose interactions of power-to and power-over through the magnetic connection of 
power-with. The task is not to compose a shiny happy bubble of pure power-to and power-with 
(that is only an illusion, a repression, which tends to mutate into new shadowy monsters of 
power-over). The task is to understand and balance a system of power-to/power-over as explicit 
relationships, determined from the middle by focusing on the modalities of power-with, the types 
of interaction, the structure of relations, the conduct of conducts that can provoke the most 
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egalitarian and interactive empowerments for all involved members of a specific collective 
action system. 
 We can also begin to look at power as a problem of the second point: power-with is the 
medium of power. To treat power-with as a medium is to assert that power is always a 
communicative causation; or, as I’ve introduced the idea already, the communicative act of 
conduct. Communication requires a medium of symbolic interaction. It is composed of 
information and messages rather than impacts and forces. Therefore, in opposition to the popular 
agency perspective which build a model of power from the basis of the physical physical cause-
ability of behaviours, the conduct perspective has to see power as a communicative cause-ability 
of actions. As Terrence Ball puts it, “people do not ordinarily exercise power by bumping into 
other human beings but by communicating with them through a system of signs or gestures or 
words.”  The mechanical philosophy of explaining power in reference to causal physical 336
phenomena, with all its allusion to billiard balls and physical jostling, will not hold for the 
conduct perspective because power here has to be about influencing the actions of other actors, 
and the communicative cause-ability of power must be more strictly differentiated from the 
physical causation of force and violence. Beginning from power-with, we have to reframe the 
concepts of power-to and power-over as inherently delimited by the boundaries of social and 
communicative influence. 
 Power is a communicative process that impels agents to act in certain ways through the 
medium of socialized, symbolic, ritualistic, and routinized forms of coded activities — that is, 
through the scenarios of possible interaction that are established by a given social milieu. A key 
point of defining power’s communicative medium resides in its responsibility to, but also 
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indeterminacy in relation to, the milieu in which it is expressed. A power relation is never 
certain, never totally defined by overbearing structural power-over, because the parties involved 
always have a capacity to change their relations and affect the milieu itself. Again, let’s consider 
the classically anarchist problem of authority. Authority is founded on communicative consent; it 
always requires a willingness to act (however that willingness is generated, by coercion or 
conviction) upon its communicated dictates. Gene Sharp has identified this as a crucial 
component of direct action nonviolence: recognizing that “the key to habitual obedience is to 
reach the mind. Obedience will scarcely be habitual unless it is loyal, not forced. In essence, 
authority must be voluntarily accepted.”  Obedience is always given, rather than taken. 337
Obedience can, of course, be coerced into being given, but the point is that the power of 
authority is always a communicative relationship. Hannah Arendt delves into this point as an 
important hinge in her thought on power. Arendt observes that “when we say of somebody that 
he is ‘in power’ we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in 
their name. The moment the group, from which power originated (potestas in populo, without a 
people or group there is no power), disappears, ‘his power’ also vanishes.”  Considering how 338
we are defining authority as a consensual relation of communicative causation, Arendt’s point 
makes perfect sense. To be “in power” is to have the authorized right to command others to act in 
the pursuit of some collectively-defined goal, a right which increases the commander’s chance of 
finding submission to an order. But if the people who act subordinate to that position of authority 
do not recognize it as authoritative, then they are always able to remove their obedience. If they 
remove their obedience, then the heightened capacity for authority to cause the actions of its 
subordinates automatically disappears. Authority requires the willing response of the subordinate 
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to follow-through with the commander’s command. Without that willingness, the power that it 
conducts will cease to function.  
 Because of the link between authority and violence, social theorists are often tempted to find 
the greatest magnitude of power in a positive correlation with the greatest coercive threat of 
violence. If power is strongest when forceful coercion is strongest, then certainly the threat of 
punishment tends to dramatically increase the capacity for power. Gerhard Lenski, for instance, 
wrote: 
The ability to take life is the most effective form of power. In other words, more 
men will respond more readily to the threat of the use of force than to any other. In 
effect, it constitutes the final court of appeals in human affairs; there is no appeal 
from force in a given situation except the exercise of superior force. Hence force 
stands in the same relationship to other forms of power as trumps to other suits in 
the game of bridge, and those who can exercise the greatest force are like those 
who control trumps.  339
If the chance of finding submission to an order reaches its greatest magnitude with the legitimate 
and plausible threat of violence, then wouldn’t a gun to the head elicit the swiftest and surest 
obedience, exhibiting the clearest and strongest power? Should we conclude that violence is the 
utmost authority, that, as Mao’s famous dictum proclaims, “political power grows out of the 
barrel of a gun?”  Hannah Arendt says no: “out of the barrel of a gun grows the most effective 340
command, resulting in the most instant and perfect obedience. What never can grow out of it is 
power.”   341
Power cannot grow out of the barrel of a gun because it is a communicative practice of 
coordinated activity among agents, and as such exists only through communicative inter-action 
rather than through forceful violence. Another way to put this is to say that violence is not an 
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inter-action. It is a propulsion, a physical movement; it is a thing that happens to bodies, not to 
actions. To highlight this point, we can take a closer definitional look at the notion of power as 
coercive influence. In order for someone to be “coerced” into performing an action that they 
would not otherwise do, they have to understand and act upon a threat. Again, to repeat the point, 
a threat is necessarily a communication. Thus, an institution of power-over relies on the 
communicative causation which the threat of violence can compel, and not upon the actual force 
of violence to which the threat refers. So, for instance, if someone puts a gun to my head and 
tells me to fall in line, the event of power is in the coercive influence of the threat that compels 
me to willingly oblige as the gun-wielder commands. I may choose to be coerced and fall in line 
instead of provoking the potential violence that could issue from the gun. But, if I refuse to obey 
and I get shot, then that is no longer an act of power but simply an event of violence (at least for 
me it is, in that specific moment; often an actual act of threatened violence serves as a 
demonstration to others who perceive it because it continues to represent a threatening 
communication of power-over — “see, I’m serious: fall in line or this will happen to you!”).  
Technically, power ends precisely where violence begins, even though there is a strong bond 
between the two in communicated coercion. In The Subject and Power, Michel Foucault 
explicitly draws the line of power at this limit of violence, specifying that 
a relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it 
breaks, it destroys, or it closes off all possibilities. Its opposite pole can only be 
passivity, and if it comes up against any resistance it has no other option but to try 
to break it down. A power relationship, on the other hand, can only be articulated 
on the basis of two elements that are indispensable if it is really to be a power 
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relationship: that ‘the other’ (the one over whom power is exercised) is recognized 
and maintained to the very end as a subject who acts.  342
This concept of power as a management of possibilities represents the limit which is set between 
force/violence and power/conduct. In fact, it is the threat of force which is the trump suit in 
power relations, not force itself. Power is conducted action, not forced action (action upon 
action, not force upon behaviour). Nikolas Rose also usefully draws the distinction between 
power as domination and power as governance that relies on the concept that power is a 
communicative causation, such that governmental actions of collective control must be 
understood as conducting and guiding the inter-actions of its members, rather than forcing them 
into shape. As he says:  
To dominate is to ignore or to attempt to crush the capacity for action of the 
dominated. But to govern is to recognize that capacity for action and to adjust 
oneself to it. To govern is to act upon action. […] Hence, when it comes to 
governing human beings, to govern is to presuppose the freedom of the governed. 
To govern is not to crush their capacity to act, but to acknowledge it and utilize it 
for one’s own objectives.   343
Power can never grow from violence because it is based on a mutual social contract of 
recognized legitimately accepted modes of inter-action: A influences B to perform a certain 
action performed willingly in the context of a defined social relation of collective action (as 
conduct, involving inter-active communicative influences that compel people to coordinate their 
actions in accordance with each other’s powers).  
 “Power and violence, though they are distinct phenomena, usually appear together,”  says 344
Arendt. The appear together as bonded by a dialectic opposition. They appear together at the 
limits of power, where power is most volatile and most tenuous and most dangerous. Violence 
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occurs upon a thing or body. The blow of violence renders upon a thing as forceful behaviour, 
having nothing to do with communication. On the other hand, power compels actions through 
communicated influence. The communicated threat of violence may indeed be a compelling way 
to induce conduct, but it cannot sustain a balanced system of collective control on its own. When 
actions work upon actions, it is by applying mechanisms of influential coercion (“that are, to 
varying degrees, strict”) which are responsible for controlling and structuring a field of 
possibilities for those actions, but without clenching so much that this field of possibility is 
suffocated. The mechanisms of coercion can be varyingly strict, but they cannot be totally strict. 
Niklas Luhmann calls upon a concept of power as contrasted to coercion in this sense when he 
comments that “the possible choices of a person being coerced are reduced to zero. In borderline 
cases coercion resorts to the use of physical violence and thereby to the substitution of one’s own 
action for the action of others one cannot bring about… for many cases we can even say that 
coercion has to be exercised where there is a lack of power.”  When the possible choices reach 345
zero, then we have exited the domain of power altogether because there is no longer any 
opportunity for conduct by inter-action, the communicative influencing of another agents 
choices in a field of possibilities. Forceful impetus or violent compulsion will only drive 
behaviours. Thus, the means of conduct power are never totally reliant on direct force: that 
would register a phenomenon of direct violence that breaks, destroys, and closes off all 
possibilities by forcing behaviours, whereas the communicative influence of power has to direct 
and manage possibility, harness and organize activities. We see here how power acts upon the 
conduction of liberties, it is a “play of liberties.” Power is a project of acts influencing upon acts, 
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a conduct of actions; whereas violence is a physics of force upon force, a causation of 
behaviours. 
And, finally, to think of my third point about conduct power: power-with as the milieu of 
power. This means that power analysis has to attend to the social spaces which power relations 
create by patterning collective systems of communicative conduct. A milieu of power-with is a 
condition of consistent rules and roles which define different collective action systems. This 
concept will lead us to the most distinct analytic invention of this project, the systems diagrams. 
The diagrams try to depict how we can model the relations of power-to and power-over as 
constituting the milieus of collective action systems. For now, a milieu has to be thought of as a 
key condition of how power exercises communicative causal social relationships that have the 
tendency to form enduring, regular, and rule-bound systems of conduct.  
Language is perhaps one of the most abstract and broad-ranging terms upon which collective 
action systems can be distinguished as defining different power milieus. Only those creatures 
who communicate — however minimally — can inter-act through power-with, and so language 
comprehension determines an important limit to the milieu in which one agent may possibly 
have the power to communicatively influence the conduct of another, or in which agents may be 
reasonably expected to conform to the rules and roles of social structures. As Peter Winch said: 
 It does not make much sense to suppose that human beings might have been 
issuing commands and obeying them before they came to form the concept of 
command and obedience. For their performance of such acts is itself the chief 
manifestation of their possession of those concepts. An act of obedience itself 
contains, as an essential element, a recognition of what went before it as an 
order.  346
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Communicative understanding is the baseline condition upon which relations of power can 
occur, conducted by languages which include words, gestures, ideals, dreams, symbolisms, 
threats. Power occurs where an action effected through a communicative medium influences 
upon the present or future actions of another agent, and when these mediums of conduct start to 
settle into consistent circuits or conduits, they can then be identified as forming milieus, specific 
spaces in which a collective action system takes shape.  
We can explore the implications of treating collective action systems as patterned 
configurations of conduct by continuing to think about authority. Take, for instance, Gerhard 
Lenski’s basic definition of authority as “the enforceable right to command others,” which he 
articulates in comparison to the concept of influence as “the ability to manipulate the social 
situation of others, or their perception of it, by the exercise of one’s resources and rights, thereby 
increasing the pressures on others to act in accordance with one’s own wishes.”  Lenski is here 347
following upon a definition presented by Max Weber’s classic concept of Herrschaft, which 
called authority an increase in “the chance of finding submission to an order.”  With this in 348
mind, let’s think about how the statement “Yes Sir” functions in relation to the structure of a 
military hierarchy. The statement “Yes Sir” is uttered by the inferior position, soldier B, as a sign 
of deference to a superior position, officer A. When B says “Yes Sir!” it is a sign of submission to 
A’s order, an expression of B’s compliance with A’s command and a routine acknowledgement of 
A’s authority. The statement “Yes Sir!” confirms an authority relationship that exists between the 
officer and the solider according to the normally encoded collective controls of military 
behaviour. In this context, authority can still be described as a case of Dahl’s power, where “A 
has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise 
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do.”  However, there is an important twist. In the case of authority, B’s social role 349
predetermines that they should automatically complete this formula of power. B will likely act 
according to the routine structure of their role, obeying A’s directives without putting up any 
resistance or conflict, which would annul Dahl’s formula, leaving us with a situation void of 
power. It is only by thinking of the power relationship as a structuring of agency that we can see 
this interaction as a normal medium of power for a bigger collective action system, the military.  
 The officer’s authority is a relationship structured by the particular collective action system of 
the military which heightens the standing probability that the solider will do as the officer 
commands without resistance. This analysis of authority considers it to be more of a structural 
condition of control which permeates and defines a specific social institution, rather than an 
individual power of causation belonging to the qualities of an active agent. The structural 
interpretation of authority treats it as a feature of defined, predetermined behaviours that preempt 
and exclude events of conflict or command between A and B by providing the social link through 
which A and B act as a common power — authority ties A and B together in C, a collective 
action system which has power-over the conduct of their related actions for the sake of producing 
power-to as an entire institution. It aims to assure that A will cause behaviours in B as a matter of 
regular, uneventful, non-conflictual compliance with the structural institutional rules, a structural 
power-over. In other words, the the milieu of communicative conduct that is instituted by “the 
military” connects A and B in a common collective action system.  
Power occurs wherever the conduct of communicative influence connects power and 
resistance. This is a formulaic definition which certainly sets up a great variety of potential 
power constellations. It is not simply coercive and destructive, nor is it simply cooperative and 
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productive. Rather, power undergirds the possibility of communicative causation which can be 
coercive or cooperative in varying degrees, and is probably always some of both. To register the 
way that power-with is in the middle relation coded by various milieus of power-to and power-
over relationships, we can highlight a key difference between Max Weber’s and Hannah Arendt’s 
concepts of power, as distinguished by Jürgen Habermas.  
For Weber, the essence of power is found in the coercive capacity of one agent to cause 
actions in another, in the case of both Macht and Herrschaft. Habermas has stated that Weber, on 
the one hand, “defined power as the possibility of forcing one’s own will, whatever it may be, on 
the conduct of others.”  That is, Weber’s notion of power as capacity comes back to the 350
instrumental projects of agents acting in conflict with one another. Habermas continues, 
explaining Weber’s view of power as “a teleological model of action in which an individual 
subject or a group has a set purpose and chooses the means suitable for realizing it.”  Arendt, in 351
contrast, proposes a model of power that is essentially a function of “the capacity to agree in 
uncoerced communication on some community action.”  Habermas draws the difference 352
between the two perspective along the battle lines of a conflictual/consensual duality: Weber 
“considers only agents who are oriented toward their own success and not toward agreement,” 
whereas Arendt argues that power is not “the instrumentalization of another’s will for one’s own 
purpose but the formation of a common will in a communication aimed at agreement.”  Weber 353
and Arendt seem to be articulating distinct ideas about power, one based on conflict and the other 
based on consensus.  
This dichotomy is in fact another common feature of meta-theorizations on power. Mark 
Haugaard, for instance, also argues against the terms of the traditional debate that “has taken on 
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the form of an insistence by some that power is primarily conflictual and others that it is mostly 
consensual.”  In the words of Thomas Wartenberg, the distinguishing mark between these two 354
theoretical streams is that some accept “the idea that power is a constraint on the lives of human 
beings,” while “others move in a fundamentally different direction by seeking to develop a 
positive notion of power, one that does not see power as fundamentally oppressive.”  If we 355
look at both views from the conduct perspective, however, it is quickly apparent that power can 
run across the spectrum from conflictual relations to consensual relations, because both versions 
depict individuals interacting in the context of collective action milieus. In this analytic context, 
both Weber and Arendt are right about power, they’re just focusing on different parts of the same 
phenomenon. It’s rather like the popular parable about several blind people who each touch a 
different part of an elephant to decide what it is: the one holding a leg says, it’s a tree; the one 
holding trunk says, it’s a snake; and the one holding a tusk says, it’s a spear. Weber and Arendt 
are talking about the same thing, they’re just at different ends of the elephant.   
In Weber’s approach, power is expressed when agent A collects agent B’s will into their own, 
coercing or manipulating or demanding that B contributes to the collective action structure which 
works to A’s benefit, control, and purposes. This is a conflictual and coercive form of assembling 
collective action, but it is quite clearly still a form of collective action. B’s actions are assembled 
into the structure of A’s projects, by means of the interaction between A and B which coordinate 
B in accordance with projects that benefit A. That is, A conducts the conduct of B in such a way 
that B’s actions become a part of A’s conduct. In the form of A versus B, power is treated as a 
battle and contentious political struggle for hegemonic dominance. In this case one agent exerts 
power-to in order to change the conduct of another agent’s power-to (the medium of 
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communicative causation), under the auspices of a shared collective system that coordinates their 
mutual inter-action (the milieu of collective control), and the analytic categories of power-to and 
power-over are bonded in this manifestation of conflictual power by their antagonistic polarity 
(power-with is the middle is a dialectic relation between my power-to my enemy’s power-over).  
On the other hand, Arendt’s version of power addresses that other end of the conflict-
communion spectrum, treating power as collective action which arises from the purely 
consensual communicative interactions of humans agreeing to act in concert. In this case, power-
to is our power and power-over is the mutually accepted authority that our bond holds over us as 
our collective system. For Arendt, power arises only in cases where humans create collective 
actions in agreement, the positive processes she defines as the essence of politics and action. 
Arendt is also clearly dealing with a concept of power that is oriented towards collective action, 
but in this case we are faced with a version of power that is ideally aimed at building a structure 
of egalitarian, communicative, non-dominating power. Here, the bond between power-to and 
power-over is synthetic: the power-to of each individual influences the conduct of the group 
(communicative causation, from the agency perspective) bound together under a common system 
of power-over (collective control, from the structure perspective) such that collective action 
systems emerge as a new source of power-to.  
 Conflict coordinates collective action systems by differentiation, consent coordinates them by 
assimilation. In either case, power arises as the active middle term of inter-active power-to/
power-over conduct relations, as the coordinating medium of communicative alliances and 
associations or conflicts and competitions, that function to distinguish and assemble a collective 
action milieu.  
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(3.2) Diagrams for Mapping Power-To, Power-Over, and Power-With in 
Collective Action Systems 
The model of power I am proposing requires that we think of all agents and all social structure as 
invested manifestations of collective action systems. In order to depict this basic premise in a 
schematic (ultimately quite basic yet innovative) way, I will briefly outline a set of diagrams that 
depict how power-to and power-over can be dialectically linked according to the internal and 
external relations of collective action systems. By outlining these power systems diagrams as 
hinged on the categories of external relations and internal relations (which I have previously 
associated with the agent perspective and the structure perspective, respectively) we can redefine 
a connection between agency and structure as mutually coherent perspectives that together 
describe elements of collective action systems. I will then use the diagrams to depict the power 
of consensus decision-making in a new light.  
 This model of power draws inspiration from a systems theory paradigm which treats 
collectives as open functioning systems of interactive components, which themselves also derive 
from open-functioning systems. I am drawing from the way that Eva M. Knodt explains Niklas 
Luhmann’s application of systems theory as a process that “simulates complexity in order to 
explain complexity, and it does so by creating a flexible network of selectively interrelated 
concepts that can be recombined in many different ways and thus be used to describe the most 
diverse social phenomena.”  I aspire to that kind of plan: these power systems diagrams should 356
empower some flexible and the interrelated concepts.  
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 Earlier, in chapter 2, I introduced the agency and structure dichotomy via Torben Bech 
Dyrberg’s explanation of external and internal relations. As he said, “the basic assumption of 
agency conceptions of power is that “the relation between agent and structure has to be 
external,”  whereas for a structural conception of power “the relation between subject position 357
and structure must be internal.”  The difference between the agency perspective and the 358
structure perspective marks several distinctive shifts in the way that people go about articulating 
their own theories of power. While most theorists ultimately tend to side with one or the other (at 
least, in the end, as a matter of method), I think these differences in fact represent two side of the 
same coin. The agency and the structure perspective are dialectically mirrored versions of a 
common phenomenon, they are a parallax view of the same image. I am trying to bring this 
image into dual focus by understanding that power is a process of collective action, that it can 
never occur without both the scene of an inter-active influence among agents and a collective 
action system of structures that coordinate those inter-actions.  
!
(3.2.1) External and Internal Relations of Collective Action Systems 
In the agency perspective power relations are built-up from the component parts of individual 
agents, promoting a theoretical architecture that works from the bottom-up, using the individual 
person as the atomic agent of power relations. The concept of an atom refers to the smallest 
possible piece of matter. Drawn from the ancient Greek philosopher Democritus’ theory of a 
world built from arrangements of a single basic material building block, 18th century European 
science picked up on the idea that the physical world was made up of essential particles, and they 
called this idea an “atom.” Literally,  the Greek word “atom” means in-divisible. The atom is the 
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building block of all things because there is nothing smaller. The agency perspective treats the 
individual agent like the atom of power relations: the individual agent is considered the smallest 
in-dividual piece of the power puzzle, from which all further relations must be built up. Putting 
together atoms, we can build molecules; putting together molecules, we build complex physical 
structures. In the same way, the agency perspective puts together power as a story about how 
individual agencies combine and collide, arrange and oppose one another.  
Figure 1: Agency Perspective — External Inter-Actions of an Atomic Individual 
Figure 1 shows the simplest manifestation of power-to and power-over for the agency 
perspective. The atomic agent is represented by the shaded, solid-lined circle in the middle of the 
diagram. Agents are treated as predetermined atoms, and social power is a matter of assessing the 
way that those agents inter-act to influence one another to “do something they would not 
otherwise have done.” The question of how power affects the agent is a question of how it over-
 225
powers other agents or is over-powered by other agents. In the diagram these relations of power 
are represented by the curved connecting lines that link the central agent with external agents 
represented by the dashed-line circles. 
 For the structure perspective we have to reverse those terms, taking power-over as the basic 
and original form of power from which the conditions of individual agency and power-to are 
then derived. In this approach, social power is built from the top-down, starting from the 
operations required for a dividual totality to control and maintain its own systemic parts. A 
dividual totality refers to a total limit within which elements may be divided, but outside of 
which nothing can be considered. The individual atom has no internal relations, only external 
relations. In direct contrast, the dividual totality has no external relations, only internal relations.  
Figure 2: Structure Perspective — Internal Inter-Actions of a Dividual Totality 
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Figure 2 represents the origins of power-over and power-to according to the structure 
perspective. The structure perspective starts from a social totality that generates power-over as a 
means of creating and controlling agents as  internal subjects of its own systemic organization. In 
the diagram above this is represented by a zone of internal relations which is delimited and 
contained by the solid-lined circle. The inward pointing dashed-lines represent the power-over 
that defines and controls internal subjects, who are represented by the dashed-line circles, to 
engage power-to in the roles and rules coded by the social totality. 
 To build a diagram that could represent the conduct perspective we will have to consider both 
of these models at once, superimposed upon each other, so that power has to be seen as 
conducting internal relations for a a collective agent who is also engaged in external relations. 
There is no such thing as an originally independent agent or an originally social totality. Every 
social agent is a system with internal relations of power in itself (as a unified totality having 
internal relations of power which constitute its own coherence) and an agent having external 
relation with other systems (as an atomic individual having external relations of power which 
articulate its interaction with other forces). Power, therefore, is a concept that depicts the 
dynamics of conduct that coordinate the inside and outside faces of a collective action system.  
 We can still consider power from both the agency and the structure perspective, depending on 
the question and the context. Gerhard Göhler aims for a similar outlook when he argues that 
“both power over and power to mean different things, depending on their potentiality or actuality 
and on whether their point of reference is inside the group (self-reference) or outside.”  If we 359
think, first of all, from the agency perspective, then it makes sense to see collective action 
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systems as constructed by the interactive coordination of agents working together to build social 
power organizations. 
Figure 3: Agency Perspective — Collective Action System Conducted by External Relations  
This diagram illustrates the basic form of an agency perspective analysis of collective action, 
coordinated from the bottom up by external relations among individual agents. The atomic 
individual agents, represented by the shaded circles, interact by influencing each other with their 
individual power-to, constructing relations of mutually binding power-over through the medium 
of power-with to compose conduct patterns of collective assemblage. Their interactions, 
represented by the curved dashed-lines, form relationships that constitute the conditions of the 
group’s collective action, represented by the solid-lined arrows pointing out towards the larger 
dashed-line circle that encompasses them. 
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 The structure perspective on power would build collective action systems the other way 
around: as a coordinated totality first, which then regulate the roles, rules, and routines of its 
internal mechanisms, designing its own individual particles in such a way that the social 
structures containing them are sustained and reproduced. 
Figure 4: Structure Perspective — Collective Action System Conducted by Internal Relations  
This diagram shows the structure perspective analysis of collective action coordinated from the 
top-down by social control over the internal relations of subjects. Power-over originates from the 
solid inward-pointing lines to conduct the internal activity of the dividual totality in question. In 
the diagram, the solid-lines coming inwards from the limit of the dividual totality first influence 
the curved dashed-lines connecting the internal subjects (who are represented by dashed-line 
circles). This is because the power-over of structural control works first of all on the roles, rules, 
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and relationships of the inter-actions, conditioning the internal subjects’ power-to in relation to 
each other in ways that support the overall integrity of the collective action system.  
 Figures 3 and 4 represent the general image of how the agency and the structure perspectives 
understand collective action to be constructed as a process that works from the bottom-up or 
from the top-down. For the agency perspective, collective action systems are built from the 
bottom-up, so that each individual is gathered together in their external relations to combine into 
a greater assembly of collective power. For the structure perspective, the collective system works 
from the top-down to orient its internal subjects in sync with the greater assembly of collective 
power. For a conduct perspective, however, power has to be analyzed as travelling in both 
directions, such that we can account for the overlapping relations of external and an internal 
interactions.  
 Power works to coordinate the internal dynamics of a collective action system and its external 
relations with other systems in its environment. This means that the two perspectives must be 
conceived as co-ordinated, as forming a dynamics feedback system. Consider the agency 
perspective first.  
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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 Figure 5: Structured Agency — Interactive Power-To Conducting Collective Power-Over 
This diagram depicts a feedback loop of structured agency. If agents coordinate to create a 
collective action system (the dashed-outer circle), that system will solidify into structured 
expectations on its internal agents’ further action patterns (the solid outer circle). The structured 
collective action system exerts pressure back upon the agents who create it (represented here by 
the inward-pointing large arrow), so that whenever agents create a common system of 
interactions the relations they have with each other become conducted through structured terms 
of agency. The agents who are parts of the collective whole cease to be predetermined and 
atomically simple (they lose their shaded solidity and are instead constituted by a dashed-line 
contingency conducted in relation to their interactive system). Agents who exist within collective 
action systems are always structurally constituted in ongoing relation to their systems.When a 
group of agents is assembled to create a collective system, then that system will inevitably have a 
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return impact on the nature of their interactions and the roles which they fulfill within their 
common activities. That is, the collective action system becomes a structural condition within 
which those agents continue to act. It is impossible to conceive of an agent who is not structured 
in some way by their participation in collective action systems.  
 From the other direction, it is similarly impossible to conceive of the structure perspective 
version of collective action as a one-way process. Whereas agents are always acting in 
collectively defined conditions of structured agency, the composition of collective systems also  
creates the inevitable condition of agentic structures.  
 Figure 6: Agentic Structures — Interactive Power-Over Conducting Collective Power-To 
In this diagram the structure model of collective action internal control now includes a dashed 
outer circle and outward-pointing arrow, which represent that the structural whole can act as an 
agent with external relations of its own. The internal control and coordination of subjects is 
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conducted for the sake of rendering the structure as an agent in other external relations. There is 
no longer any shaded exterior zone because the structure’s dividual totality no longer represents a 
a strict limit to the analysis of internal relations. In any collective action system, insofar as 
internal relations are strutted into conformity with the structural totality it is for the purpose of 
acting as an individual agent in power relations with other social forces, other collective action 
systems. The collective action system which is coordinated by controlling internal relations 
always does so because it is itself an agent in its own external relations; that is, structures are 
agents too. 
 As Niklas Luhmann says, modern systems theories have made important strides “to replace 
the traditional difference between parts and wholes with that between system and 
environment.”  Parts and wholes remain conceptually important to these theoretical 360
approaches, but they cannot be taken as essentialized atoms or fundamentally presumed 
totalities. There are no abstract units of absolute reference. That is, there is no whole which is not 
also a part in other wholes, and there is no part which is not also a whole that contains other 
parts. The diagrammatic depictions of collective action systems’ internal and external relations 
should banish any thought of treating power as a simple matter of parts and wholes, pure agents 
and pure structures. Thinking about systems and environments rather than parts and wholes helps 
to challenge the notion the everything fits neatly into a single functional system or that power 
must originate certainly from a fixed natural source. There are no atomic individuals and no 
dividual totalities. There are no agents and no structures; only structured agencies and agentic 
structures.  
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 Power is in the conduct relations of social coordination and competition that differentiate the 
systemic environments of collective action systems. As Luhmann puts it, “a differentiated system 
is no longer simply composed of a certain number of parts and the relations among them; rather, 
it is composed of a relatively large number of operationally employable system/environment 
differences, which each, along different cutting lines, reconstruct the whole system as the unity 
of subsystem and environment.”  The power systems diagrams should work as a conceptual 361
toolset that can help to classify the “cutting lines” that distinguish how a collective action system 
is composed of both internal relations with common systems and external relations in common 
environments. A power analysis based in this perspective must always ask a double set of 
questions: 1) the agency questions: how does a specific collective action system interact with the 
environment of external power relations in which it is situated? — where does it stand in conflict 
or cooperation of external relations with other systems that are beyond its own patterns of 
internal conduct? And 2) the structure questions: how does a specific collective action system 
coordinate the internal power relations of its own system? — where does it fit in relation to other 
systems with which it shares internal patterns of conduct? By treating every social agent as a 
collective structure and every social structure as a collective agent, these double questions must 
be asked for every question of power.  
 If we think of the problem as an abstract magnetic polarity, starting from the middle of a 
relation between power-to and power-over, power manifests most clearly on the edges of 
collective action systems, as the thin film of the diagrammed bubbles, as the dialectic limit that 
separates insides from outsides. Both sides of power are generated from the middle, through the 
differance that arises when power-to and power-over associate to coordinate collective actions or 
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contrast to divide collective actions. In the first case, power-to and power-over coordinate the 
power-to of agents according to system parameters of power-over, thus coordinating a system of 
conduct. In the second case, power-to and power-over magnetically oppose integration, and 
instead define the relationship of resistance between systems of conduct. “Power” in general is 
the praxis of alignment and opposition among systems which are acting prefiguratively and 
contentiously in their own environments. 
The purpose of these initial diagrams is to provoke closer scrutiny concerning the relations 
which assemble collective action systems based on domination, and to analyze how those 
systems can be resisted by alternative relations that could subvert, overthrow, and reconstruct 
them. We can no longer divide power-to from power-over, but the point is not to lump it all 
together as a one big category of general influence. The concepts of power-to and power-over 
operate as analytic labels under which many different types of social organization can be 
clarified and differentiated. As Michel Foucault clarified with regard to his studies of sexuality, 
the conduct perspective does not deny that domination is a key function of power:  
 Of course, states of domination do indeed exist. In a great many cases power 
relations are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and allow an 
extremely limited margin of freedom. To take what is undoubtedly a very simplified 
example, one cannot say that it was only men who wielded power in the conventional 
marital structure of the 18th and 19th centuries; women had quite a few options: they 
could deceive their husbands, pilfer money from them, refuse them sex. Yet they 
were still in a state of domination insofar as these options were ultimately only 
stratagems that never succeeded in reversing the situation.  362
Authoritative command, institutional hierarchy, and dominant control are common and well-
practiced human methods for empowering collective action systems, but they are not the only 
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options. As we already heard from Nikolas Rose, a broader definition that accords with the 
conduct perspective treats government as “all endeavours to shape, guide, direct the conduct of 
others.”  There is always a specific organization of power and a struggle among powers in any 363
given collective action system, and it is the task of our analysis to illustrate and quest(ion) these 
arrangements. 
In its most positive expressions, where we think of power as our power, collective action 
arises from the free association of individuals’ power-to in a project for collective power-to. But 
these systems, too, must be critically investigated for they are not free from the demands of 
power-over. Brian Fey marks this point as a key corrective to the regularly negative concept of 
social power-over which normally prevails in social and political thought. 
For critical social science, power exists not only when a group is controlled but 
also when a group comes together, becomes energized, and organizes itself, 
thereby becoming able to achieve something for itself. Here the paradigm case is 
not one of command but one of enablement in which a disorganized and unfocused 
group acquires an identity and a resolve to act in light of its new-found sense of 
purpose.  364
The power-over of collective control can refer to the positive constitution of a collective power-
to. Collective power-to arises when a group composes a socially united body able to act in 
concert towards collective goals. Of course, even this sense of government is not a utopian 
green-light to think of power as “good when it’s government” and “bad when it’s domination.” 
Governments coordinate collective action structures which define the capabilities of agency in 
ways that are always complex, never simply good or bad. Power-over is never simply good or 
bad. It is a function of human collectivity that we shape our relationships of power-with and our 
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individual conduct of power-to in accordance with constraints, models, rule, roles, that define 
and direct both who we are as individuals and who we are as groups. Todd May reflects on this 
point in a pamphlet about Power, published as part of the Institute for Anarchist Studies’ Lexicon 
series:  
We might think of power, at least political power, as the exercise of constraint on 
people’s actions. We should not confuse the term constraint with the word restraint. 
To constrain an action is to influence it to be a certain way. It is not necessarily to 
stop it from happening, although it could be that. It could also be a matter of 
making an action happen where it otherwise wouldn’t, or of influencing an action 
in one direction or another.   365
The anarchist uneasiness with “constraint” is a big part of what complicates our concern with 
accepting the notion of power-over as a more neutrally analytical concept. Do we reject any and 
all constraint, control, and power-over? There is an anti-organizationalist strand that is still alive 
and well in anarchist traditions, whose champions would argue that social order is inherently 
oppressive and constraining, to the extent that any organized activity should be avoided at all 
cost.  Those people are confusing “restraint” with “constraint,” where by constraint we mean 366
not simply a controlling coercion, but the obligations and influences of a collective action 
relationship. When people act according to how they will affect the actions of others, then they 
are (at least minimally) “constrained” by the forces which those others exert upon their actions, 
and therefore, according to the generally formula of causal power, they are engaged in a form of 
power relation. As the title of an anarchist-feminist treatise from 1975 proclaims: “The question 
is not 'organisation or no organisation?' but 'what sort of organisation?' And the same goes for 
structure.”  This kind of constraint is, however, not the kind we would wish to exorcise. We 367
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have to be clearer about treating power-over as a neutral analytic concept that must always fit in 
a constellated association with certain forms of power-to and power-with. The tactical question is 
not “how to do we destroy power-over?”, but rather: what modes of power-over should we 
conduct for dual power anarchist collective action systems in order to prefiguratively and 
contentiously destroy archist modes of power-over? 
From the conduct perspective, the operable question of power-over is always: what kind of 
power-over and for whose benefit? There are as many options as there are people to conduct 
them, but we can make categorical distinctions that can help to arm our analysis. Consensus 
decision-making is actually quite distinct, categorically speaking. The next section will use these 
new systems diagrams to clarify exactly how we may think of consensus process as capable of 
producing a specialty type of collective action system.  
!
(3.2.2) Consensus Decision-Making and the Power of Anarchist Solidarity 
Beginning to think in this new mode now, treating the question of power as an analytical 
mapping of collective action system dynamics, we can return with a fresh perspective on how 
power is organized in the techniques of consensus decision-making. I propose that the consensus 
process is a tool specifically designed to generate a collective action system based on emergent 
synthetic anarchist solidarity. The idea of “emergent synthesis” is a key quality of the consensus 
process that orients it around generating collective solidarity through the process of deliberation. 
In the manuals, a successful consensus decision is defined according to two criteria: 1) the 
decision should be a good decision that effectively empowers the group to achieve its 
instrumental goals; and 2) the decision should be made in such a way that it empowers the group 
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to learn and grow as an egalitarian community. These two criteria match directly with the terms 
of anarchist dual power: 1) contentious politics of anarchist instrumental action in a hegemonic 
struggle to change society; and 2) the prefigurative politics of anarchist pedagogical 
development. They also match with the terms of external and internal power relations as depicted 
in my collective action power systems model. That is, the collective action system produced by 
consensus decision-making should: 1) empower the external power-to of the group as a 
collective actor in a wider environment of its hegemonic relations; and 2) empower an anarchist 
system of power-over that allows for egalitarian relations of power-with to conduct the group’s 
overall coherence and communal system. The task of consensus decision-making is to empower 
the group’s external contentious instrumental power-to through an internal system of power-over 
that nurtures prefigurative communal relations of power-with. The consensus process is special 
when it can successfully combine those goals. 
 First of all, let’s delve into the way that the manuals depict the importance of emergent 
synthesis. For a consensus decision-making process to be considered successful, the final 
decision “should reflect the integrated will of the whole group.”  That can only happen when, 368
as the ActUp manual puts it, “coercion and trade-offs are replaced with creative alternatives, and 
compromise with synthesis.”  Participants are supposed to work together against the normal 369
behaviours of competitive power and command, for the sake of the group’s best interests and for 
the general ideal of working with a more anti-authoritarian and nonviolent means for building 
cooperative capacity. Consensus process is oriented towards cooperative synthesis in contrast to 
the way that it views alternative decision-making as a process of competition, including 
democratic procedures. For instance, the ActUp manual says that any democratic voting 
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procedure is “a means by which we choose one alternative from several. Consensus, on the other 
hand, is a process of synthesizing many diverse elements together.”  The Formal Consensus 370
manual makes the point that “the goal of consensus is not the selection of several options, but the 
development of one decision which is best for the whole group. It is synthesis and evolution, not 
competition and attrition.”   371
The Vernal Project’s Notes on Consensus implores that consensus is a necessary procedure 
because it offers a process that does “not assume someone must win and someone must lose 
when discussion reaches a stalemate. There may be a totally new idea (a ‘third alternative’) that 
encompasses everyone’s views.”  Consensus is a process of finding that third alternative. 372
Rather than choose between A or B, when the group is divided in its support for A and for B, 
consensus strives to generate a solution to the problem at hand that was not apparent before 
deliberation began by promoting an atmosphere and structure of debate which can work through 
conflicts of ideas and interests until another possibility opens up that will empower everyone 
together. This process requires that everyone accepts the premise that, as stated in the Formal 
Consensus guide, “there is no right decision, only the best one for the whole group.”  Likewise, 373
the Livermore Direct Action Handbook explains that “consensus is a process in which no 
decision is finalized until everyone in the group feels comfortable with the decision and is able to 
implement it without resentment. Ideally, the consensus synthesizes the ideas of the entire group 
into one decision.”4  So, as the Rhizome guide says, “this weaving together of the various 374
threads into a proposal is sometimes referred to, in consensus jargon, as synthesis.”   375
A successful consensus decision-making process aims to arrive at an emergent synthesis 
decision: the consensus decision should emerge from open and egalitarian debate, undertaken in 
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the spirit of cooperation and compromise, to find a synthesis of all views that can best serve to 
empower the group as a whole. In the discourses of consensus there are two main ways that a 
successful emergent synthetic decision is thought to impact the group, and they accord directly 
with the model of dual power as the internal/external relations of power engage by a collective 
action system. On the outside, in the external relations of the group as a united collective action 
system, the decision is successful when it empowers the group instrumentally in contentious 
political struggles. That is, when an emergent synthetic decision contributes to empowering the 
group’s contentious political action it thereby increases the collective power-to which the group 
can exert in conflict with the external power-over it faces in its external hegemonic struggles. On 
the inside, through inter-active relations internal to the group’s collective action system, the 
decision is successful when it empowers the group autonomously in its prefigurative political 
organization. An emergent synthetic decision contributes to empowering the prefigurative 
pedagogical praxis of forging radical democratic inter-actions within the group as a collective 
action system.  
Tamra Gilbertson opens her short depiction of consensus method with the statement that 
reflects two sides of instrumental and pedagogical sides of “success” quite clearly: “consensus is 
the practice of oneness for those who are committed to that idea, or it is the search for the best 
possible solution for those who are more logic-based.”  The twin terms of success for 376
consensus decision-making process are equivalent to the twin terms of anarchist dual power: as a 
power-to for the group’s anarchist projects in externally contentious politics of collective action: 
and as a politics of anarchist power-with for the group’s internally prefigurative inter-actions.   
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The twin form of power-to externally and power-with internally must coincide with a specific 
type of power-over: how does consensus decision-making coordinate and collectivize its 
participants? What kind of power-over do people generate through its mechanisms? First, let’s 
consider how a consensus decision is said to empower the group’s externally instrumental 
contentious collective action. The two main points expressed by the manuals state that the 
consensus process can increase group solidarity and strategic novelty for a collective action 
system’s instrumental power-to wage its externally contentious politics. A successful consensus 
synthesis instrumentally benefits the group because any decision made with full consent of all 
group members will enjoy more active commitment and contribution from the entire group’s 
membership. It is also said that the consensus process can help to discover new ideas that no one 
in the group would have articulated on their own, because the discursive influence of searching 
for a “third way” forces people into a brainstorming process oriented towards what is best for the 
group. That is, consensus process can instrumentally empower the group’s external contentious 
actions when it provokes novel thinking that can lead to new tactics and strategies.  
These two points are generally stated as conventional wisdom in the consensus manuals. 
Often, they are noted in the same breath. Here’s a few examples from the manuals to get the ring 
of it. Martha Kotusch Legacy Project: “The results are high quality decisions that last longer than 
decisions made by one party and are more easily implemented because all stakeholders agreed 
with them.”  Centre for Conflict Resolution: “We are convinced that a group is most effective 377
when all its members can participate fully in decision making and group activities. People 
support what they help to create.”  Vernal Project: “everyone is involved in the final decision 378
and understands it better, so everyone is more likely to work to implement it;”  Formal 379
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Consensus: “If everyone participates in the decisionmaking, the decision does not need to be 
communicated and its implementation does not need to be forced upon the participants. The 
decision may take longer to make, but once it is made, implementation can happen in a timely 
manner.”  Dan Spalding: “And since everyone gets to contribute their ideas into the decision-380
making process, the decisions are not only the best possible ones - but also the ones people are 
most invested in. Since everyone feels ownership over the decisions, people are more likely to 
take on responsibility for projects.”  381
These points articulate the most common perspective on how consensus process can 
contribute to the instrumental power-to of the group who employs it, enabling that collective 
action system to make good-quality and potentially novel decisions that enjoy the highest-level 
of support from participants. On the other hand, the consensus manuals also describe a successful 
process in terms of “internal” or “community-building” benefits. It is said then, as the ActUp 
manual states, that “through consensus, we are not only working to achieve better solutions, but 
also to promote the growth of community and trust.”  Consensus will serve to empower the 382
prefigurative pedagogy of radical democracy by teaching people how to unite in egalitarian 
interaction, making difficult decisions together without resorting to coercion, conflict, or 
authority. From Peter Gelderloos’ consensus manual we hear the purposes of this prefigurative 
political pedagogy most clearly expressed: “An explicit consensus process serves as a crutch or 
bridge which intentionally reinforces the learning of consensus until a new, cooperative, anti-
authoritarian society provides that reinforcement as a matter of course.”   383
So the success of emergent synthetic decision is not only instrumentally useful for 
contributing to contentious political goals, but also pedagogically useful for contributing to 
 243
prefigurative political goals. This dual goal aligns with the anarchist project of dual power, which 
reminds us that these two goals must support and empower each other in order to generate the 
best of both: there is prefigurative power in contention and there is contentious power in 
prefiguration. In some very important respects, consensus reveals the way that the two terms of 
dual power are necessarily interactive. As Francesca Polletta argues, the idealism of radical 
democratic initiatives is not purely idealistic, but rather provokes some important instrumental 
benefits as well. She notes that even though activists often express their judgement of radical 
democracy in idealistic terms as a prefigurative practice, it is also true that “over and over again 
activists have been drawn to the solidarity, innovatory, and developmental benefits of 
participatory democracy — benefits that are a practical and political.”  The claim to dual power 384
is also common to the discourses of consensus — it indicates an intention to span the two sides 
of being radical, to propose that there are two essentially intertwined goals that should be 
forefront in the process of decision-making: the prefiguration of egalitarian relationships internal 
to the group as well as the practical group activity of fighting for equality external. From 
Rhizome, we hear this dual power praxis expressed as the ultimate sign of a successful consensus 
decision-making process: “When it’s working well consensus delivers highest common 
denominator decisions — that is decisions based on the best of all the ideas discussed in a 
diverse groups. It addresses people’s concerns. And it reaffirms the sense of group and leaves 
people energised, creating a virtuous circle.”  Good decisions lead to good collective actions 385
that can externally force political gains in social movement campaigns, while they 
simultaneously also engage people in the prefigurative politics of internally constituting good 
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egalitarian community relations. A successful consensus process generates a “virtuous circle” on 
the cycle of dual power. 
In power theory, the terms of dual power success in a consensus decision represent the 
positive relationship between power-with and power-to in the politics of power-with. This 
relation has to move both ways across the boundary of the collective action system, from the 
individual members as atomic agents who inter-act within the system, to the totality of the group 
as a collective agent generated through those inter-actions. Looking out from the inside, an 
instrumentally effective good decision constitutes a directive for the group’s collective power-to 
in instrumental external actions. Looking in from the outside, the effective instrumental external 
actions binds the group together under common goals and struggles in such a way that their inter-
actions are organized according to the consistency a structure and meaning system. As Alberto 
Melucci put it, the “collective action is not a unitary empirical phenomenon. Whatever unity 
exists should be considered the result and not the starting point, a fact to be explained rather than 
assumed.”  The decision-making process of consensus decision-making achieves it’s external 386
terms of success when it unites the group into a collective action system based on full egalitarian 
solidarity of power-with, which acts as a binding obligation of power-over its members to render 
the collective action system into an emergent individual agent capable of external action power-
to.   
!
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Figure 7: External Relations of Power-To — Instrumentally Contentious Collective Action 
I bring up Figure 1 again in order to depict the tactically contentious viewpoint that is proper to 
the agency perspective. In order to depict the contentious action of a collective action system, we 
look to what it can do in its external relations. The consensus decision-making process is 
oriented towards this term of its success when it can design a group collective action system as a 
totalized unity for external action. Consensus does in fact aim to produce a type of solidarity in 
action which produces a fully united and undifferentiated collective actor. It is a solidarity 
machine built from members who are “all in,” so to speak. This can be described as a process 
that generates a certain form of intensely solid power-to for the collective action system 
composed by inter-actions of egalitarian power-with among its participants. In these terms, the 
ideally successful decision of consensus decision-making is to create a solid in-dividual agent 
that can act out a fully united power-to in its external contentious relations.  
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The same purpose is also reflected on the “inside” of the collective action system, in its 
internal inter-actions among the participants. As we hear again from the Occupy guide, “through 
consensus, we are not only working to achieve better solutions, but paving the way for an 
egalitarian model of community decision making.”  To bond the dual power relationship, the 387
contentious collective cause-ability of external relations must be generated by the proper means 
of internal power-with relationships. The consensus decision achieves its internal terms of 
success when the collective action system allows for participants to develop the prefigurative 
skills necessary to treat each other according to relations of egalitarian power-over.   
Figure 8: Internal Relations of Power-Over — Communally Prefigurative Collective Inter-
action 
We find the internal side of the “successful decision” represented in this diagram, showing the 
usefulness of the structure perspective as a way to critically reflect on the communal 
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prefiguration of power-over. This diagram is a repetition of figure 6, showing the influence of 
structural organization on internal relations for the sake of collective empowerment to act as a 
collective action system in external relations. The dual power activity of prefigurative 
organization must manage to complete this power loop by methods of anarchist power-over.  
Consensus decision-making can be depicted as a mechanism for generating an anarchist 
collective action system that must be analyzed by the dialectic relationship between: 1) its 
external relations where the group generates a good decision that will impel the collective agent 
to exert power-to in the externally contentious political actions necessary to achieve the goals 
anarchist radical democracy; and 2) its internal relations where the group generates that same 
good decision as a way to prefiguratively perform the means of egalitarian inter-actions of 
power-with necessary to achieve the goals of anarchist radical democracy. Consensus decision-
making is special when it is able to bond those two sides in that mutually productive “success.” 
This promise and potential does not mean that it deserves a utopian trophy of uncritical worship. 
It does not mean that it is essentially better than any other alternative form of decision-making 
that tries to empower the politics of power-with. It does, however, mean that it should be 
recognized as very useful in some respects. So if we can understand better how consensus is 
unique and special, compared to all the other means of radical democracy and anarchist dual 
power, then we can learn to situate this tool and apply it more effectively.  
!
(3.3) Authoritarian Versus Anarchist Modes of Collective Action Conduct 
The consensus process is a decision-making technique method of anarchist radical democracy 
that can help to generate emergently synthetic anarchist collective action systems. In the 
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following analyses I will elaborate on this special feature of consensus decision-making, trying 
to draw more detail into this idea by contrasting between an authoritarian decision-making 
model of head-body organizational power relations and an anti-authoritarian decision-making 
model of power relations in a political body-without-a-head. 
Usually, the prevailing modes of organizational power operate by separating their decision-
making faculties from their action-performing faculties — that is, by dividing the head of the 
organization from the body. The emergent synthetic solidarity of the consensus process 
represents a different collective practice, one which is in direct contrast to systems that operate 
by pre-formulated orders issued by a structurally regimented authority. Consensus decision-
making tries to conduct a different type of organization than the usual head-body model does. It 
aims to create a political body-without-a-head. Consensus decision-making is specially adept at 
this task when it can create that particular type of anarchist collective action system, based on 
solidarity and equality. The advantages and disadvantages of this mode of political organization 
mark consensus decision-making’s unique place as an organizational tool in the projects of 
anarchist radical democracy. In the following sections I will define this conceptual distinction 
with reference to the conduct perspective, continuing to explore how the concepts of power can 
be developed as an analytic tool for mapping the dynamics of collective action systems.  
!
(3.3.1) The Authoritarian Head-Body Collective Action System  
The anarchist project is set out as an intense quest(ion) against forms of power represented 
broadly by the concept of domination. One of the key forms that domination takes, especially 
prominent in the traditions of anarchist analysis, is that of authority. Working from the starting 
 249
point of Max Weber’s classic definition, I have already dealt with authority defined as “the 
probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of 
persons.”  We can also note a repetition of this meaning of authority in Weber’s broad 388
conceptual definition for the law: “Law exists when there is a probability that an order will be 
upheld by a specific staff of men who will use physical or psychical compulsion with the 
intention of obtaining conformity with the order, or of inflicting sanctions for infringement of 
it.”  The law is the structural order in which authority can operate. Authority is present in an 389
organizational setting wherever participants are held to obedience in the face of some decree, 
command, or rule. A collective action system can only regulate its power inter-actions according 
to the techniques of authority if there are distinctive positions within the system that situate those 
who command and those who obey. There has to be a position which decides actions and speaks 
orders, and another separate position that embodies actions and operates on orders based on the 
appropriate rules and sanctions that maintain those relationships.  
 The broad form of such command-obedience relationships engenders a model of social 
organization akin to the relationship between a head that commands and a body that obeys. The 
head-body model of authoritarian collective action systems can be portrayed in the following 
diagrammatic mode. 
!
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Figure 9: The Authoritarian Head-Body Decision-Making Model 
The outer circle represents the head of the organization or institution, exerting top-down control 
on its internal mechanisms for the sake of its own power-to in external relations (represented by 
the outward pointing arrow). The inward pointing arrows represent the “decision” as a command 
that has the authority to direct the pre-determined obedient body parts, the internal subjects. The 
internal subjects are represented here as dashed-line circles, whose interactions are conditioned 
and contained within the larger dashed-line circle that constrains them to their proper internal 
roles. In this model a “decision” comes pre-concluded from the head, as a directive, which means 
in the collective actor there is a predetermined, authoritative, and legitimized difference between 
the function of deciding and the function of doing.  
Now, there’s nothing inherently “evil” about this mode of organization. All collective action 
systems organize their internal inter-actions of power in order to compose and coordinate 
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external relations of power. The simple fact that collective action systems must organize a mode 
of collective control over their internal inter-actions is the basic concept of power-over, and this 
does not represent an inherently evil form of domination. However, the authoritarian model of 
head-body collective action system does represents a schematic depiction of a key tactic by 
which domination and authority can rule collective action system organizations. We have to be 
able to differentiate between this modality of the power-over function and other options that 
could be more empowering to anarchist radical democratic praxis.  
Thomas Hobbes’ depiction of “the Leviathan” articulated a quintessentially modern 
philosophical portrayal of this idea that collective unity in political organization requires an 
authoritative separation between a group’s head and its body. For Hobbes, the institutionalized 
position of legitimate authority emerges in the State when individual agents mutually contract 
their right to wield power-over each other to their commonly collective action system — the 
collective agent of the Leviathan, who then holds a common power-over all of them. Hobbes 
believed that to unite a commonwealth of rabbling competitive powers requires subsuming them 
under only one position that is above all others. As he wrote, “the only way to erect such a 
common power […] is to confer all their power and strength upon one man or assembly of men, 
that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices unto one will.”  The “one will” named by 390
Hobbes is granted with the power to command all the subservient wills, and can be represented 
as a political head which rules over its various organizational bodies that obey and serve. There 
is a direct power inter-action that runs from command to obedience where Leviathan is 
personified as the head (the sovereign who holds all the subjects together) that exerts power as 
authority in whatever it commands the body to obey (the subjects who do as they are told 
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because they are held together). Leviathan holds authority because it represents collective action 
system as a whole which generates a new collective agency from the systematization of its inter-
acting members.  
In the authoritative model of decision-making there is a strict division between command and 
obedience, between the decider and the doer. An important facet which I highlight for my present 
purposes is that this division is predetermined by the structure of the organizational model in 
which a collective action is mobilized. So the head’s decision-making process generates a 
command, and this command is supposed to be performed, unquestionably, by an already pre-
constituted and pre-possessed body. The body belongs to the head, and it is unquestionably 
expected to obediently perform any and all commanded activities expressed by the head. 
Leviathan’s subjects are certainly expected to be so accommodating, and the same formula 
resonates across a range of experiences. Psychologically, the head-body system invokes the 
notion of personal will and self-control, whereby our thoughts are supposed to be able to 
command the behaviours of our bodies. The “I” is generally conceived as a conscious and willful 
Head that has control over certain actions of “me,” treated as my unconscious and subservient 
Body. The I-Head is personified, active, capable of causing actions; the me-body is objectified, 
passive, capable only of obeying directives. When I say “I” there is an immediate identification 
with an undivided conscious experience, thought, and the decisions “I” make. From this 
perspective I refer to “my” Body as a possession which is, ideally, supposed to be trained and 
controlled to do my bidding. “I” am Sovereign. My body is “my” subject.  
This division is also basically analogous to the classic concept of power formulated by the 
relation between the agent of the law and the subject of the law. As Michel Foucault put it:  
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Confronted by a power that is law, the subject who is constituted as subject — who 
is ‘subjected’ — is he who obeys. To the formal homogeneity of power in these 
various instances corresponds the general form of submission in the one who is 
constrained by it — whether the individual in question is the subject opposite the 
monarch, the citizen opposite the state, the child opposite the parent, or the disciple 
opposite the master. A legislative power on one side, and an obedient subject on 
the other.  391
The ideological terms of who gets to be on the legislative side and who gets to be on the obedient 
side of political decision-making is posed along the lines of an association of rationality with the 
legislative head and physicality with the obedient body. The slaves, the outsiders, the underlings, 
the women, the others are conceived as incapable of contributing to the processes of decision-
making. The head is represented as motivated by higher purposes, aware of morality and logic , 
driven by spirit and activity. This is a naturalized sense of “mastery” which John Richardson 
identifies as integral to Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of power: “Mastery is bringing another will 
into a subordinate role within one’s own effort, thereby ‘incorporating’ the other as a sort of 
organ or tool.”  This sense of “mastery” is what we normally assume when considering the 392
meaning of leaders as the decision-makers — as hierarchical bosses, patriarchal dictators, 
autocratic tyrants. “That commanding something which the people calls ‘spirit’ wants to be 
master within itself and around itself and to feel itself master: out of multiplicity it has the will to 
simplicity, a will which binds together and tames, which is impious and domineering.”   393
On the other side, the body’s motivations are considered carnal and base, driven by instincts 
and passions, and they are therefore represented as in need of being controlled. Silvia Federici, a 
theorist and historian concerned with feminist and communist empowerment, points out that 
Hobbes’ and Descartes’ mechanical philosophy (these philosophers who have also offered so 
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much theoretical support to the notion that power-over is the inescapable root of government), 
aimed “to institute an ontological divide between a purely mental and a purely physical 
domain.”  The idea of the body in early modern thought was intentionally modelled in terms of 394
mechanical causation — that is, according to the forces, and energies of power-to because the 
power-to of the head, the spirit, the rational capacity of the enlightened Man needed something to 
control: to have power-to meant, in obverse, to have the power-to control, to have power-over; 
that is, the new conception of the head-body relationship would lead to the construction of a 
“bourgeois psychology” which treats “all human faculties from the viewpoint of their potential 
for work and contribution to discipline.”  The power-to of understanding is simply to possess 395
the power-over of knowing how the world functions. This is a power-over which comes along 
with the human capacity for logical deduction, pattern recognition, and practical action. But, 
there can always be too much of a good thing. Strung on a thin binary thread between power-to 
and power-over, the power of knowledge in modern society (this capit-alist, heady, capti-vating 
head-rush) threatens to exploit and drain everything that comes to understand. In this mode, the 
practice of being-together in egalitarian arrangements of mutually beneficial influence (acting in 
respectful power-with among ourselves and with other creatures in this world) becomes 
unintelligible.  
In the guise of “Mechanical Philosophy,” Federici writes,  
we perceive a new bourgeois spirit that calculates, classifies, makes distinctions, 
and degrades the body only in order to rationalize its faculties, aiming not just at 
intensifying its subjection but at maximizing its social utility. Far from renouncing 
the body, mechanical theorists seek to conceptualize it in ways that make its 
operations intelligible and controllable.   396
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For the head, a “good body” trusts, accepts, obeys, performs what it is told, is spoken to but 
never speaks, faithfully executes the will of its beloved and wise head. For too long established 
patriarchal wisdom has assured everyone that women simply were not capable of making 
properly rational decisions necessary for governance. Their status as the more physical sex 
limited their ability to learn complex tasks of the Head. Woman-the-bodily is always to be 
commanded by man-the-heady.  
In so many variations, the head-body system of collective action applies an internal 
domination of collective control in order to act as a united actor in external relations. The head 
has domain over the parts of its own body because those parts belong to it; literally, the 
subordinate positions are in-corps-orated: made into a body. The German sociologist Georg 
Simmel referred to a similar sense of incorporation and mastery to clarify a difference between 
internal domination and external conflict: “Certainly, the desire for domination is designed to 
break the internal resistance of the subjugated (whereas egoism usually aims only at the victory 
over his external resistance).”  When internal powers are in-corps-orated by domination, this is 397
for the sake of the power-to of that incorporating agent, the greater power, the over-powering 
agent. Domination forms internally to a collective action system, as a mode of top-down 
organizational structure. Decisions at the top, performances at the bottom. However, since 
collective action systems have to be considered fractally, any internalizing domination project 
iOS performed for the sake of external relations. So the over-powering agent — the State, the 
Man, the Head, the Boss, the Sovereign, the Law, Society, the Cause, the Group, the Revolution, 
the Power — over-powers only in order to gain power-to in its own collective actions, in projects 
of it’s own egoically motivated victory over external resistances. Simmel’s distinction between 
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internal domination and external egoism perches on the edge of the collective action system, on 
the “skin” — so to speak — where the internal and the external is divided. The two practices 
may support and reflect one another in a common form of conduct, the power-with of that 
collective action agent spanning its internal and external inter-actions. 
Leviathan’s sovereignty, the I’s body, the law’s subjects, the man’s woman: these all represent 
an internal system of collective control as a form of domination power-over. The head of the 
group is supposed to order the rest of the being around: the consciousness, the ego, the will, the 
law. The Sovereign tells it’s body what to do, the Boss tells his workers what to do, the Patriarch 
has his woman (etymologically, literally the word woman means wife-of-man), the I tells it’s-self 
what to do — because the Sovereign has that right, because the boss owns his workers, because I 
have my body. All of this exploited power-to of these bodies gets in-corps-orated by the power-
over it, so that the energy of the individual components is transferred to the greater whole; all the 
power-tos internal to the system get controlled by the power-over of the system and re-applied to 
serve the purposes and power-to of the greater controlling actor.  
As Judith Butler has said, “the cultural associations of mind with masculinity and body with 
femininity are well documented within the field of philosophy and feminism. As a result, any 
incritical reproduction of the mind/body distinction ought to be rethought for the implicit gender 
hierarchy that the distinction has conventionally produced, maintained, and rationalized.”  In 398
an insatiable quest to control, consume, cause the structure of the world. In the drive to have 
power-over everything we humans act like we’re the psychopathic tyrannical head for all the 
earth. We are the victor, sovereign conqueror, controller, ruler, extracter, consumer: Rex Homo 
Potens — the lord of power-over everything! This kind of power manifests the extremes of 
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tyrannical, unquenchable power-over. This can’t go on. Off with His Head.  
 
(3.3.2) The Anarchist Body-Without-A-Head Collective Action System  
As Michel Foucault famously said: “in political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the 
head of the King.”  This is a distinctly archist form of collective action organization: it treats 399
some mode of institutional hierarchy as essential to the practice of government. It is this accepted 
“essence of government” that anarchist forms of collective action must strive to depose by 
finding alternative methods and systems that can structure collective action systems without 
recourse to command and obedience. It is not only difficult in the social organizational sphere, 
but has to be challenged up and down the fractal range of collective action systems from the 
psyche to the social.  
Consensus is a political practice that tries to perform this anarchist feat. I am trying to 
understand how it works in the terms of political thought. I propose that we can fruitfully think 
of the consensus process as a political technique of creating collective action systems without-a-
head.  
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 Figure 10: The Anarchist Body-Without-a-Head Decision-Making Model 
In this diagram, the inner dashed-line circles represent individual participants who are not pre-
enclosed into an organismic-organizational structure. They inter-act to relate with each other in a 
manner that will compose the nature of their collective action system as a body-without-a-head 
through the relations of mutual conduct that they create by their assembly. The solid-lined circle 
represents their successful emergent synthetic consensus decision, which provokes a temporary 
and performative collective action system that can enact external power-to (represented by the 
large outward-pointing arrow).  
Power, insofar as it is understood as always provoking the differentiation and assimilation of 
collective action systems in co-operative and conflictual relations, is always involved in defining 
the limits of organizational belonging. The model of the head-body authoritative collective action 
system, orchestrate power relations that separate positions of command and obedience and hence 
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relie on a distinction in decision-making power. It separates people: some people as deciders and 
others as merely doers, some people as commanders and some people as obeyers. The challenge 
of participatory radical democracy, however, as understood by the anarchist consensus traditions 
I am concerned with here, must include everyone in the decision-making process, therefore 
erasing the clean distinction between a head and a body. We must ask: if everyone decides on the 
commands, then who enacts them? What changes in the relation between command and 
obedience when radical democratic operation involves all people in its decision? For an anarchist 
project, the concept of the dichotomous power-to/power-over relation between head/body must 
be treated as an arch-enemy. From the anarchist perspective, “all of these forms of organization 
claim to represent the people in struggle, to act in their name. And what defines autonomous self-
organization is precisely the rejection of all representation.”  Another such distinction can be 400
drawn from the 1980s anarchist journal No Picnic, where this divide is framed as a contrast 
between direct action and directed action: “the self-direction stems from the decisions reached 
by the people/person involved in the action. It is only then that the action takes on the form of 
self-direction. […} If people are merely following others or the ideas of others, the self-direction 
is negated. it becomes directed activity.”  In the authoritarian model, there will be an archic 401
ruler — some head that is authorized to command the other parts of the body politic. In the 
properly democratic model, there is no such head — we find a body-without-a-head, or a body-
as-a-head, because all the people who are involved in the decision of the action are also 
responsible for performing those actions. There is no separation between decider and doer. This 
is the essence of democracy’s radically anti-authoritarian model of collective control. I will now 
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explore how consensus decision-making should be considered as a distinct means of 
accomplishing this type of power system.  
No matter whether the decision is made by a single tyrant, by a committee of elected 
representatives, or by a consensus assembly, to distinguish between a collective action based on 
authoritative arche versus a collective action based on autonomous arche we must still ask: does 
the decision assume the status of an authoritative command directing the performance of a body 
that is predisposed to serve? We still have to bring “the body” into a political theory of radical 
democracy, asking not only “who decides?” but also “who performs?” Even consensus processes 
have to take this critique (its own critique) more seriously, and make its own quest(ion)s harder: 
how do we make a political body without a head? What is that good for? What can it do?  
During the 1960s and 70s, the French anthropologist Pierre Clastres studied American 
indigenous cultures, particularly in the Amazon, trying to understand how societies can function 
without recourse to institutions of state-centralization or strict relations of command-obedience. 
"Why are primitive societies stateless?”, he asked. How do societies work when they refuse to 
accept any difference between dominator and dominated, between head and body in a social 
organization? “In primitive society, there is no separate organ of power, because power is not 
separated from society; society, as a single totality, holds power in order to maintain its 
undivided being, to ward off the appearance in its breast of the inequality between masters and 
subjects, between chief and tribe.”  That is, Clastres’ notion of the primitive society is a group 402
that has no institutional seperation between head and body. Clastres observed that many so-called 
“primitive” societies build organizational structures that intentionally resist the centralization of 
command and power in any one place or person. He called these social scenarios a case of 
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“society against the state,” in an effort to emphasize that the stateless institutions were not simply 
a passive, underdeveloped, pre-mature form of social organization, as many Western 
anthropologists would have labelled them. Rather, societies that resist hierarchy must be 
understood as having a historical relationship with hierarchical possibilities which they have 
actively rejected, finding instead the means of conducting forms of power that could resist 
authoritarian collective action systems. The crux of Clastres’ thesis is set up, in a way, by the 
anthropological battle-line between a politics of power-with and politics of power-over. An anti-
authoritarian system of power-with has to wage hegemonic struggle against the power-over of 
State-formation in order to make egalitarian social mechanisms of anarchist power.  
So what are the mechanisms of stateless anti-authoritarian collectivity? In deliberative 
processes, of course, the question of speech is central. In authoritative state-rule systems, 
Clastres observes, “the exercise of power ensures the domination of speech: only the masters can 
speak.”  We might say: in authoritarian systems of power only the head speaks. It’s a talking 403
head, so to speak. A talking head that spouts commands to a docile body which must never talk 
back. Feminist author Marilyn Frye has also said that “the powerful normally determine what is 
said and sayable,”  pointing to the fact that any utterance at all spoken from a subordinate 404
position can be viewed as insubordination, resistance, or an act out of place that generates 
conflict (“a woman should be seen and not heard,” as they say). Accordingly, in the political 
deliberations of egalitarian power-with, speech must be made available to everyone. Everyone 
must speak in order for everyone to have mastery over their collective destiny. this is the status 
of political humans, humans who can conduct their collective action through communicative 
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causation: “‘men’, that is, beings engaging in a collective destiny through words,”  as Jacques 405
Rancière would have it.  
In the equality of speech, the meaning of “conflict” is transformed by the politically 
democratic register of debate. In the process of speaking and listening to others, conflict as 
disagreement is inevitable and indeed necessary. As the Formal Consensus guide puts it,  
Consensus requires a different kind of attitude toward conflict and its resolution. 
Conflict is considered necessary, welcomed, and desirable, not something to be 
avoided, repressed, or feared. Its resolution is achieved through creativity and 
cooperation. The groups strives to create an environment in which disagreement 
can be expressed without fear and heard as a concern which, when resolved, will 
make the decision stronger.  406
The Occupy Wall Street guide also marks the equalization of speech as a defining feature of its 
process: “there is no single leader or governing body of the General Assembly, everyone’s voice 
is equal. Anyone is free to propose an idea or express an opinion as part of the General 
Assembly.”  Everyone should speak and listen, everyone’s voice is respected and integrated in 407
the process of finding a mutually acceptable solution that every participant can support freely 
with their words and their actions. In the ActUp guide, we hear that “the fundamental right of 
consensus is for all people to be able to express themselves in their own words and of their own 
will,” and that “the fundamental responsibility of consensus is to assure others of their right to 
speak and be heard.”  As opposed to an authoritative mode of power-over, where only the head 408
speaks commands, in the anti-authoritarian mode of consensus many heads talk amongst each 
other. The whole social body speaks.  
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This is the very condition of politics, as Hannah Arendt defines it: the process of inter-active 
power influences people to conduct each other’s lives in free and equal assemblage through 
speech. Arendt retraces the steps of political etymology to support her view, claiming that the 
Greek democratic principle of “isonomia does not mean what equality before the law means for 
us.”  Today, living under the modern nation-state, we assume the meaning of isonomia — 409
literally “equal-law” — in a terms of rules and regulations. It comes to represent our relation to 
the State that incorporates and controls us as obedient subjects, to the rules that bind us to 
authoritarian orders in home, school, work, government. And as such, we think about isonomia 
as a concept that relates to “equality under the law” to mean that each subject has the same status 
under the greater power-over to which we subject ourselves. But, Arendt reminds us of the 
original meaning: 
Isonomia does not mean that all men are equal before the law, or that the law is the 
same for all, but merely that all have the same claim to political activity, and in the 
polis this activity primarily took the form of speaking with one another. Isonomia 
is therefore essentially the right to speak […] To speak in the form of commanding 
and to hear in the form of obeying were not considered actual speech and hearing; 
they were not free because they were bound up with a process defined not by 
speaking but by doing and laboring.  410
This is what consensus decision-making does: it creates an entire group as a collective of 
radically equal speakers as isonomic inter-active agents, by eliminating any organizational 
communication that functioned “to speak the form of commanding and to hear in the form of 
obeying;” that is, by refusing to conduct any power by means of an authoritative head and an 
obedient body. In the ideally successful consensus decision there is no separation between the 
people who decide and command the action and the people who obey and perform the action.  
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The political theorist A. P. D’Entreves has said that “liberty in the positive sense is in fact 
nothing else than self-government, autonomy. It cannot be realized except when the power which 
commands is the self-same power of him who obeys.”  This is a classic representation of 411
freedom in the Western political tradition, but it doesn’t quite accomplish the sense of isonomia 
that Arendt explains, that purpose of consensus decision-making: the freedom of people in 
concerted relational conduct. This form of power-with cannot be modelled along the same axis as 
command and obedience. D’Entreves is positing autonomy as something like a closed-gap 
between head and body, between the means and ends of political organ-ization. However, as 
Arendt urged us to recognize, there is something essentially different about speech conducted in 
its political sense which is not at all possible between the commanding-speaker and the obeying-
hearer. Where no one is commanding and no one obeying, we have instead autonomy as a plural-
political inter-active relationship of power-with as opposed to a singular-authoritarian causal 
relation of power-to commanding power-over.   
In this sense, Arendt notes the conceptual mutation from arche (as leading or ruling) into 
agere (as combining and agreeing): the power relations that compose the collective action system 
change forces from command to agreement, and the concept of leadership begins to sound a lot 
more like a means of power-with than of power-over. It’s a different kind of leadership, a 
collective relationship among mutual means, anarchist leadership that empowers an entire 
group’s mutual organization of agreement in order to begin new capacities of collective action. 
The difference, says Arendt, is that we normally conceive of freedom, agency, the rights of the 
individual person. “According to our conceptual thought and its categories, freedom is equated 
with freedom of the will, and we understand freedom of the will to be a choice between givens, 
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or, to put it crudely, between good and evil.”  In that frame of reference, freedom is bound to 412
the capacity for power-to, an agent’s individual and asocial ability to affect differences int he 
world and to resist the power-over of those who might impose difference upon them. But, if we 
consider freedom in the political sense that Arendt recalls as crucial to antiquity, we get a 
different picture. In that case we get an idea of freedom that can only be expressed among 
relations, as a capacity for inter-action of conduct, rather than the activity of a singular cause-
ability, as the root of power-with not power-to. Then, she says, we can understand “politics” in 
the Greek sense of the word,  
whereby freedom is understood negatively as not being ruled or ruling, and 
positively as a space which can be created only by men and in which each man 
moves among his peer. Without those who are my equals, there is no freedom, 
which is why the man who rules over others — and for that very reason is different 
from them on principle — is indeed a happier and more enviable man than those 
over whom he rules, but he is not one whit freer. He too moves in a sphere where 
there is no freedom whatsoever.   413
Isonomia is a condition of political action, collective action, derived from the basic condition of 
power: power-with as the inter-actions that relate people together to form collective actions, and 
the collective action systems that relate back to control the way that people inter-act. The 
freedom of radical democracy, the freedom of a politics of power-with, has to come from this 
basis of power in the capacity for people to conduct their common conduct through isonomic 
inter-actions in deliberation.  
 For this radical idea of democracy it is necessary that a “we” emerges from the process, rather 
than as a label determined by prior organization. Democracy cannot be authorized, legislated, 
and controlled in advance by a preconditioned I-Head. It is authored, spoken, and performed at 
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the moment by a we-body. This is its autonomy. One commenter on the Occupy Wall Street 
movement’s sense of consensus decision-making calls upon the idea of Collective Thinking to 
explain the meaning and purpose of consensus decision-making as a constructive process. 
That is to say, two people with differing ideas work together to build something 
new. The onus is therefore not on my idea or yours; rather it is the notion that two 
ideas together will produce something new, something that neither of us had 
envisaged beforehand. This focus requires of us that we actively listen, rather than 
merely be preoccupied with preparing our response. Collective Thinking is born 
when we understand that all opinions, be these opinions our own or others, need to 
be considered when generating consensus and that an idea, once it has been 
constructed indirectly, can transform us.  414
The process can transform “us” essentially because it can create an “us.” As Francesca Polletta 
has also said, “what distinguishes [radical democracy] from majoritarian voting in an adversary 
system is its emphasis on having participants make their own reasoning accessible and legitimate 
to each other. Solidarity is re-created through the process of decisionmaking, not its endpoint.”  415
The head-body organization asserts authority to make a predetermined body do something; a 
body-without-a-head authors the body that will do something. This is its speciality in practice, 
and its uniqueness in theory. This quality of the body-without-a-head collective action system 
produces a phenomenon that is like a performative speech act. According to J.L. Austin’s 
definition, “a performative” is a particular type of speech act where the utterance does not refer 
to any already existing thing. Rather, the act of speaking performs a thing into existence by its 
utterance. As Austin puts it, a performative speech act “indicates that the issuing of the utterance 
is the performing of an action.”  A good example of a performative speech act in Austin’s 416
account is that statement “I name this ship…” By stating “I name this ship,” let’s say “I name 
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this ship Isobel,” the speaker does not refer to something already existing in the world. Instead 
the speaker names the thing into existence by stating it as such. This ship’s name becomes 
“Isobel” by the performative power of my having named it so. This is a thoroughly social 
phenomenon that communicatively causes a name to enter into the circulation of speech; it only 
exists among people who speak and hear and know and influence one another. This is to say: the 
performative speech act can only be performed among the reflective recognition of people who 
share a mode of power relations. It is a phenomenon of power relations, through and through. 
When the consensus process decrees that an action is to be performed it does so in a similar 
fashion as a performative act. Consensus constitutes a collective actor and its action at the same 
time: by speaking the consensus decision it also performatively names the collective body that 
will enact the decision. The decision creates its own doer. This strange situation can occur 
because the consensus decision does not simply issue a command which is then obeyed by an 
already existing organizational body. Instead, the consensus decision generates the collective 
actor who will perform the decided action: the actor and the act are determined whole, at the 
same time. Judith Butler influentially made a similar point about the constitution of gender as a 
performative act. Gender is never a predetermined or essential quality, she says, but is rather 
performed as a regenerative a code of behaviours that we categorize according to gendered 
expectations. 
Gender proves to be performative — that is, constituting the identity it is purported 
to be. In this sense, gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who 
might be said to preexist the deed. The challenge for rethinking gender categories 
outside of the metaphysics of substance will have to consider the relevance of 
Nietzsche’s claim in On the Genealogy of Morals that ‘there is no ‘being’ behind 
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doing, effecting, becoming ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed — the 
deed is everything’.  417
Herein lies the key distinction between the consensus process and other authoritative processes: 
the decision of a consensus process does not command an institutionally separate bodily organ 
that is prepared and ready to do as it is commanded; that is, in consensus there is no being before 
the doing. The decision of a consensus process does not bear upon any other part of a 
predetermined organization, it does not move from a head (whose responsibility is to decide and 
command) to a body (whose responsibility is to obey and perform); it is not an authoritative 
speech statement that commands a subject to enact its decree. It is, rather, an authoring speech 
statement that performatively creates the subject of its address as itself, simultaneously deciding 
upon a course of action and bringing into being the agent that will enact that course of action. It 
is a deed that constitutes the doer of the deed in a performative action. The actor and the action, 
the performer and the performance, are co-produced by a successful consensus decision-making 
event.  
 This is the momentary, intense, performative act of a collective action system that 
simultaneously creates its performer and its performance at once. It is a strange beast, distantly 
removed from the normal genus of the authoritarian head-body type of organizational structure, 
which so obviously and widely populates our normal social environments. This strange anarchist 
collective action system is as different from authoritarian collective action systems as an amoeba 
is from a complex multi-celled organism. The performative body-without-a-head can be further 
distinguished by association with what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have called a Body 
without Organs (BwO). The BwO is a concept that Deleuze and Guattari apply to illustrate 
 269
concepts related to the simple unity of desire intensities, as a way to contrast against the classical 
conception that all government requires the distinctions of head-body control so common to 
political theory. As they state, “the BwO is opposed not to the organs but to that organization of 
the organs called the organism.”  The BwO is opposed to organism systems that are organ-ized 418
by the differentiation of their bodies into separate subsystems acting as functionaries for the 
whole system, each committed to performing certain acts under direction from the head-organ/
central nervous system. The relationship between a head and its functionary organs is elucidated 
by the command-obedience power relation, requiring a complex authoritative process that 
requires internalization, in-corps-oration, organ-ization: the head organ-izes the body. On the 
flipside, the BwO is a fully simple or undifferentiated body. Nothing organ-izes anything else. 
This body has no internal organs to do its bidding; it is a body that exists only for the moment 
when it is activated-by and becomes-active-for a unique event, acting as a singular body without 
direction from the centralized authority of a head who calls all the shots. In a BwO, the sense of 
power of command-obedience head-body relationship fades away entirely and is replaced with a 
power that functions performatively and instantaneously, generating a body that cannot separate 
its deciding from its doing. A BwO is born like the performative speech act, in a moment of 
collective embodiment where “composer and composed have the same power.”   419
Against the modes and logics which determine centred and authoritarian systems of 
organization, Deleuze and Guattari counterpose “acentered systems, finite networks of automata 
in which communication runs from any neighbour to any other, the stems or channels do not 
preexist, and all individuals are interchangeable, defined only by their state at a given moment — 
such that local operations are coordinated and the final, global result synchronized without a 
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central agency.”  With no rule, no organ-izational order, no authoritative structure of 420
differentiated jobs, functions, and skills, the BwO is “simple” — which isn’t to say it is 
simplistic or easy, only that it is undifferentiated, smooth, momentous.  
The consensus decision-making process generates this same mode of intense singularity when 
it performatively creates a collective action system through the emergent solidarity of anarchist 
unity. Within a fully realized consensus process there is no decision which makes a body do 
something, there is not even a body which predates the decision. The decision generates the body 
which can perform it. There total simplicity of the system’s ideal product is an undifferentiated 
political body. Because the collective agent conducted by means of consensus decision-making 
requires the active, explicit, and direct consent of every member in order to do anything at all, 
technically there is no consensus collective actor that outlives the action it was explicitly born to 
perform. People’s active, explicit, and direct consent can never be extended or presumed beyond 
the specific decision it was committed to endorse. There is no presumably primordial social 
contract or established hierarchical command structure that can instil duty beyond an immediate 
commitment to the specific decision at hand. That is what makes the demands of consensus 
decision-making so unique, and so extreme. It is a way of generating collective action systems as 
all or nothing, immediate or nonexistent. Because of the performative bond between the decision 
and the doer, each individual collective decision also creates an individual and specific collective 
action system. Each action has a life of its own.  
Like a life, the collective actor of a BwO is composed only once: it is born, it acts, it 
influences the creation of other new lives, and it dies. The simplicity of the BwO means that it is 
performatively transient. Like a performative art that only happens in the moment and cannot be 
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fully preserved. It hasn’t the organizational complexity required to coordinate and maintain 
large-scale projects or to structure hierarchical systems of power relations, to differentiate labour 
and arrange economic or ecologic networks. The body-without-organs is a temporary thing, 
inherently fleeting, because it has no unification, it has no controlled order. It never creates 
“unifications, never totalizations, but rather consistencies or consolidations.”  Consensus, too, 421
relies on the momentary, temporary, and specific synthetic emergence of its political bodies: a 
new decision will constitute a new body, and there can be no prearranged assumption about 
when, where, how, why, or who it will be. So too the collective actor devised from the consensus 
decision-making process composes a unique singular life — organizes, itself, acts, progenates, 
and dies. The consensus body-without-a-head thus “reveals itself for what it is: connections of 
desires, conjunctions of flows, continuums of intensities.”   422
This peculiar type of collective action system acts more like a swarm of locusts than like the 
body of Leviathan: a group composed of individual units that have no direct control over each 
other even while they act as a functional unity. The association sometimes made by Deleuze and 
Guattari between the BwO and “the swarm” is a pertinent analogy to consider the organizational 
form of a body composed from a transient and momentous assemblage of desires, flows, 
intensities: the BwO has certain modes in common with the collective bodies of insects, derived 
less from organ-ization of command and obedience as from the mass association of a basic form 
of social cohesion, and connected less to the identifications of persons than to the intensities of 
activities. The “I” possesses its own, specifically constituted body. The I is mine. But “the BwO 
is never yours or mine. It is always a Body.”  Leviathan is a personified ruler, a territorially 423
situated commander. The locusts are a nomadic swarm that collectively attack, devour, and cross-
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pollinate without fixing themselves to any authoritative persona. The Head-Body order controls 
and coordinates, unifies and totalizes. The organism that controls and commands the organs, the 
head that claims the body, the State that organizes the people: these follow the same patterns: 
they are a “phenomenon of accumulation, coagulation, and sedimentation that, in order to extract 
useful labor from the BwO, imposes upon it forms, functions, bonds, dominant and 
hierarchicized organizations, organized transcendencies.”  424
Before moving on, let’s take just one more angle on this concept (the more angles we can use 
to observe an object, the more we can see that object in detail). We can also think of the 
consensus process as a special means of creating an autonomous and autoergoic collective action 
system. Max Weber’s most famous contribution to power theory is derived from his analysis of 
authority, categorizing the different forms of legitimacy that derive from charismatic, 
bureaucratic, or traditional leadership. But Weber also realized that any organizational analysis of 
social systems should understand how “power actually rests in the hands of those who, within the 
organization, handle the work continuously.”  In groups where power is supposed to be shared 425
equally, this means that imbalances in work are just as problematic as imbalances of decision-
making. Peter Gelderloos recalls, for instance, the experience of trying to run a Food Not Bombs 
chapter with not enough labour power (a problem many of us have experienced at one point or 
another, no doubt):  
For most of its history Harrisonburg Food Not Bombs distributed work in such a way 
as to encourage burn-out among activists. For several months at a time, two or three 
activists would be responsible for nearly all the work each and every meal, including 
dumpstering the night before (I’ll refer to these people as “leaders”, though the only 
authority they had stemmed from the fact they did all the work).  426
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The Seeds for Change guide to consensus also notes the importance of this point, addressing that 
power can easily become centralized into certain positions and roles when the essential work 
involved in implementing collective action tasks is not evenly distributed. 
Some people end up doing most of the work within a group, leading to more 
knowledge of the issues and more emotional investment. This means that they can 
find themselves speaking a lot in meetings and dominating the discussion whether 
they like it or not. One of the best ways to deal with this is for every member of the 
group to do a fair share of the work, rather than letting one or two people do it all. 
That way information, skills, and effort are more equally distributed. Taking on 
more tasks should also enable quieter people in the group to have more confidence 
to speak up.   427
That is, balancing inequality in work is integral to balancing inequality in speech: when more 
people are involved in the daily work, more people can be informed and engaged enough to get 
involved in daily speech.  
 The bond between work and speech is important for anarchist collective action systems 
because the implementation of decisions in deeds represents a crucial aspect of the power 
dynamics that operate in any given collective action system: Who speaks? Who works? The 
question of equality is important not only as auto-nomos (the self-given laws generating rules, 
directives, and plans through an equality of decision-makers) but also and at the same time of 
auto-ergon (the self-given work needed to accomplish those rules, directives, and laws through 
an equality of labour performed by those same persons). The goal of a successful consensus 
process is to produce a decision-performance or head-body link that is coordinated autonomously 
and autoergoically so as to eradicate the organizational conduits of power-over. Autonomy may 
erase command among those who take their part in the process of decision-making, but it is quite 
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often then implemented upon others outside that inner circle of the organizational head. This is 
how the consensus manuals often portray official democracy as a mechanism that continues to 
serve as technique of power-over most people. To truly erase command would be simultaneously 
to erase obedience, so that the people who make decisions must apply those decisions 
themselves, and must be prepared not only to decree a collective action but also to become the 
collective actor who will perform it. This is precisely what consensus does. In this sense, 
consensus process represents an extreme allegiance to the principle of participatory democratic 
equality that rejects any hierarchical organ-ization that separates decisions and deciders from 
their performances and their performers. Consensus decision-making is a mechanism for 
collective action systems that want to performatively bond decision-making power and work-
producing power, linking conditions of autonomous and autoergoic collective action by requiring 
that a law or decision to be performed can only be decided if those who decide it are also the 
ones who will perform it.  
 The ideal process of a successful consensus decision-making event occurs when collective 
autonomy decapitates command by the performative covalence of decision-and-action, 
articulating a collective action system that is unitary and two-dimensional, like a body-without-
organs, the balanced and immanent activity of an autonomous and autoergoic collective action 
system.  
!
(3.4) Consensus Decision-Making as Anarchist Dual Power 
The archetypal contrasts between head-body and body-without-a-head modes of collective action 
power systems allow us to see the specificity of consensus decision-making as a tool for 
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generating emergently synthetic anarchist collective action systems. When consensus process 
creates a body-without-a-head collective action system, it makes a link between the internal bond 
of power-with among equally independent collected actors and the solidarity that they create for 
an external power-to action performed by their collective agency. But just as much as we can 
view power from the bottom-up, as a process of agents inter-acting to build a collective agency 
capable of contentious external relations, we must also always see the system from the top-down. 
From the top-down, the prefigurative structures of consensus process construct and educate the 
kinds of agents whom will inter-act within the bounds of a consensus-based collective action 
system, and in that sense the collective action system constructs and conducts the agencies of its 
members. The collective action system itself cannot command any internal relations because they 
are not distinguished from it in any way.  
 The process of consensus decision-making is a solidarity-making machine that creates 
emergent anarchist solidarities. There are modes in which this tool can enable a dual power 
capacity. But there are also ways that it can fail to achieve this mode of power, and instead 
reassert established collective action systems of power that may even directly oppose the projects 
of anarchist dual power. With the new concepts of power developed in this chapter, I think we 
can begin to reassess and clarify the potentials and problems inherent in the power relations 
which consensus decision-making makes possible.  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Chapter 4) Analyzing Consensus Decision-Making as Tool of 
Anarchist Radical Democratic Dual Power 
 
In the previous chapter I developed the basis of a conduct perspective on power that uses the 
concepts of power-to, power-over, and power-with to describe the internal and external dynamics 
of collective action systems. I then began to apply this model to illustrate the special character of 
consensus decision-making as a tool for building a body-without-a-head anarchist collective 
action system. However, this special feature certainly does not mean that consensus decision-
making is the one and only “most revolutionary” of all democratic processes. It most definitely 
does not mean that consensus enables a model of collective action that is free from any power 
inequalities. The power of consensus decision-making (like all powers) must be treated like the 
power of a tool: it is a practical mechanism that can serve different uses and different projects. 
 Consensus decision-making can be a powerful tool for projects of anarchist radical 
democratic dual power, but: the more powerful a tool, the more dangerous it can be. Like all 
tools, the consensus process can be used and abused across a range of circumstances and 
projects, and, like all tools, its value shifts depending on the situation in which it is employed. It 
is not so terrible as its detractors have worried and it is not so amazing as its proponents have 
promised. It certainly has a place in the toolbox of anarchist radical democratic power praxis, but 
we have to understand it more specifically and more pragmatically than we usually do. In this 
chapter I continue to apply the conduct perspective on power to analyze consensus decision-
making in a different light, treating it not as an ideal or as an idol, not as a salvation or as a 
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damnation, but as a tool that we can learn how and when to use best by accepting and managing 
both its positive and negative potentials. 
 So, consensus is not a totally revolutionary mode of radical democracy, nor is it a process that 
does more harm than good, limiting the overall empowerment of radical democratic movements. 
This is the way the discourse about consensus is most often posed, however, ruled as it is by the 
way “those two guys” grandstand the issue as a choice between two monsters. But the conduct 
perspective on power should allow us to avoid choosing either side in that abstracted duel 
between internal prefigurative power and external contentious power. First, don’t fall for that 
first guy’s rosy burps: consensus decision-making is not the single way to perform perfectly 
egalitarian prefigurative relationships. And then, don’t bow to that other guy’s tough pomp: 
consensus decision-making can be more than a distracting circus for self-indulgent prefigurative 
poseurs. The first guy acts like easing the internal systems of power-over are enough to challenge 
dominant power systems in the world. The second guy acts like attacking power-over in wider 
social structures is enough to change the way we all interact. Dual power is the project of 
changing internal and external power relations in co-ordinated strategy. It only shows up when 
both guys are proven wrong at the same time.  
 Consensus can, in fact, be very useful tool for anarchist dual power, but we have to be able to 
figure out when it can help to accomplish dual power and when it may not. Thats what I’m trying 
to figure out. First, I will argue that consensus decision-making is useful as a tool of anarchist 
democracy that creates emergent solidarity. When it is used to create temporary, transient, and 
transformative moments of unitary group identity, the consensus process can birth new collective 
action systems that generate new powers and new movements. However, when consensus 
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process is used as a regularly instituted structure that supports established collective action 
systems, it ceases to work in that way. In fact, a very interesting total reversal occurs, and the 
consensus process can actually end up working as a tool of anarchist domination that conserves 
established solidity in an already instituted collective action system. In these cases, the consensus 
process stifles new beginnings, maintains conservative uniformity, and resists change. In the first 
use, the consensus process is an anarchist technique that can be used to birth emergent egalitarian 
collective action powers, and can function as a useful part of an anarchist radical democratic 
project. In the second use, it is an anarchist technique that can be used to conserve established 
inequalities in collective action power relations, and this function usually works against the 
anarchist radical democratic project. In one context, it’s a potential anarchist power; in the other, 
it’s a troubling anarchist problem.  
 As a way of elaborating on this split in consensus usages, I will introduce some concepts 
derived from an alternative tradition in political theory that sees “radical democracy” in a 
different light than the participatory democracy traditions of consensus decision-making. Dealing 
mainly with the thought of Miguel Abensour and Jacques Rancière, I will explore how radical 
democracy can been conceived as an insurgent disruption that works to fight established 
consensus in political institutions, disrupting the normalized authorities and rules of deliberative 
participation, intruding upon the inequalities of a regulated collective action system with the 
challenge of equality. The insurgent democracy perspective provides a new way to challenge the 
traditional ideals of participatory democracy in anarchist consensus decision-making. These 
theorists are in fact emphatically opposed to the ideal of “consensus” because they commonly 
treat it as the direct enemy of radical democracy. That is, a social and political consensus is 
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exactly what insurgent democracy is supposed to interrupt, unsettle, and overthrow. So how 
could a “consensus process” have any place in the theory of radical insurgent democracy? It is 
important, here, to remember that the consensus process is not an ideal that should settle power 
dynamics once and for all into utopian democratic perfection. It is a tool for mobilizing certain 
arrangement of power dynamics at a time and a place where it can be useful for practical 
democratic movement. A tool can be used for a variety of purposes, projects, and powers, and the 
power of consensus that generates the emergent anarchist solidarity of a body-without-a-head 
collective action system is different than the power it can deploy to support an established 
consensus on group uniformity. The critique of “consensus” that emerges from the insurgent 
democracy tradition applies explicitly to the abuses of its conservative mode, but in its creative 
mode the process can actually be implemented as a tool for insurgent democratic activity. 
Applying conceptualizations of insurgent democracy drawn from Abensour and Rancière, I will 
argue that the consensus decision-making process is a tool that can function on both sides of the 
divide between insurgent democracy and instituted inequality. 
 Ultimately, I argue that the consensus process provides a specifically useful power of unity to 
create new anarchist collective solidarity for initiatives of insurgent democratic dual power. The 
creative mode of consensus can empower a political subject that manifests outside-of or in-
between normalized organizational institutions because it is concentrated in the performative 
lifespan of a temporary, autonomous, body-without-a-head collective action system. If, on the 
other hand, a collective action system tries to encode, established, or organize the consensus 
process as a permanent idolized method for conducting a more complex social order, then it’s 
function inverts and instead works as a power of uniformity to conserve the established solidity 
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of predetermined power systems. By analyzing the difference between those two uses of 
consensus process we can perhaps get better at applying the method more consistently for 
situations where it can truly enhance anarchist radical democratic dual power. The consensus 
process is only capable of generating anarchist dual power when it interrupts and challenges 
established systems of power, and we should strive to apply it more carefully for the moments 
and the jobs that apply to that project.  
!
(4.1) The Uses and Abuses of Consensus Decision-Making  
In chapter 3 I proposed that the consensus process can work to generate anarchist power when it 
produces a body-without-a-head, isonomic, performative, body-without-organs, temporary, 
autonomous/autoergoic, and synthetically emergent collective action system. That’s what it is 
capable of creating, according to its ideal terms of success. But of course, everything doesn’t 
always go according to ideals. Everything can break, and everything can be used poorly, 
inappropriately, or irresponsibly to produce results widely different from those it could produce 
when applied carefully and appropriately. Consensus has uses, and it has abuses. It works, and it 
breaks. As one internal letter circulated within the San Francisco Food Not Bombs chapter 
during the winter of 1996 puts it, sometimes you just have to admit it and scream out: “Help! 
We’re fucked!” In that letter, the author named several problems they perceived to be prevalent 
in the Food Not Bombs use of consensus process: 1) “There is unacknowledged hierarchy within 
the group;” 2) “there is competition within the group;” 3) “people think individualistically, not in 
terms of what is best for the group;” 4) “we are unable to detach individuals from their ideas or 
proposals;” 5) “we give individual people insane amounts of responsibility;” 6) “we are 
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consistently late.”  All of these are significant problems related to anarchist decision-making 428
practices, and each could be addressed in its own right. At present, I want to address how this 
type of controversy arises especially because we want the process to create ideally emergent 
anarchist solidarity, but when we impose that much pressure it then often ends up promoting 
almost the exact opposite type of organizational format, serving instead to resist change and 
settle established power relations, conserving or reinforcing an already established collective 
action system. 
 The consensus process has more than one application, it is a tool that can be used and abused 
to empower different functions and different forces in a collective action system. In this section, I 
elaborate on the dynamics which prevail in both modes of consensus decision-making: 1) as an 
anarchist tool for creating emergent solidarity and 2) as an anarchist tool for conserving 
established solidity. It is important to recognize that in both of these functions, the consensus 
process facilitates a distinctively anarchist system of power relations — but calling it an 
“anarchist method” does not automatically mean that it is all good. There are good and bad uses 
for anarchist tools, just like there are for any other tool. I am trying to detail consensus process as 
a tool of anarchist power-over: a collective mode of government in which people assemble 
without recourse to the authority of a collective head. By distinguishing between the uses and 
abuses of the consensus process, we can begin to get a clearer idea of how to tactically apply it in 
strategically powerful moments. 
 
(4.1.1) The Power of Unity: Creating Emergent Solidarity  
In May of 1977, over 2000 protestors gathered under the banner of the Clamshell Alliance to 
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occupy the site of a proposed nuclear power plant at Seabrook, New Hampshire. 1400 protesters 
were arrested and jailed together in a makeshift prison at a nearby armories. While imprisoned, 
they were faced with making a collective decision: would they accept release on bail, or would 
they demand to be let out on their “Own Recognizance” (OR)? The protesters went right to work 
determining whether they could make a collective demand for OR. First, they broke into smaller 
affinity groups to find a consensus decision among groups of closer comrades and friends. For 
the environmental and anti-nuclear movement in which Clamshell was situated, activist George 
Franklin writes that “affinity groups are a base of support for activists — a small group to check 
in with, plan tactics, keep an eye out for each other — and perhaps share jail time. At some direct 
actions, organizers require that all participants be part of an AG. This is difficult in urban actions, 
where the situation is often more fluid.”  Once each affinity group had come to a consensual 429
decision among themselves, they would then send a representative back to a larger meeting (a 
“spokescouncil") to discuss the problem as an entire assembly. When each affinity group’s 
representative was asked who would accept bail, none rose. When asked who would demand OR, 
all rose. It was decided.  
 As Barbara Epstein reports, “‘Once we got that done, we were united as a group,‘ Meg 
Simonds said. ‘You need a unifying decision that you can make quickly and easily at the 
beginning.’ This demonstration of the capacity of the consensus process to affirm solidarity 
strengthened the protesters’ determination to insist on their right to use it.”  In this case the 430
consensus process operated as a solidarity amplifier or a group-belonging feedback machine. It 
reinforced and augmented the strength of a collective action system with the greatest capacity for 
non-coercive voluntary solidarity, so that a group of actors can coalesce without any system of 
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authoritative command into a unique group-body that lived out its activity in the specific act for 
which it was gathered-together. This is the power of unity which is produced by consensus 
decision-making, and it can be a useful tool for dual power — both prefiguratively and 
contentiously empowering to the anarchist project. In order to find out where consensus 
decision-making has the most dual power potential, we have to think about how the instrumental 
power of creative solidarity and the communal power of creative belonging become mutually 
reinforcing. In the Clamshell jail solidarity, these two factors clearly coincided.  
 Consensus was successfully applied in the armories not as a way to make tough decisions, not 
to sort out complex strategic choices, not to define a movement — but to affirm and amplify a 
condition of solidarity which was already implicit in the communal conditions of the group 
which performed it. “In the armories, consensus process had worked well because everyone 
wanted it to work and because there was plenty of time to work out every question.”  It is clear 431
that in this case the conditions for solidarity were both culturally and circumstantially ripe. It 
makes sense that anyone who was already invested in the group’s collective action (by 
association with its cultural identity and its instrumental goals) stood for insisting on OR – what 
had they to lose? The only other option was to publicly remove themselves from the group’s 
solidarity association: to give up and accept bail would be to signal your surrender in front of the 
entire assembly, immediately initiating your expulsion from the group. Anyone who wanted to 
remain in solidarity, who wanted to continue acting collectively with the Clamshell project, 
would choose to affirm and strengthen that bond by consenting to the only option that built 
power from solidarity.  
 We can elucidate some of the specific power derived from this experience of communal 
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solidarity by reference to Emile Durkheim’s classic ethnographic sociological investigations into 
the phenomena of collective effervescence. In his study of Australian Aboriginal peoples, 
Durkheim developed a sociological account of how ritual activities serve to confirm unity in a 
social group: 
The very fact of concentration acts as an exceptionally powerful stimulant. When 
they are once come together, a sort of electricity is formed by their collecting 
which quickly transports them to an extraordinary degree of exaltation. Every 
sentiment expressed finds a place without resistance in all minds, which are very 
open to outside impressions; each re-echoes the others and is re-echoed by the 
others. The initial impulse that proceeds, growing as it goes, as an avalanche grows 
in its advance. And as such active passions so free from all control could not fail to 
burst out, on every side one sees nothing but violent gestures, cries, veritable 
howls and deafening noises of all sort.  432
The terms Durkheim establishes here can also categorize the factors of unity which arise in a 
successful consensus process: 1) “the very fact of concentration;” 2) “every sentiment expressed 
finds a place without resistance in all minds, which are very open to outside impressions;” 3) 
“each re-echoes the others and sis re-echoed by the others.” We’ve heard this kind of thing 
before! They are another version of how the conditions of equality are understood in consensus 
discourses as special because of its process-oriented creation of solidarity as a product of 
democratic interaction of power-with. 
With sociologists Scott Hunt and Robert Benford, we can begin to conceptualize solidarity 
generally as “the ability of actors to recognize others, and to be recognized, as belonging to the 
same social unit.”  Sociologist Herbert Blumer’s concept of esprit de corps fits in nicely with 433
my analogical choices here, representing solidarity as a process of belonging within a social 
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body, a corps. In Hunt and Benford’s words, “esprit de corps suggests that solidarity has two 
major facets: a body of confederates that can be identified as a collectivity and a spirit that 
involves feelings of identification with that group.”  The consensus process stands out among 434
decision-making options because of its emphasis on developing the prefigurative, internal, 
communal dimensions of egalitarian group belonging, but ritual elaborations of communal 
identity are common to all collective action systems: esprit de corps is a function of power-over 
which consolidates and integrates members into the purposes and structures of the group system.  
As social movements scholar William Gamson asserts, “any movement that seeks to sustain 
commitment over a period of time must make the construction of collective identity one of its 
most central tasks.”  The consensus process is explicitly focused on the prefigurative tasks of 435
producing egalitarian collective identity, more so than most other decision-making processes. 
This lean towards the prefigurative emphasis has often been a source of imbalance in the use of 
consensus, and can tip its capacity to generate dual power dangerously off kilter if people get too 
caught up i its charms. Nevertheless, that same focus on the prefigurative power of creating 
egalitarian and inclusive unity has pragmatic benefits too, especially when we consider how 
poorly our culture prepares us for egalitarian political deliberation. The act of getting together 
and working out ideas in explicit allegiance to radical democratic values can help to provoke our 
capacity to imagine and understand what it would take to build a more radically egalitarian 
society. As Chris Shilling and Philip Mellor put it, social reproduction relies heavily on sites of 
ritual experience where it is the “collective effervescence stimulated by assembled social groups 
that harness people’s passions for the symbolic order of society.”   436
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It is in this frame of mind that consensus decision-making has often been promoted as a 
radical counter-pedagogy, a way of relearning who we are and how we can work together, a way 
of recasting the symbolic order of our society in more radically democratic tones. Butler and 
Rothstein, for instance, depict consensus as creating a mode of solidarity that is not yet fully 
functional, because “in general, nonviolent conflict resolution does not exist in modern North 
American society. These skills must be developed in what is primarily a competitive 
environment. Only time will tell if, in fact, this model will flourish and prove itself effective and 
worthwhile.”  As Justin Elliot wrote concerning the Occupy movement’s capacity to affect 437
contentious transformation in American society, “I don’t think it’s that realistic that we’re going 
to get fundamental change from the system that created this crisis by occupying plazas. I think 
the occupying creates a new way of relating for people that they can then take to other spheres of 
life and work.”  Speaking at Occupy Wall Street in the fall of 2011, Slavoj Žižek colours the 438
same idea with a prescient joke that nicely highlights how prefigurative politics can help to 
challenge to our political imagination: 
Let me tell you a wonderful, old joke from Communist times. A guy was sent from 
East Germany to work in Siberia. He knew his mail would be read by censors, so he 
told his friends: “Let’s establish a code. If a letter you get from me is written in blue 
ink, it is true what I say. If it is written in red ink, it is false.” After a month, his 
friends get the first letter. Everything is in blue. It says, this letter: “Everything is 
wonderful here. Stores are full of good food. Movie theatres show good films from 
the west. Apartments are large and luxurious. The only thing you cannot buy is red 
ink.” This is how we live. We have all the freedoms we want. But what we are 
missing is red ink: the language to articulate our non-freedom.  439
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Processes that emphasize the group belongingness and a collective effervescence of egalitarian 
equality serve as a way to begin articulating the revolutionary possibilities of radical democratic 
action. They help us believe in the potential of changing ourselves — inside and out, from the 
smallest interpersonal interaction to the grandest systemic organization — into more egalitarian, 
anarchist, communally responsible, and democratic people.  
As I argued in the previous chapter, there is a key distinction between collective action 
systems that function by means of authoritarian heads commanding obedient bodies and those 
which orchestrate anarchist power-over of mutually inter-active bodies-without-heads. Now, 
group unity is a challenge common to any type of power organization. When an anarchist 
collective action system needs to reinforce its terms of group unity, it tends to rely even more 
heavily than more authoritarian systems on the informal effects of collective effervescence and 
communal belonging, simply because they cannot appeal to more direct and explicit coercive 
mechanisms. In absence of any recourse to institutional authority and the threat of punitive 
violence, anarchist collective action systems often try to strengthen group unity by intensifying 
the power of a voluntary solidarity. As Uri Gordon notes:  
In groups and networks thoroughly predicated on voluntary association, compliance 
with collective decisions is also voluntary. Consensus is the only thing that makes 
senses when minorities are under no obligation or sanction to comply, because 
consensus increases the likelihood that a decision will be voluntarily carried out by 
those who made it.  440
David Graeber has made the same basic point about the conditions of effective anarchic political 
organization: 
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The explanation I would propose is this: it is much easier, in a face-to-face 
community, to figure out what most members of that community want to do, than 
to figure out how to convince those who do not to go along with it. Consensus-
decision making is typical of societies where there would be no way to compel a 
minority to agree with a majority decision – either because there is no state with a 
monopoly of coercive force, or because the state has nothing to do with local 
decision-making. If there is no way to compel those who find a majority decision 
distasteful to go along with it, then the last thing one would want to do is to hold a 
vote: a public contest which someone will be seen to lose. Voting would be the 
most likely means to guarantee humiliations, resentments, hatreds, in the end, 
destruction of communities.  441
A consensus-oriented process is especially applicable in situations where the decision and its 
performance will require the utmost faith and full solidarity of its members, but where that 
solidarity cannot be controlled or coerced by any means and where the organization of the 
assembled actors cannot be presumed to extend beyond the immediate performative life of the 
specifically consented action. This is, again, the special power of consensus decision-making: it 
aims to garner the maximum power of unity for a collective action system built purely on 
anarchist solidarity.  
 The problems of harnessing the power of voluntary solidarity is a well-worn problem of 
anarchist small-group association. Solidarity is a special kind of power. As social theorist Alvin 
Goldman explains, “to the extent that members of a group have greater confidence in the 
reliability of their partners (and hence greater confidence in the efficacy of their own acts as part 
of a larger group) the group itself has more power, or is more likely to have at least some power 
w.r.t. a selected issue.”  Mancur Olson, an American economist and sociologist, has argued that 442
small, voluntary, and open organizations would be likely to optimize a collectively egalitarian 
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distribution of “goods” simply because each person is only likely to contribute their own 
resources to the collective action if they also feel they will get a reasonable proportion of the 
rewards from the collective action. As a general economic imperative, then, small voluntary 
groups would be expected to tend towards radical democratic distribution of responsibility 
because  
in any group in which participation is voluntary, the member or members whose 
shares of the marginal cost exceed their shares of the additional benefits will stop 
contributing to the achievement of the collective good before the group optimum has 
been reached. And there is no conceivable cost-sharing arrangement in which some 
member does not have a marginal cost greater than his share of the marginal benefit, 
except the one in which every member of the group shares marginal costs in exactly 
the same proportion in which he shares incremental benefits.  443
However, as Olson also argues, the propensity towards egalitarian distribution of goods in 
voluntary association must rely heavily on integration within the group norms. When a group has 
enough socially contextual impetus to stick together, then they will tend to reassert the conditions 
of voluntary solidarity. But, as activist and scholar Steve D’Arcy has written: 
A collective action problem exists whenever the action that would be most 
advantageous to a group of people, were they to cooperate with one another, is not 
advantageous to any of them individually in the absence of such cooperation. As a 
result, each of the individuals is in the position of being reluctant to “stick their 
necks out.” What is missing... is coordination. Each individual or isolated group 
needs to be able to trust all the others that, when one person or group sticks their 
neck out to fight, all the others will “have their back” and take up the fight. This is 
the missing ingredient. But how can we begin to address this 'atomization,' this 
sense that we all stand alone, wishing we could stand together?  444
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A 1985 anarchist pamphlet urging direct action against nuclear armament suggests that the 
consensus process is most useful precisely when facing this exact problem: because “the unity of 
purpose that arises from groups that use consensus is impossible to defeat,”  people can feel 445
more confident that when they stick their own necks out that everyone else is going to be there 
too.  
On the inside of a collective action system, solidarity structures a unity of internal relations 
that regulate common inter-actions and feelings of membership, powering the collective 
effervescence that builds bonds of affective association for egalitarian practices. On the outside, 
the collective action system that is united by those radically egalitarian internal relations of 
anarchist solidarity can also enhance the power-to of its external relations. The power of unity 
available through the consensus process can function upon these internal relation or to strengthen 
the external relations, or in very particular circumstances it can do both at once. If a group can 
use consensus decision-making to mobilize both the internal and external powers of unity in 
sync, then they will be able to wield the special capacity that consensus offers for anarchist 
radical democratic dual power.  
!
(4.1.2) The Power of Uniformity: Conserving Established Solidity  
The consensus process can create the power of anarchist solidarity by enabling, enhancing, and 
channelling a performatively assembled voluntary collective action system. It would be a grave 
mistake, however, to think that consensus that automatically generates a utopian equality that is 
somehow totally free of any power-over. If consensus decision-making is a solidarity-making 
machine for birthing performative, voluntary, and temporary anarchist collective action bodies, 
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then the emphasis on birthing should be a crucial condition. The progressive power of creating 
social solidarity can very easily transform into the conservative power of maintaing social 
solidity sameness and certainty, depending on whether the “consensus” is emergent or 
established.  
 To understand how the power of consensus can exert conservative control over a collective 
action system, we have to take up a structure perspective on understanding social power as 
religio, or relegere the root of our English word “religion”) which means to bind together. The 
social power of solidarity binds together. The consensus process evokes anarchist solidarity, the 
power of unity, which has certain kinds of power-over to conduct the actions of its participants. 
The peculiarity of this anarchist form of power-over is that it cannot resort to any explicit 
authority or domination in asserting and maintaing these systems of inter-active conduct, and 
instead must work with more informal and cultural means of socializing conduct. Rather than 
exerting the explicit power of an authority that must be directly obeyed, the power of solidarity 
which is so crucial to consensus process operates according to the more implicit structural power 
of norms, rules, and roles. Then the capacity to achieve consensus relies substantially on 
upholding traditions, beliefs, and customs that can perpetuate inequality and maintain subtly 
coercive systems of power that are rooted in subtle and subterranean religio. 
 The power of religio is not the same as a command or coercion that “says no,” it is an 
incitement to act in certain established manners, a reaffirmation of habits and codes that strike 
those who perform them as natural, normal, and right. Remember, as I first introduced the 
concept of solidarity in Benford and Snow’s definition, it means “the ability of actors to 
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recognize others, and to be recognized, as belonging to the same social unit.”  This is a 446
productive, consensual power, wherein, as Michel Foucault famously put it, 
what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it 
doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces 
things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be 
considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, 
much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression.  447
For Foucault, as for others who take the structure perspective seriously, power does not simply 
emanate as commands and coercions, coming explicitly from the most obvious sites of power-
over. It circulates through the circuits of power-with, through the connections of social 
interactions, so that it enables conducts as much as it may also block them.  
 To study the great varieties of power-over which “say yes,” which guide and direct our own 
deepest conventions and common senses, we have to abandon the agency perspective’s prejudice 
that all power-over is simply the same, and simply evil. It is crucial that we treat the bonds of 
religio as mechanisms of power-over, and equally crucial that we do not thereby normatively 
constrain them into representing something oppressive and dominating. There is a power-over of 
religio in every social formation, and especially in the most extraordinarily anarchist formations. 
Only by first accepting this basic point can we be capable of reflectively analyzing our own 
structures of group organization in meaningful ways.  
 So, I argued above that anarchist solidarity can promote a type of collective action system in 
which power-over is emergent and voluntary, birthing new systems of egalitarian collective 
action. This is a power of religio, but the process can also be used to promote more secretive, 
darker, forms of religio which are less desirable. From the agency perspective, the concept of 
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power is often used to identify who can be held accountable in an organization. As Steven Lukes 
puts it, “an attribution of power is at the same time an attribution of (partial or total) 
responsibility for certain consequences. The point, in other words, of locating power is to fix 
responsibility for consequences held to flow from the action, or inaction, of certain specifiable 
agents.”  When those agents who have the power-over in a situation are dubbed powerful, this 448
designation allocates those agents as responsible for the consequences of the situation. As Lukes 
again says, “the powerful are those whom we judge or can hold to be responsible for significant 
outcomes.”  Peter Morriss also makes this association between power and responsibility clear 449
when identifying the relationship as “essentially negative: you can deny all responsibility by 
demonstrating lack of power.”   450
In this sense, asking “who’s powerful here?” is like asking “who’s responsible here?” SO 
who’s responsible in the situation of consensus decision-making? The answer from the manuals 
is unanimous: everyone. Everyone is equally responsible. This is a source of possible strength 
because it can create anarchist solidarity, but it is also a sign of possible danger because it can 
diffuse any specific responsibility for power. Marilyn Frye has said that “the powerful normally 
determine what is said and sayable.”  What happens when “everyone” determines what is 451
sayable? In an ideally successful consensus decision, the the responsibility for the decision 
belongs to everyone. What happen when the process is not ideal? If it relies too heavily on what 
the group implicitly accepts as said and sayable?  
The ideal of consensus aims to design a situation in which everyone can say what they want, 
but what is considered fundamentally sayable is nobody’s responsibility, and it therefore settles 
into the unspoken rules and norms determined by the group’s common sense consensus. This is a 
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way of talking about common sense, convention, socialization, normativity. The responsibility 
for these decisions belong to nobody. Within the mechanics of the consensus process the block 
represents a crucial point where responsibility for group power belongs to a structurally 
established normal nobody. The “block” is the clearest type of resistance possible in the formal 
process, and it does exactly what it says: it blocks the proposal (in the U.K. they tend to call it a 
veto). In the final phase, a proposed decision can be “called to consensus.” At this point any 
participant can decide that they do not accept the proposal as it stands, and if they are willing to 
assert the block then the decision fails consensus and the group must resume discussion, usually 
refocused on the conflicts which the blocker has posed.  
 The block represents the most concentrated formal means which consensus allows for a single 
individual to exert power upon the group’s collective actions. It is therefore also, as the Rhizome 
guide says, “the biggest obstacle groups face as they learn to use consensus well.”  The block 452
allows any individual — regardless of authority, position, or privilege within the group — the 
negative capacity to unilaterally influence the group in not making a decision. Because of this 
crucial feature, as Ethan Mitchell reflects,  
the notion of ‘voter power’ in a majoritarian democracy has little relevance to 
consensus. A voter in an idealized referendum or a town meeting has a relative 
power of 1/n, where n is the size of the group. In an idealized consensus system, 
the voter has a power of where vetoes are concerned, and a power of 0 where 
positive proposals are concerned.   453
That is, in a consensus process the group has no formal power to command that a decision be 
accepted; no one can tell any one else what to do. There is instead a kind of negative command: 
the block is a command that says “no” to a decision; it tells everyone else what they cannot do as 
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a collective action. The individual power of any one/anyone is enhanced by the consensus 
process, but only in a negative mode of resistance to the collective power of everyone/no-one. 
“Each individual having the right to veto any proposal at any stage? That’s a huge amount of 
power and a huge responsibility.”  As is clear from this mention in the Rhizome manual, the 454
guides to consensus certainly understand that the block is a structured position of responsibility 
and individual power over the group. What happens if an individual abuses the power of the 
block? What recourse does the group have to reassert a collective authority over an individual 
who uses the block to monkey-wrench the entire process? As a counter-weight to the huge 
amount of power and responsibility invested in the block, the consensus process generally relies 
on the big social structural power of religio invested in normal practices, social precedents, and 
ethical standards to judge dissent. In principle, the consensus process considers a specific block 
to be valid and acceptable if it can be said to represent the interests of the group rather than the 
interests of the individual. From the Seeds for Change manual, for instance, we hear that “in 
some cases the rest of the group is unwilling to respect a block. This is a difficult situation. A 
group should respect a block, unless it stems from a fundamental disagreement with the aims of 
the group or is driven by abuse of power (although it isn’t always easy to tell if this is the 
case.)”  Fundamental values concerning the aims of the group are not always entirely explicit, 455
and they often rely heavily on shared cultural understandings, shared experiences, and shared 
moralities: that is, it relies on the implicit social powers that bind the group together to determine 
deviance.  
As the ActUp manual states, to block usually means “‘I cannot support this or allow the group 
to support this. It is immoral.’ If a final decision violates someone's fundamental moral values 
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they are obligated to block consensus.”  If a proposal is thought to conflict with “fundamental 456
moral values” then participants have an “obligation” to block consensus. If a member does 
challenge the group with a block which cannot be adequately resolved, then the final appeal 
concerning whether or not to accept the block is made to “the group,” or “the group’s essential 
principles.” 
 If you find yourself faced with a veto that you suspect might not fit the group’s 
definition of an appropriate block, gently ask the blocker if they are able to 
articulate the reasons for their block in relation to group values and aims. If what 
you hear sounds personal, keep asking — ‘it’d help me to understand your 
objection if you could say a little more about how that relates to our collective 
vision for the group’?  457
If “a concern must be based upon the principles of the group to justify a block to consensus,”529 
every block addresses both the proposed decision at hand as well as the very essence of the 
group’s collective identity. The Formal Consensus manual lays this down forcefully, construing 
the block as a key moment wherein “every objection or concern must first be presented before 
the group and is either resolved or validated:” 
 A valid objection is one in keeping with all previous decisions of the group and 
based upon the commonly-held principles or foundation adopted by the group. The 
objection must not only address the concerns of the individual, but it must also be 
in the best interest of the group as a whole. If the objection is not based upon the 
foundation, or is in contradiction with a prior decision, it is not valid for the group, 
and therefore, out of order.  458
 Whenever a group doubts a block’s validity, it is held against the judgement of traditional 
value, group moral code. This is a trial. And, as it is with trials in general, there is a double social 
function at stake: on the one hand, it is oriented towards achieving a resolution on the proposed 
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decision (a specific function); but on the other hand it also a mechanism for revisiting and 
reinforcing the normativity of the group’s common sense, throwing light on differences and 
conflicts “in principle” which serve to reaffirm and delimit group’s identity, belonging, 
acceptance, and membership. As Gianfranco Poggi says, “(and this is a view already presented 
by Durkheim) even punitive and cruel visitations of violence on errant members of society have 
largely symbolic significance; they reaffirm threatened values and, when they take particularly 
spectacular forms, allow the majority of members to renew their own sense of moral 
commitment.”   Instead of attributing distinct positions of power to differentiated roles among 459
its members, the consensus process relies on a most diffuse and indistinct form of social power 
derived from an implicit consensus about common sense. This anarchist mode of power-over 
may indeed grant authoritative violence to no-one, but it does so by appealing to normal values 
and group belonging that derive from the commonality of common sense, the sensibility of the 
common, the census of commonness. To highlight the deep connection consensus process has 
with this form of power (and because I like to be linguistically cheeky), I call this the power of 
common sensus.  
 Interestingly, this feature of the process seems to be largely accepted by the consensus 
tradition. It is common to hear, for instance, that the consensus process works best when used 
among those who already have common goals and common cultural expectations and values. As 
Randy Schutt remarks: 
The consensus process also does not usually work well in groups where 
individuals hold conflicting basic values. Basic values are those deep beliefs that a 
person applies under all circumstances. These are often immutable to logical or 
emotional appeals and can therefore lead to insurmountable disagreements. All 
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non-basic values, by definition, can change. New information, persuasive 
arguments, or emotional appeals can sway people to change their perspectives.  460
If we accept that only “non-basic values” can change, isn’t that a process that sets up 
conservative protection for the group’s essential identity? Doesn’t that set of “immutable basic 
values” cover almost the entire essence of a collective identity and its goals, leaving only shallow 
matters of tactical and logistical concern open to discussion? It is a depressing tautology to 
suggest that a consensus is only possible among those who already agree. When a person’s block 
is judged according to the group’s normal principles of common sense, it suggests that consensus 
is only possible within a range of predetermined socially acceptable shared understanding about 
the aims and values of the group.  
 This is the mode of consensus found among a group of friends who have long since ceased 
explaining anything to one another because they all implicitly believe the same things. In Jane 
Mansbridge’s words, this sameness of common sense promotes “conformity and conflict 
avoidance, producing surface unanimity while masking a genuine opposition of interests.”  In 461
league with the dynamics of privilege which I analyzed in chapter 2, the power of common 
sensus works to articulate a very conservative function of the consensus process which gains 
prominence exactly in those places where so many commentators suggest consensus “works 
best.” For instance, in an article concerned with the dangers of informal anarchist decision-
making Kristian Williams recounts the story of Portland Cop Watch, a small, tightly knit, 
anarchist-oriented group with common political values and defined tactics operating by 
consensus decision-making which consistently failed to attain consensus decisions and 
unintentionally isolated newcomers in the process. Ultimately, Williams recalls, “disagreements 
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were settled largely by default. Changes were blocked by recalcitrant members; irresolvable 
questions became taboo; and, in the absence of true consensus, deference was given to precedent. 
Tellingly, these all amounted to the same thing: within the organization, the status quo 
prevailed.”  For Portland Cop Watch, consensus prevailed as the assumedly proper mode of 462
inclusive and participatory decision-making, but actually functioned to include only those who 
were already well established in the group while excluding and delimiting outsiders from 
participating, consistently stifling new decisions and alienating new members precisely because 
of its reliance on common sensus.  
 This problem is structural, pertaining to a construction of consensus decision-making which 
digs itself into a hole of its own making whenever established consensus gets in too deep. As Zoe 
Mitchell has also argued, “when an oppositional discourse challenges the coercion implicit in 
consensus process, the only other option is to return to the status quo. Put simply, when conflict 
exists, consensus process does not allow a third way that could provide a method of shifting 
policy without manipulating some members of the polity.”  Ultimately, as Timothy Luchies has 463
puts it,  
 in the service of efficiency, consensus places groups' guiding principles beyond 
the reach of politics as usual, and stipulates something very close to perfect 
agreement in order to revisit or amend them. This means that difficult negotiations 
relevant to anti-oppression can be sidelined in the interest of a groups' cohesion, its 
tactical orientation or for the sake of its ‘collective process’.  464
If all you’ve got to build on is a repetitive referral to your own founding principles of unity or 
pre-specified collective goals, then whatever positions differ from those original purposes will 
continue to be excluded, no new ideas or radically challenging positions will be able to get heard 
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in a serious way, and the entire consensus process will gravitate towards its own centre of priorly 
established social solidity.  
 If consensus decision-making only works among those who already share common sense, is it 
really likely to empower new emergent decisions and collective action systems? Or, is it more 
likely to reaffirm already established ideas that happen to be the most commonly held or least 
controversial among an already prevailing set of social expectations? Organizational sociologists 
Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen have inspected this type of phenomenon 
in groups that prioritize decisions that reinforce their already-established range of routines and 
tactics. They call organizations that rely on this self-referential mode of decision-making 
(appropriately for my purposes) organized anarchies. In this kind of organizational forum 
decisions are made more as a function of expressing established identity than as a means to solve 
actual problems. A decision made by an “organized anarchy” is, according to these authors, “a 
collection of choices looking for problems, issues, and feelings looking for decision situations in 
which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and 
decision makers looking for work.”  This is what happens when the power of uniformity rules a 465
collective action system, and this is the point at which we have to quest(ion) how the consensus 
process can function in ways that will give “organized anarchy” a bad name.  
 When a consensus process is used to reassert established group identity and self-assured 
group goals, then it can increasingly restrict the range of possible decisions, aims, tactics, ideas, 
and membership. In the worst possible cases, it can also sometimes even serve as a tool of 
domination in the hands of those who know how the system works and want to keep it working 
for the benefit of those who're already well-established within it. As Rob Sandelin, a community 
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activist and decision-making facilitator, has reflected: “this is where you need a process to either 
remove an individual, or move the process to something temporarily that can not be hijacked. 
There is a place where blocking on convictions is appropriate, there is also a place where 
blocking is used to hold a group hostage to a personal agenda.”  466
 It’s very interesting and very important that these functions of consensus process seem to be 
exactly opposite to the functions I discussed earlier. Here, on the flip side of its capacity to serve 
as a power of unity for creating collective action systems based on emergent solidarity, the 
consensus process generates a power of uniformity for conserving the established solidity of 
collective action systems. In both cases we are dealing with a definitely anarchist mode of 
generating collective action systems, good and bad. This is a simple point, but it flies against the 
established belief that anarchist collective action systems must be void of power-over, or that 
anarchist organizing strives simply to eradicate power in general. Both the unity of solidarity and 
the uniformity of solidity are potential powers of this particular anarchist tool, and they have to 
be engaged as inevitable facets of power which occur whenever humans act in collective conduct 
(which, I dare say, is always).  
 For the sake of anarchist collective conduct, as a specific ideal for finding the most egalitarian 
and empowering ways of conducting human interactions, we have to recognize a polar bond 
between the powers of unity and uniformity, between creative emergent solidarity and 
conservative established solidity: there is a dual edge to the power generated by consensus 
decision-making, it can cut both ways. In the next section I aim to examine how an anarchist 
project of radical democracy can enhance its power for creating emergent anarchist solidarity 
while resisting the abuses of conserving established anarchist solidity. 
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(4.2) Dual Power Radical Democracy, Revisited  
If we are going to use consensus for creating anarchist collective action system solidarity and 
avoid using it to conserve anarchist collective action system solidity, then we need to distinguish 
between how and when each function is likely to occur. This final section delves deeper into 
those distinctions by introducing an analysis of insurgent democracy. This title “insurgent 
democracy” names a grouping of thinkers who conceive of democracy as a politics of agonistic 
deliberative dissensus: an activity of disagreement, conflict, and political interruption that breaks 
established consensus in order to allow for insurgent new equality to erupt where it was formerly 
withheld. This insurgent democracy perspective presents a necessary challenge to the traditional 
discourse of consensus decision-making’s participatory radical democratic ideals. If democracy 
is actually generated by acts of insurgent dissensus that break up collective action systems based 
on political unity, then how could a formal consensus process which is premised on achieving 
unitary agreement truly be radically democratic?  
 Sorting out this question of how the theories of insurgent democracy relate to the practices of 
consensus decision-making, we shall be able to further elaborate on some useful differences 
between the opposed powers of consensus decision-making. Recognizing an important difference 
and relationship between anarchist solidarity and insurgent democracy, as opposed to anarchist 
solidity and insurgent democracy. Insurgent democracy is a movement (never an established 
order of things) that impacts upon established and solidified collective action systems. Therefore, 
it affects the two modes of consensus process very differently. Facing the consensus process’ 
power to conserve the established solidity of anarchist collective action systems, the movement 
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of radical insurgent democracy will be an antagonistic force that breaks that power of uniformity 
and reasserts new subjects into any established code of normal ruling religio. But the consensus 
process’ power to create an anarchist collective action system from emergent solidarity can form 
a synergy with the movement of radical insurgent democracy which can propel revolutionary 
project of anarchist dual power. In other words, when it is used to conserve established solidity, 
the consensus process fails to coordinate dual power mobilization and instead reasserts 
preconditioned collective action systems, then it is the enemy of radical democracy. However, 
when it works to create emergent solidarity, when it is successful in creating a dynamic dual 
power collective action system, then it can be an agent of radical democracy. The trick is to tell 
them apart and know when each can be applied. 
  
(4.2.1) The Politics of Insurgent Democracy 
The concept of insurgent democracy depicts a social activity that interrupts any institutionally 
coded normalcy, prescribed order, or established consensus. The editors of the recent anthology 
Thinking Radical Democracy write of how this tradition stands in contrast to the classical and 
mainstream trend of political theory: 
From Plato to Rawls, the outstanding representatives of Western political thought 
have clearly recognized that division is the essence of the sphere of politics: divisions 
continually re-emerge between different parts of society – between those who claim 
different titles to govern, between those with opposing visions for the community, 
between those who are members of society and those who are not. But with few 
exceptions – Machiavelli, in particular – the tradition’s canonical thinkers have seen 
the indeterminacy resulting from these divisions as something to be overcome, not as 
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a condition to be affirmed. The realization of democracy, though, depends upon 
precisely this affirmation.  467
Democracy is not an institution, not a system, not a method — it is a social movement of 
political insurgency that erupts wherever people introduce new equalities and new subjects into 
previously settled institutions, systems, and methods.  
 This idea of democracy depicts a principle of activism, a social movement that affirms 
resistance and introduces the demands of new equality into an already-given power system. It 
cannot be applied to accept or reproduce established power, a given state of order, a given law, a 
given authority. Even where a social order may calls itself “democratic,” then insurgent 
democracy must be thought of as an act of introducing new terms of equality and new political 
subjects into the system called democracy. In the terms I have developed so far, this idea of 
insurgent democracy fits in as an attack on the powers of uniformity, the consensus of common 
sensus, the conservative established solidity of a collective action system. The concept of 
“consensus” has been roundly criticized from the insurgent democracy perspective as a notion of 
established and institutionalized normalcy. In one sense, consensus is the arch enemy of radical 
democracy because it stands for the normal, routine, accepted form of government in which a 
collective action system goes about arranging its “common sensus” status quo systems of power.  
 French theorist Jacques Rancière’s conceptual opposition between politics and police can 
serve well to elaborate on this contrast. First of all, he expresses that “politics is generally seen as 
the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the 
organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this 
distribution. I propose to give this system of distribution and legitimization another name. I 
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propose to call it the police.”  Any institutional coordination of managerial normativity is a 468
matter of “the police,” whereas politics is an insurgent challenge to the police. In his Ten Theses 
on Politics, Rancière writes that the police is “not a social function, but a symbolic constitution 
of the social,”  which means that we should recognize the police as a certain mode of order 469
which can arise in any and every social formation, not simply in our enemies’ outrightly 
egregious examples of tyranny and domination. The concept of the police represents any social 
coordination of the normal which settles habits and organizes the sensible and understandable 
arrangements of “groups tied to specific modes of doing, to places in which these occupations 
are exercised, and to modes of being corresponding to these occupations and these places.”    470
 Emphasizing also that the politics of democracy is not simply a designation of institutional 
systems or an idealized image of the will of “the people,” Rancière sees democracy rather as an 
interruption of who counts as “the people.” This requires that democratic politics be conceived 
as an intrusive interruption of the established consensual solidity of a collective action system: 
“whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place’s destination.”  It is the 471
emergence through disagreement of how to name “the people.” It is the emergence of a political 
people who will infect the good name of the police people. Then, says Rancière, “politics exists 
when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have 
no part.”  The part who have no part are those who previously did not count as “the people,” 472
but who, through contentious interruption of the normal organization of the police system, have 
come to cause a break in the normal order and place that ranks and sorts people’s power. 
 Politics is the act of intruding upon the police. Upsetting a group’s established police orders to 
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into the realms of political possibility. It is a process of interrupting the presumption and 
presence of the people’s rules of belonging and equality with a challenge to the rules of 
belonging and equality. John Keane (albeit from a somewhat different perspective) also 
addresses this conceptual essence of democracy as a challenge to the principles of participatory 
democracy. Arguing that any democratic government (even those claiming radical participatory 
unity) must necessarily perform some kind of division between rulers and ruled, Keane says that 
understanding democracy simply as a “government of self-rule by the people” overlooks the 
point that  
a ‘people’ cannot govern itself unless it relies upon institutions that in turn have the 
effect of sundering ‘the people’. So despite the fact that they may try to imagine 
themselves to be standing shoulder to shoulder, seeing eye to eye, a body that calls 
itself ‘the people’ always finds in practice that it is a fictional entity made up of 
different individuals and groups interacting through institutions that materially 
shape not only how they make decisions and what they decide as a body, but also 
who they are as a ‘people’.  473
Against any officially organized institutional definition of “the people,” the people who actually 
do democracy are those who are always left out of “the people,” those who do not count in that 
count, who are unnamed in that name, and who are unheard in that speech. For Rancière, this is 
key: “the people always, in fact, take shape at the very point they are declared finished.”   474
 With this new take on the meaning of radical democracy as an insurgent act of disrupting 
established order, we are presented with a challenge to the previously accepted definitions of 
consensus decision-making as a tool of radical democracy. There are certainly conditions in 
which the consensus process can stifle the possibility of politically insurgent dissensus — I have 
already identified this situation as specific to the powers of uniformity that conserve established 
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collective action system solidity. That one side of the dual function in consensus decision-
making is basically a definition of the police in action. If a consensus is called and the people are 
named as a whole, united, and indivisible collective action system, then Rancière’s vision of 
democracy begins as counterattack to that consensus. In direct opposition to the premise that 
radical democracy should aim to establish equality based on consensus and unity, Rancière calls 
on the concepts of dissensus and dis-agreement to describe democracy as an interruption that 
exposes structured inequalities of political power; as a crack in the stability of an enclosed 
discourse, it is the uncomfortable struggle between a fully integrated common sensus and an 
exposed and scandalous uncommon sensation. Democracy is not consensus at all, it is the very 
opposite: it is the rupture of consensus, “the manifestation of dissensus as the presence of two 
worlds in one.”   475
 However, by thinking about the consensus process as a tool of collective action systems, I 
have tried to unhinge it from representing fixated idealistic and theoretical oppositions of this 
kind. Consensus process may be used as a function of the police, indeed, but it is not bound to 
that function alone. The critical perspective of insurgent democracy is definitely opposed to the 
conservative functions of consensus, but not necessarily to its creative functions. In fact, I think 
that insurgent democracy and anarchist solidarity are potentially powerful allies against systems 
of conservative established solidity. The distinction in the consensus functions that generate 
either the power of unity or the power of uniformity has echoes in Miguel Abensour’s conceptual 
contrast between the all ones and the all One. Recalling the political thought of Étienne de La 
Boétie, Abensour writes that 
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insurgent democracy means the community of ‘all ones’ (tout uns) — what it 
specifically terms friendship — against the ‘all One’ (tout Un); and more precisely, 
if we take in charge the dynamic dimension of the political, the resistance of all 
ones to the shift into all One, as if insurgency had among other functions the one 
of blocking, eradicating the ever menacing slippage of the community of all ones 
towards the unifying form of all One, denying the plurality, the ontological 
condition of plurality.  476
The all One is a process of managing a collective action system that is established prior to any 
interactions that may take part within it. It is a singular order. The all ones is a collective 
plurality, always a dynamic relationship determined through the process of a collective action 
system of equals. It is not a single unity — not an all One — but a plural unity — composed of 
all ones. It is a plural assembly. 
 Abensour employs this conceptual opposition between the all ones and the all One as a way 
to define the principles of struggle between democracy and the State. For Abensour, the State is 
not simply a name for certain institutions of political governance, but a categorical form of 
human organization, a code for any collective action system which resorts to the rule of the all 
One. The State is a conceptual category that can “designate a social ensemble — of groups, 
relations, practices — which work towards the reproduction of a given historical community, in 
various fields: technical, scientific, industrial, cultural, ideological.”  Abensour is concerned 477
with elaborating a politics whose primary aim to to struggle against any such social and political 
reproductions. In this way, Abensour’s sense of democracy is by definition against the State, an 
insurgent action rather than an instituted organization, but it must engage against an instituted 
organization in order to exist. Democracy against the State means that “the State is not the last 
 315
word of the political, its accomplishment. On the contrary, it is only a systematic and destructive 
form of the all one in the name of the One.”   478
 The tricky part about this conceptual array is that the all ones and the all One are not 
categorically distinct; they can transform and slip into one another, they are a dialectic 
conceptual polarity in human collective action system dynamics. As Abensour puts it, democratic 
“insurgency corresponds to the time of the caesura between two State forms; it is to recognize 
that the democracy which is inspired by it works to preserve this time of the caesura.”  This 479
means that insurgent democracy is a transient and performative act which cannot establish itself 
as an ongoing and established system of power-over without transforming the character of its 
democratic insurgence into the State order of coordination and systemic maintenance. 
Democracy has to work within a gap between State forms, which means that its very existence 
pertains to State forms. “Insurgent democracy installs itself paradoxically in a place which defies 
any installation, the very place of the caesura between two forms of state, one past, the other to 
come.”  As Abensour says, if democracy is to represent the all ones against the all One, it must 480
be “redefined as the always possible emergence of human struggle.”  The act of democracy is a 481
momentary, insurgent situation of disruption, rather than a lasting, organized institution. 
Democracy, so often trivialized and domesticated in order to be better trained, is a 
particular form of political experience that gives itself political institutions, so that 
it may endure with efficiency. Yet it simultaneously never ceases to rise against the 
State, and in such a way that its effervescent opposition has less to do with 
negating the political realm than with embodying, in a most powerful and 
paradoxical fashion, an incessant ‘new disorder’ that reinvents the political realm 
beyond the State, and even against it.   482
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 This is a vision of democracy as a struggle, not a state. It is an act of transforming the 
established systems which prevail, disrupting them when they rule and resisting their return to 
rule. In these senses, the concept of insurgent democracy accords amazingly well with the 
qualities we’ve already identified in the emergent consensus decision-making tool: it is a 
transient moment of irrupting equalization, staged as a moment of disorder that insurgently 
disrupts the institutionalization order of established consensus to reinvent the political conduct of 
power relations. The same polar dynamic which constitutes the relation between the democratic 
insurgency of the all ones and the institutional order of the all One should be recognized in the 
dual functions of consensus decision-making’s capacity to empower creative emergent solidarity 
and conservative established solidity. As a tool of emergent solidarity, consensus is a mechanism 
for conditioning an assembly based on plurality. Through the consensus process a group of all 
ones can build the collective power determined only by their explicit and immediate inter-
actions, autonomously generating a collective action system unprepared by any established 
system of coded order. In this role, the consensus process is a tool for radical democratic 
empowerment of a group composed of all ones. When it works to conserve established solidity, 
however, it empowers the very opposite — it serves the all One because it asserts predetermined 
regulations about who belongs, defines and protects a regime of what is sayable, and only counts 
those who are placed in their proper positions. On the one hand, the consensus process is a tool 
for empowering the political action of all ones; on the other, a tool for holding the all One power 
of the police. 
 I contend, therefore, that if consensus process is going to be a useful tool for insurgent 
democratic activism, then it should be applied only as a creative emergence that can provoke 
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collective action system power in a caesura between States, in the gaps between instituted 
functions of collective action systems, as a way to enable the power of dissensus through the 
collective action of all ones who manifest a wrong with their very emergence.  
 Consensus decision-making process illuminates the polar connection of the all ones and the 
all One, the thread that runs between politics and the police, the dual capacity for creative and 
conservative functions of anarchist power. The police and the all One will return on their own, so 
our task is to always invigorate the creative side of the consensus process. We have to figure out 
how to identify when and how the creative function of consensus decision-making can empower 
insurgent democratic politics of dual power, and how we can best recognize and resist its 
transformation into a function for State stability and police order. In the following sections I will 
focus on two important points that the insurgent democratic perspective can teach us about when 
and where consensus decision-making’s capacity to create emergent solidarity can serve 
anarchist radical democratic dual power: 1) as an insurgent democratic action, the consensus 
process is useful for specific tasks that require new collective action systems to be created from 
disparate parts — it has to be treated as a specific tool for specific jobs; 2) as a caesura between 
State forms, the consensus process has to be accepted as a technique that has a limited time and 
place — it has to be a transient, performative, and unsettled activity. Together, these two points 
draw some new detail into the quest(ion) of how and when the consensus process can best serve 
as a dual power tool implemented to create new associations and to challenge collective action 
systems, rather than as a formal standing system that operates to control and manage ongoing 
collective action systems. 
!
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(4.2.2) Anarchist Dual Power Praxis (Both Hands, Again) 
The autonomous solidarity of all ones is always cast in conflict with the autocratic solidity of the 
all One, in a dual sense: 1) it must act as an insurgent interruption of all One/the police this is 
established in prevailing social institutions; and 2) it must always reflect and resist its own 
transformation into another form of all One/the police. There is an external and an internal 
dimension to these struggles because the all ones and the all One are not separated by a stable 
categorical distinction, they are a conceptual pair that expresses dynamic polar tension. To 
accomplish the political task of that insurgency, the all ones have to assemble a dual power 
collective action system that can act both prefiguratively to minimize the reproduction of all One 
within its own internal organization and contentiously to externally fight and defeat the 
organization of the all One in its environment. This formula recalls, once again, the sense of 
anarchist dual power: to incite the insurgent democratic power of all ones that can contentiously 
fight the all One externally, associated with prefigurative methods of coordinating power among 
the all ones so that we do not reproduce the all One internally. 
 How can these insurgent democratic concepts be mapped to the systems diagrams of internal 
and external power relations? Insurgent democracy is a contentious politics of disrupting 
established institutions and regulated distinctions; it interrupts any settled rules that define 
inequalities in how people are able to participate in political collective action. The consensus 
process is one way of generating a collective action system capable of these activities when it is 
both without internal distinctions of rule and which can serve to help the struggle against 
external powers of rule. As long as it lives as a temporary and transient collective body, it will 
not organize any institutionalized established power structures. When consensus is successful at 
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generating dual power it is much more likely to hold these qualities as a new, undifferentiated, 
body-without-a-head collective action system in which there is no categorical division among 
those who participate. This is a type of collective action system that cannot be the object of 
democratic insurgent interruption because it has no standing order, there are no places, no counts, 
no differentiation among those who have power and those who are excluded. On the contrary, in 
fact, the successful consensus process can be understood as creating a collective subject that is 
especially capable of enacting democratic insurgency.  
 Now, such an alliance between the consensus process and insurgent democratic action is 
relevant only for those rare and fleeting cases where consensus achieves its ideal terms of 
success and acts to create an emergent collective action system based on anarchist solidarity (the 
transient, performative, autonomous and autoergoic body-without-a-head anarchist system). 
These moments of emergent solidarity are not meant to last, they are assembled only for specific 
and definite actions, after which they are supposed to disassemble. If the body-without-a-head 
becomes an instituted form of established functioning, it then transforms in function into the 
conservative rule of all One. When the consensus process is instituted as a system to rule over 
established and solid collective action systems, it then must become the object of insurgent 
democratic interruption; it must itself be broken open to reveal the hidden patterns of inequality 
which are solidified in its common sensus routines and relationships. There is a thin line between 
creative consensus of all ones and a conservative consensus of all One. In the remaining sections 
of this project I aim to detail some powers and problems of consensus decision-making where we 
should pay close attention to that line. 
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 Here’s a hypothesis: the use of consensus process for anarchist insurgent democratic action 
can only prevail where it is mobilized by dual power. One important sign that the consensus 
process is likely operating in its conservative mode rather than in its creative mode is when the 
process works only for one side of dual power. Considering external relations of dual power, 
anarchist solidarity can empower an externally contentious power-to for movements of insurgent 
democracy. Considering internal relations of dual power, the body-without-a-head mode of 
prefigurative anarchist solidarity coordinates a situation where — at least potentially — every 
participant can be counted, where every voice is politically integral to their collective action 
system. Of course, there are specific and delicate conditions in which this dual power must be 
situated. It won’t work like this for every situation or at all times. In the history of consensus 
decision-making, the delicate dual power balance has often leaned towards emphasizing 
prefigurative harmony over contentious struggle. Too often the process has been used to organize 
and to justify idols of prefigurative unity, by which a group perceives itself to be righteously 
manifesting radical democratic equality in a way that actually only privileges its own established 
terms of solidity.  
 Even when a group does manage to perform a creatively emergent consensus, if it is not also 
engaged in any effective contentious political action then it will quickly settle into itself and fail 
to act as a tool for insurgent democracy. Insurgent democratic action requires contentious 
interruption, it cannot exist merely in the casual unity of solidified equalities. If the consensus 
process arranges a perfectly harmonious anarchist unity but for no actively contentious purpose, 
then that collective action system is only filling in a uniformity that was probably born too easy 
into predetermined positions. In those cases we should be wary that the process is liable to 
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reassert established consensus on privileged power rather than create emergent possibilities for 
radical insurgent democracy.  
 Anarchist solidarity and insurgent democracy can be allied, if employed carefully. How to be 
so careful? In the remaining sections of this chapter I will explore two key concepts which I 
believe to be necessary for the tactical deployment of consensus decision-making as an anarchist 
radical democratic dual power. These two points are simple enough in principle, although 
apparently difficult enough in practice to warrant more explication as principles.  
 1) To every job a tool.  
 We cannot ever allow a specific democratic tool like consensus decision-making to stand for the 
ideal of all democratic practice. The consensus process is a tool among many, and many tools 
will be required to coordinate the entire project of anarchist radical democracy.  
 2) To every power a season. 
 All tools have their tasks, and every job has its moment. Dual power is not a problem solved by 
any one resolution, it is a praxis which requires ongoing balance and adjustment, it is the 
homeostatic challenge of coordinating collective action empowerment. Consensus decision-
making enables a specific mode of power to that project which will be useful at some times and 
not at other times.  
  
(4.2.3) To Every Job a Tool 
Consensus process is not the salvation of radical democracy. It is a specialized tool for creating 
collective action systems based on emergent anarchist solidarity. In this capacity it has an 
indispensable place in the toolbox of an anarchist radical democratic project which, of course, 
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must also involve many other techniques and tactics. Wherever consensus is hailed with blind 
adulation, idolized as a universal democratic multi-tool, treated primarily as a technique that in 
itself leads to harmony and belonging, it is then likely to become mired in its conservative 
abuses. When people use nothing but consensus, they end up with nothing but 
consensus.“Nothing but consensus” is just pure sameness, the all One. It’s the conservative 
police. That guy who assures you “we’re all equal here” is content to live in a harmonized world 
of established consensus because his vision of equality does not include struggle. He wants peace 
without justice. He wants happy consensus over necessary conflict. He wants the police without 
politics.  
 If equality were as easy as agreement, if democracy were equivalent to unity and anarchism 
could truly eradicate power, then it should only take a properly articulated consensus process to 
make a world where “we’re all equal here.” Whenever one single system, theory, or process gets 
put up on such a tall pedestal, its ideal possibilities harden into idolized assurances. This has 
been a problem with the modern tradition of consensus ever since its growth-spurt in the 1960s. 
This is a common point among social movement historians. Social movements scholar Jean 
Cohen, for example, casts the difference between the “old” social movements and the “New 
Social Movements” (NSMs) upon an axis of “strategy versus identity” (that is, again: “those two 
guys”) claiming that the newer movements were focused on a self-reflexive process and self-
referential campaigns that renounced the greater revolutionary tasks of the old movements. As 
she puts it, the NSMs express “a self-understanding that abandons revolutionary dreams in 
favour of the idea of structural reform, along with a defense of civil society that does not seek to 
abandon the autonomous functioning of political and economic systems - in a phrase, self-
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limiting radicalism.”  That is, according to this tale, activists have increasingly turned towards 483
problems of how to be radically democratic, rather than how to fight for radical democracy. The 
preoccupation with being radical certainly applies to the way that consensus decision-making 
has often been treated as a symbolic commitment to the anarchist ethics of power.  
 As Andrew Cornell argues, “consensus functions as a synecdoche—a part rhetorically 
standing in for a greater whole. In this case, the whole that consensus stands in for is a 
participatory, egalitarian, self-determining movement, on the one hand, and, on the other, a 
society with the same characteristics.”  The prefigurative idolization that has plagued 484
consensus over the years is concocted from a potent brew of ethical commitments derived from 
anarchist, feminist, Quaker, Peacemaker, and Christian civil rights movements. By the time the 
consensus process became so popular in the antinuclear environmental movement of the late 
1970s, the method was already treated reverently, as a process that held some possibility for the 
political salvation of a movement that held strong spiritual opposition to the general character of 
modern industrial society as a whole.  Many groups treated consensus not only as a good 485
democratic decision-making method but as the one and only truly democratic decision-making 
method. Consensus became the way, the truth, and the light. As Francesca Polletta says, “for 
many, the commitment to consensus reflected a firm belief that there was one true way, God’s 
way, discoverable through joint contemplation.”  In a now oft-referenced piece emerging from 486
the experience of antinuclear mobilization of consensus decision-making, Howard Ryan wrote 
that “groups making decisions by consensus tend to regard the process with a sort of spiritual 
reverence — I mean it is worshipped. The suggestion that even a straw vote be tried often brings 
reactions of hostility and moral indignation. The aura of morality discourages any objective 
 324
analysis of the effects of consensus.”  Years later in 2004, Andy Cornell asked why the alter-487
globalization movement seemed to be sputtering through a lack of mobilizational impetus: 
Why? Because the real revolution was happening right there, on the dirty floor of a 
warehouse in Red Hook, Brooklyn, where 75 people, nine tenths of them white and 
economically comfortable, were having "democratic" conversations. The revolution 
was the process itself-- assuming that every nuance of consensus procedure was 
followed, the facilitator ran through the “stack” in the correct order, and each 
participant used the correct hand gesture to indicate that she wanted to make a “direct 
response.” It didn't matter what the outcome was, as long as we were "reinventing 
democracy" in the process.  488
 Today, when consensus is still called “the most revolutionary decision-making decision 
making process” it is coloured by the same type of spiritual sheen and miraculous promise for an 
ecstatic sense of community. The spiritualized valour and moral indignation that tends to pervade 
these traditions of radical democratic prefigurative politics can offer a certain kind of limited 
power: when a group of people is so passionate about the righteousness of their actions it helps 
to cement their courage and commitment to the cause. But there are also serious drawbacks: 
people start to presume and reinforce their positions as common sensical to the point that their 
commitment devolves into a head-in-the-sand inability to recognize when alternative processes 
and perspectives may be required to get anything new done.  
 Many scholars see the Clamshell Alliance as an exemplary case of this conglomeration of 
influences, a clear example of both the power and danger in treating consensus process so 
reverentially. As Barbara Epstein reports, “Clamshell was perceived as a dialectical response to 
the failures of the New Left. This is one of the reasons consensus decision making was such a 
sacred cow.”  First of all, in the Clamshell story we can observe how the procedure of 489
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consensus came to be a synecdoche for the core values and ideals in radical democracy, equality, 
and nonviolence. From the very beginning, the Clamshell Alliance presented consensus as 
eminently necessary for achieving these essential cultural revolutionary aims: no “truly radical” 
organization would be possible that allowed for hierarchy, differences of power and control, or 
any internal structural privilege to decide on matters of collective affairs. In Epstein’s review of 
the Clamshell’s development from a small closely-knit group process to a mobilization network 
involving thousands of protesters, she expresses that 
the almost ecstatic sense of community that Clamshell enjoyed in its first year or 
so led Clams to believe that internal harmony was the automatic result of 
consensus process and a philosophy of nonviolence. But in fact consensus 
probably worked best among people who were more or less like-minded, as the 
original group was, or in the special circumstances of incarceration in which power 
struggles were not at issue and there was both the time and the desire to work out 
differences.   490
That “ecstatic sense of community” is a prime symptom of the collective effervescence that can 
help promote anarchist solidarity-building. Then, the process eases into delimiting boundaries of 
belonging, setting “the community” apart as an exclusive domain; literally ec-statically (standing 
outside from the normal) distinguished from others. When groups like Clamshell have over-
emphasized the intensity and importance of prefigurative politics, they are much more likely to 
fall into favouring the conservative side of the consensus process. When a group has to stand 
aside from the rest of the world in order to achieve their radical democratic ideals, they will 
inevitably step out from the praxis of dual power. 
 In a society fragmented by the modern dismemberment of more traditionally organic 
associations, in a world where so many people are longing for belonging, it is tempting feel 
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emotional about the consensus process. It augments and emphasizes the presence of collective 
“being,” it builds the collective effervescence of belonging and harmony, it helps people build 
tightly-knit public-political groups in a society where those experiences are in short supply. 
However, this kind of heightened emotional charge tends to make people over-invested in the 
practice of deliberation itself, transforming a tool into an idol. To take a line from Zygmunt 
Bauman, when trying to compensate for a general lack of social unity many “groups are 
overloaded with expectations which are virtually impossible to meet, and which, once frustrated, 
lead to mutual recrimination.”  History certainly shows this trend in consensus practice. 491
Initially, the Occupy movement’s focus on the prefigurative construction of an alternative 
political experience was potent in itself. The mainstream media was baffled, as CNN reporter 
Erin Burnett’s piece makes explicit with its title: “Seriously?! What are they protesting?”  For 492
many Occupiers this kind of response from the mainstream was taken as a sure sign that they 
were doing something right simply by inhabiting a different kind of politics. However, as L. A. 
Kauffmann, a sociologist and Occupy participant, worries: the movement may have ultimately 
ended up bending its power into an obsessive focus only on the internal-communal and 
prefigurative processing of insular solidity to the exclusion of any instrumental aims to increase 
their empowerment into a more powerful externally-acting social movement. Kauffman quotes 
Jonathan Smucker’s poignant recollection: 
I began to wonder if the heightened sense of an integrated identity was “the 
utopia” that many of my fellow participants were seeking. What if the thing we 
were missing, the thing we were lacking — the thing we longed for most — was a 
sense of an integrated existence in a cohesive community, i.e., an intact lifeworld? 
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What if this longing was so potent that it could eclipse the drive to affect larger 
political outcomes?  493
Participants in Occupy initially bonded by sharing a collective emotional anger about their place 
in the modern world, a feeling that they had previously found to be frustrated and unexpressed in 
public political spaces. This point was so prevalent in the Occupy movement that it fed the 
popularity of the slogan that “at Occupy, process is politics.”  The common social and political 494
estrangement which Occupy strove to transform first served as a spark for the initial burst of 
movement passions. But, as Smucker asks, what if this longing were more potent than the drive 
to affect larger political outcomes? To the regret of many the task of creating “cohesive 
community” seemed to outweigh the task of creating a “larger political outcome” in the Occupy 
movement, once again splitting the capacities of that mobilization along a familiar fault line of 
prefigurative versus contentious politics. Those two guys, at it again.  
 The Occupy movement became infatuated with being radically democratic, and this was 
initially its primary strength: when it could put the consensus-based political process to use for 
creating emergent solidarity. But, as that identification with radical democracy slowly established 
as Occupy’s only strength the creative function of consensus process mutated into the 
conservative function. Occupy’s slow demise was attended to by that conservative power of 
consensus process that augments the power of uniformity to settle group decisions down to the 
lowest common denominator of a very broad common sensus, a broken-down consensus that 
eventually isn’t for anything but conserving consensus itself. Even the best prefigurative process 
easily wallows in the self-righteous conservations of established collective action power patterns 
when cut away from contentious activism.  
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 When the presumption of an established anarchist cultural consensus reigns in activist 
organizations, “we ghettoize ourselves in our comfort zones, to a point that anyone that doesn’t 
fit the anarchist “description” feels as out of place as a fat woman in a fashion magazine.”  One 495
anonymous author depicts this classic dual power disfunction sprouting at Occupy Los Angeles 
after only a few weeks, blossoming quickly in the fertile soils of presumed cultural common 
sensus and idolized political process. According to this participant, the choice between those who 
prioritized the prefigurative power of the process versus those who wanted to use the movement 
to build the power of contentious direct action sprang up almost immediately as the main 
dividing line of ideological difference that would ultimately spell out the demise of that camp’s 
effectiveness as a united collective action system. As this person recounts, the consensus process 
was almost immediately prioritized beyond any question, and when opponents fought back the 
whole mechanism ground to a halt:  
We spent literally 5 hours, without exaggeration, and nothing was agreed on beyond 
where we would sleep. Since day 1 this model has been used to stifle and stop direct 
action and civil disobedience rather than to foster it, and when I have called for even non-
violent autonomous actions the organizers (who are mostly new to activism) have gone 
out of their way to troll us and make us look divisive and out of touch with the 
movement.  496
When consensus is lopsidedly applied for prefigurative politics, it lends it considerable powers to 
establishing the privileges of easy decisions and easy actions that promise revolutionary delivery 
in and of themselves. These are false promises, and the eventual fall from grace they provoke 
tends to hit pretty hard. As long as the value of consensus is essentially equated with the whole 
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symbolic pantheon — anti-authoritarian, non-violent, feminist, and anarchist principles — it will 
demand a lofty dose of idolized worship.  
No worshipful initiate dares to treat their idol like a “mere tactic;” it’s a harsh demotion to get 
bumped down from a synecdoche for all democratic equality to just another tool in the toolbox. 
But this is what is necessary. So long as consensus continues to be treated as somehow 
equivalent to anarchist cultural principles of justice and equality, its practitioners risk losing the 
dual power edge that the tool may actually contribute to radical democratic mobilizations. As 
Andrew Cornell counsels:  
to avoid some of the muddled strategic thinking that often accompanies an 
introduction to consensus, organizers must stop teaching consensus in a way that 
entrances activists into thinking that the quality of their intermovement 
conversations are alluring enough to revolutionize society by weight of example. 
Concretely, this means that they need to use and teach additional methods for 
making decisions in political work and help less-experienced activists determine 
when each are most useful.  497
Mark Lance, writing about how too many groups tend to fetishize the consensus process, sums 
up this basic point clearly: “no procedure guarantees wise decision making, and a wide variety of 
procedures can be useful in arriving at wise decisions. So do not privilege one over another in the 
abstract.”  Many tools make a good toolbox. For idols, on the other hand, two’s a crowd. 498
Worshipping one idol is especially inimical to the pluralizing spirit of democracy. If power is 
always a feature of collective action systems (coordinating people into collective agents and 
against other collective agents, both internally and externally to their respective systems) then we 
cannot expect any system to deliver the pure utopia of equality, freedom, and release from power. 
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In fact, quite the opposite: to treat democracy as an idol is to begin sacrificing its power in actual 
practice.  
 To develop anarchist radical democratic methods of dual power requires that we think of our 
processes as tools — useful or useless depending on the task — not as idols to be worshipfully 
followed in every case. In fact, wherever consensus decision-making has worked best as a dual 
power tool people have tended to treat it as both a tactical and an ethical instrument, as the 
combined praxis of a tool that helps their contentious empowerment an their prefigurative power 
systems. For instance, as Polletta recounts, during the early stages of the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee’s rising influence on civil right mobilization in the American South 
(SNCC) the methods of participatory democracy and consensus-orientation were treated 
explicitly as tactics of dual power. However, when the organizational composition of SNCC 
changed dramatically in 1964-65 there was an interesting reversal in the rhetoric associated with 
radical participatory democracy. SNCC’s executive secretary at the time, James Forman, 
believed in the need for drastic organizational restructuring to build a more efficient and 
coordinated mass organization. SNCC needed to change if it wanted to compete in the big 
leagues, and for Forman this meant abandoning the decentralized participatory structures it had 
used so far, adopting instead more coordinated, centralized, and leader-oriented structures which 
could deliver effective large-scale mobilization. The resulting organizational conflicts within the 
organization then began crystallizing around a distinction between “freedom highs” and 
“hardliners”  (another version of “those two guys”): the one driving for loose structure, open 499
organizational authority, and defending these choices with the appeal to high ideals; the other 
 331
going for stricter structure, controlled organizational authority, concerned with justifying the 
need for pragmatically immediate capacity.  
 However, Polletta argues that “in fact, the objections to Forman’s plan were initially made on 
practical grounds.”  Against Forman’s proposal for a more conventional bureaucratic structure, 500
an alternative was suggested that would be based on a new structure of groups who would meet 
to coordinate and deal with localized problems. These, “loose structure proponents cited not the 
requirements of ideological consistency — of enacting participatory democracy in the here and 
now — but Mississippi field organizers’ need for organizational flexibility.”  It was a tactical 501
problem, a problem of direction, an issue with the very heart of the organization: its goals, its 
dreams, its life choices. And it was problem that no one quite knew how to describe or solve. In 
the face of uncertainty, people resorted to the familiar lens of ethics versus tactics, prefiguration 
versus contention. Nevertheless, throughout these debates and difficulties SNCC members 
continued to discuss their organizational forms in terms that privileged strategic concerns.  
 After difficult internal processing in 1964 and 1965, SNCC abandoned the explicit 
commitment to participatory democracy and consensus-oriented procedure, approaching instead 
a supposedly more ‘radical’ ideal of building power for the movement by assuming a different 
sense of responsibility for leadership. Just as SNCC had been born in distinction against the 
authoritarianism in the more-established Southern Civil Rights organizations, in 1965 the move 
away from loose structure was cast largely in terms of distinguishing themselves from the 
influence of a “participatory democracy” that had now become largely associated with the white, 
Northern activists. In this, Polletta argues, we can see a reversal of the traditional sense that there 
is a clear divide along the lines of strategic capacity versus ethical commitment. “Decentralized 
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and informal structure here, as in other movements, had facilitated individual initiative and 
tactical innovation. The source of top-down structure’s appeal was not its capacity to yield more 
efficient outcomes or its consistency with an existing ideology but its symbolic resonance.”  It 502
is only in the story’s repetition, in its transformation into history, that the model of hardliners 
versus freedom highs has been drilled into memory as determining the shifts in SNCC 
organizational form. The problem of practical strategy versus utopian ethicality was actually 
itself part of the problem. That is, the division between prefigurative politics and contentious 
politics is itself a matter of ideological framing rather than a predetermined real choice. 
 To break free from the powerful trance created by the dichotomous ideological frame of 
prefigurative versus contentious politics, we have to recompose our attention on seeing practices, 
process, ideas, and actions as tools of praxis: more political doing, less political being. More 
flexible political action means less rigid political identification. When people get caught up in 
assuming that they are democratically equal simply due to the quality of their political ideals and 
structures it can assuage the democratic urge for actually practicing equality. Then people can 
proudly assuage themselves (“we’re so very democratic that we don’t even need to be working 
on that anymore!”), convinced that they are already doing all the egalitarian decision-making 
they need (“just keep it up and all will be well!”). The same kind of displacement goes on with 
regard to the struggles of feminism or anti-racism: assuming that feminism has won (“men and 
women are finally equal, we are all feminists!”) or that racism is over (“we’re all even now, 
hooray no more racism!”) distracts from any further attention to advancing feminist or anti-racist 
action. It should never seem that easy; equality is never finished. Whenever it does seems that 
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easy, then some power of covert coercion is blinding people to the actual status quo inequalities 
in their collective relations. 
 That covert power that conserves established notions of standardized equality is more likely to 
work for a collective action system that privileges one or the other side of dual power. In this 
section so far I’ve been mainly considering the follies of a prefigurative idolization, because that 
is one of the most prevalent characteristics in the tradition of consensus decision-making. The 
same effect can be derived from idolizing contentious action as well. When a collective action 
system requires uniformity from its members in order to mount its collective power-to in external 
struggles, the conservative functions of consensus can help to coordinate and reinforce that 
uniformity. This is what political theorist Ronald Dworkin worried about when noting that 
solidarity is “a category that could be used by people with power to compel the allegiance of 
those without it.”  The consensus function of assuring collective action solidity works in this 503
way, disregarding the need for prefiguring an internal composition of democratically egalitarian 
power-over in favour of raising an externally powerful collective action to defeat contentious 
enemies and advance “the movement.” On this point Jodi Dean’s 1995 distinction between 
conventional solidarity and reflective solidarity proves illuminating as a way to consider, again 
from another angle, the difference between a creative anarchist solidarity and a conservative 
anarchist solidity. In the formation of conventional solidarities, Dean writes:  
The expectations of members are given, whether rooted in traditional values or 
engendered by a situation which constructs various individuals as members of a 
group. Conventional solidarities, then, take their form from a shared adherence to 
common beliefs of goals which unite people in membership. These goals and 
beliefs serve as mediations surpassing the actual interconnections among members. 
 334
Yet as they serve to bind the group together, these mediations present themselves 
as delimiting the self understanding of the group. In other words, they provide 
limits beyond which one as a member cannot go.  504
Solidarities based on exclusive belonging function by categorical exclusions; the group solidifies 
its own identity by being impermeable to influences and interaction, cut-off from the power 
circuits that flow beyond its boundaries. Reflective solidarity, on the other hand, does not 
centralize the interests of members in the same way. Reflective solidarity is a practice of 
reaching across the boundaries of identity and ideological interests in order to join groups in 
common actions derived from a reflective process of connecting synthetic collective action 
systems.  
 Although the point is commonly made that consensus works best among people who are more 
or less like-minded, the concept of reflective solidarity suggests that we would do better to apply 
it as a way to reflectively link minds rather than to consolidate like-mindedness, to discover 
common ground and create bonds of solidarity rather than to reaffirm common senses and 
conserve bonds of belonging. In Peter Gelderloos’ words, “in working out these practical details 
we will start from our own experiences and we will develop our own strategies. But anarchy can 
only benefit from a diversity of experiences and strategies.”  This has often been the task set 505
for consensus process in situations where there is no prior group identification, as a means to 
assemble new collective identities by finding common ground among people who do not 
necessarily share an automatic cultural or tactical like-mindedness. For instance, as sociologist 
Donatella della Porta recounts, consensus was used to good effect in alter-globalization 
movement spaces to open new dialogues and spark new alliances:  
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The Foro Social de Palencia (2008) presents itself as a ‘permanent space for 
encounters, debates and support for collective action, where ‘decisions are made 
by consensus’. In fact, the pluralist nature of the forum is positively assessed in its 
definition as a ‘meeting place of different visions and positions with some common 
denominator, not an organization that has to reach a unique position.’  506
In addition to its potential as a solidarity amplification tool (as demonstrated in the Clamshell 
armories case), this is another general scene where consensus can function usefully to create 
emergent solidarities that synthesizes “different visions and positions with some common 
denominator, not an organization that has to reach a unique position.” When used as a “meeting 
place” technique the consensus process can clear away any preconceived positions and roles 
which might have predetermined ranks and powers, allowing all people the chance to speak and 
be heard in open forum. It then facilitates the possibility for a new grouping of those people to 
emerge, and those effects will have a longterm and unforeseeable impact on all the social 
interactions in which those people will forever be involved. They can begin to form new bonds 
of power-with through their communicative association; they can begin to know and understand 
people they had never known or understood before; they can begin to invent new collective 
action systems and birth new movements. 
 Jacques Rancière also depicts a useful model of insurgent performative transience when he 
describes democracy as responsible for creating emergent political subjectifications where there 
were previously only pre-coded police identity-positions. “Politics is a matter of subjects, or, 
rather, modes of subjectification. By subjectification I mean the production through a series of 
actions of a body and a capacity for enunciation not previously identifiable within a given field 
of experience, whose identification is thus part of the reconfiguration of the field of 
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experience.”  Insurgent democracy occurs when a subjectification creates a previously 507
unidentifiable political actor — a wholly new political body and a capacity. Rancière is 
describing the creation of a new political actor whose very existence depends on the dissensus it 
manifests when disrupting established codes of power. It exists because of the active and 
contentious difference it forces into an established social system by becoming a subject that 
previously had no set place in the institutional order of things. This political subjectification is 
born in contentious resistance to what Rancière call a “wrong” in the established system which is 
challenged: “the wrong it exposes cannot be regulated by way of some accord between the 
parties. It cannot be regulated since the subjects a political wrong sets in motion are not entities 
to whom such and such has happened by accident, but subjects whose very existence is the mode 
of manifestation of the wrong.”  The emergent collective body generated by the consensus 508
process is this very same kind of subjectification: an agent that was previously nonexistent, 
brought into being as the power-to manifest a wrong in established codes of power-over.   
 Insurgent democracy has to be acted by an emergent subjectification, it has to be initiated by a 
collective action system of some kind, and the consensus decision-making process is an anarchist 
tool that can produce this subjectification in a particular formation of dual power. Of course, I do 
not want to suggest that consensus decision-making is the only means for manifesting the 
political subjectification of insurgent democracy, but it can be and has been used in precisely this 
capacity. Treating consensus process as a political principle of radical democracy tends to 
overload it with unattainable fantasy idols of who we should be because of it, to the point that 
there is sometimes no room left for the praxis of doing anything useful with it. Consensus as a 
culture-principle-idol can be a dangerous ideology that allows conventional solidarity to 
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conserve common sensus interests in a idolized system of established collective action system 
solidity. Consensus as a process-tool-ideal can be valuable for identifying common goals and 
coordinating them into the reflective solidarity of a synthetically emergent collective action 
system that can enact the political subjectification of insurgent democracy. The creative power of 
consensus can be allied with the project of insurgent democracy to find a path of dual power in 
fighting against established orders of inequality, but the conservative uses of consensus supplies 
power to established orders of inequality. It’s a fine line between these two contradictory uses of 
the same tool, a line that we need to distinguish more pragmatically. To every job a tool. 
   
(4.2.4) To Every Power a Season 
The dual power tool of emergent consensus for insurgent democracy must be a doing rather than 
a being, an unsettling action rather than a settled situation. For the insurgent democracy 
perspective, for the practices of reflective solidarity, and for the creative consensus body-
without-a-head mode of power — equality has to be an activity of struggle, not a state of affairs. 
This point introduces the idea that the consensus process is not only a specific type of tool with 
different uses, but that there are specific moment, places, and situations where those different 
uses of the tool are more applicable.  
 Sheldon Wolin, an influential American political theorist, urges us to understand democracy as 
more than a name for institutions and systems. In a vein similar to the insurgent democracy 
perspective, he too see democracy as something that has to happen “in-between” institutionalized 
systems and their established codes of order and procedure. He argues that 
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democracy needs to be reconceived as something other than a form of government: 
as a mode of being that is conditioned by bitter experience, doomed to succeed 
only temporarily, but is a recurrent possibility as long as the memory of the 
political survives. […] Democracy is a political moment, perhaps the political 
moment, when the political is remembered and re-created. Democracy is a 
rebellious moment that may assume revolutionary, destructive proportions, or may 
not.  509
For Wolin, “democracy thus seems destined to be a moment rather than a form. Throughout the 
history of political thought virtually all writers emphasize the unstable and temporary character 
of democracy.”  It is in this condition that democracy must be understood as “fugitive” — 510
fleeting, rare, on the run, and rebellious, or, as Jacques Rancière says, “an always provisional 
accident within the history of forms of domination.”  Democracy manifests as the arch nemesis 511
of any managerial, instituted, proceduralized organization, a phenomenon which arises as 
retaliation to accepted and normalized inequality. This is why, for instance, democratic theorist 
Nicholas Xenos also says that “the democratic moment must be a moment of transgression of 
boundaries and not a renewal of them,”  a point that again reiterates the difference between 512
creative and conservative consensus: if consensus is to serve the democratic project, it must be a 
moment of transgression and not a renewal of them; it must be the moment of creating a new 
collective action system through emergent solidarity, and not the moment of conserving an old 
collective action system through established solidity. 
 The creatively emergent mode of the consensus process births a performative anarchist 
collective action system which exists only as this “fugitive moment,” through that “place of 
caesura” which Miguel Abensour names as the habitat of insurgent democracy. Emergent 
anarchist solidarity is not good at coding and organizing ongoing systems of complex human 
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government, it is supposed to generate a singular agency, a body-without-organs, whose entire 
existence is bound to the specific action which it is born to perform. If the characteristic of 
transient performativity is accepted and respected then the consensus decision-making process 
will never become a form, rather than a moment, never move from the place of caesura to a 
position within a State. It will disintegrate before it can transform from an assemblage of all ones 
into a system of all One. Democracy emerges in a place of caesura between States or as the 
creation of a caesura within a State; it is the interruption of subjects who present a wrong in the 
established order of the police; a momentous and transient occurrence that rends the coded order 
of collective action systems, breaks in between States, and interrupts any settled relations of 
power. The political action of subjectification isn’t meant to last: it is the eruption of new power 
relations, the disorganization of modes of conduct which open collective action systems into 
their environments. The all ones are a temporary and momentous assemblage of a radically 
egalitarian collective action system that can bring a subjectification to bear on an established 
system of all One. To activate the truly special mode of emergent consensus, the doer is entirely 
in the doing.  
 In order to better situate consensus decision-making as a dual power tool, we can focus on 
how these transient performative moments arise. How can we recognize the time of consensus as 
a performative fugitive act, locating symptoms for when it is ready to sprout when it as run their 
course? In the 2011 assembly movements that shaped a wave of radical democratic protest across 
Europe and North America, consensus-based processes were originally used promisingly to 
create emergently synthetic collective associations. Initially, consensus-based assembly 
procedures served these movements well by providing the forum in which everyone could speak 
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and listen to each other in new ways, so that the process aiding a motley assemblage of different 
people to build themselves into the solidarity of an emerging collective subjectification. Michael 
Albert reports an example of this perspective from his experience at the European assemblies: 
For example, Greek and Spanish activists said that at assemblies initially people 
spoke with incredible passion of their plights and desires. Their voices often broke. 
Their hands shook. Each time someone rose to speak, something real, passionate, 
and persistent happened. It was enchanting and exciting. People were learning not 
only new facts and interpretations - and, indeed, that kind of learning was 
relatively modest - they were also learning new confidence and new modes of 
engaging with others.  513
The same tone set the early days of the Occupy movement, where there was a clear self-reflexive 
awareness that the general assemblies were really focused on creating new political spaces rather 
than accomplishing contentious political actions. As the Occupy movement made abundantly 
clear to a baffled mass media, they didn’t demand anything in particular. Not anything 
“externally,” anyway. They made no assertions or attacks on the authorities, but by occupying 
public space and making it a political space they created a new subjectification, creating 
democratic inter-action where there was none before.  
 However, even where the consensus process first proved to be invigorating and solidarity-
producing, we also hear a common story about that spirited enthusiasm turning sour when the 
goals, activities, and organizational systems of the assemblies became more complex and 
diverse. Albert noticed this change in his report from Spain, recalling that 
after days and then weeks, the flavor of the talks shifted. From being new folks 
speaking passionately and recounting their reasons for being present and their 
hopes for their future by delivering deeply felt and quite unique stories, the 
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speakers shifted toward being more seasoned or habituated folks, who lectured 
attendees with prepackaged views. The lines of speakers became overwhelmingly 
male. Their deliveries became overwhelmingly rehearsed. Listening to robotic 
repetition and frequent predictable and almost text-like ranting got boring and 
alienating. Sometimes it was even demeaning.  514
At that point where the “flavor of the talks shifted” those assemblies might have benefited from 
being able to alter their procedures. If the flavour of a meal shifts for the worse, then you change 
the recipe. As Albert recounts, after providing the tools for an emergent original openness, the 
very same procedure increasingly served to solidify old privileges and consolidate established 
routines of power. Perhaps the original task of “learning new confidence and new modes of 
engaging with others” — which was so effectively articulated in the early days of open forum 
assemblies —  had been completed? If the tool had done its job, how could we recognize when 
its moment had passed?  
 As I’ve already argued, the mode of political action where anarchist solidarity and insurgent 
democracy are allied isn’t meant to last. It serves best as a tool for new beginnings, rather than as 
a tool for orchestrating lasting institutions. It’s a seasonal tool. So there’s a trick we need to 
learn: how to smell the changing winds? Well, one way I think we can identify the shifting 
seasons of consensus decision-making is by looking at who speaks and who counts in the group. 
As soon as a count of who belongs begins to get established in a group, then we should watch out 
for a shift from the emergent to the established use of the consensus process. In Albert’s report, 
he signals to this kind of change. It’s a shift that happens when people stop telling each other 
about their own positions and instead begin to tell others what positions they should take. It’s a 
shift that happens when the signals and habits of the process begin to feel like in-group secrets, 
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when cultural lingo begins to baffle and alienate newcomers. It’s a shift that happens when 
people get accustomed to counting on each other to the point that they discount any others.  
 In one of its more straightforward manifestations, the count of who belongs will begin to fall 
in line with the privilege of in-groups. When C. Wright Mills spoke of a “power elite” that 
silently ruled American society he was not concerned with a group that controls everything by 
means of tyrannical directive. For Mills, the power elite is coordinated by association and 
networks, it is a special “higher social circle” which determines membership by attributions of 
belongingness and prestige to grant privileged access to social, economic, and political 
resources. A power elite, wrote Mills, will “form a more or less compact social and psychological 
entity; they have become self-conscious members of a social class. People are either accepted 
into this social class or they are not, and there is a qualitative split, rather that merely a numerical 
scale, separating them from those who are not elite.”   515
 Defining the power elite in this way, Mills wanted to identify how power is hoarded and 
circulated among associated members to differentiate inside from outside. These power elite 
circles define their terms of inclusion according to what they exclude, their self-definitions rely 
on other-elisions. This sense of in-group/out-group dynamic of power elite control was often 
reported as a weak-point in the Occupy movement’s application of consensus. We hear it loud 
and clear from this anonymous critic, writing with verve for Occupy’s online forum discussion: 
The thing they don't tell you about consensus, is that it only works if you're willing 
to exclude others from it. When faced with a block, it's common for people to use 
psychological manipulation, threats, invent process to deny that person a vote, or 
even pressure them to leave the group entirely. Oftentimes when such people don't 
get their way, they'll leave the group themselves. Consensus invites the most awful 
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type of conflict because there can be no agreeing to disagree. But at the same time 
consensus also quells the more constructive forms of dissent because most 
considerate and rational people aren't masochistic enough to welcome the hatred 
and backlash inherent in blocking a proposal.  516
When everybody is a part of the in-group, then everybody will be more likely to be heard and 
have their say. But this is often because they’re all saying fundamentally the same thing anyway, 
they are repeating an established common sensus on fundamental moral values to reaffirm their 
social circle’s own biases and opinions. And, of course, everybody can’t always be a part of the 
in-group. The in-group defines itself against those who are labelled outsiders and others, and the 
power of uniformity is often evoked unintentionally as a way to differentiate between those who 
belong and those who don’t, those who can be a part of the power collective and those who will 
be separated from counting as “the people.”  
 In anarchist situations, where there is no formally labelled and specific authority, the power of 
religio will have to increase its hold on matters of moral commitment, the socially constructed 
limits of an in-group’s common sensus will have more power than usual to define the range of 
considerable decisions, moral commitments, and the range of possible punitive powers needed to 
dissuade dissenters. A well-cited example of this type of problem has been highlighted in 
Joreen’s critique of her experience in American feminist cooperative movements of the 1960s 
and 1970s. Organizing based on in-group relationships was an explicit focus of early 1970s 
feminist movement that saw the opportunity to augment feminist power in the egalitarian, non-
hierarchical, and anti-patriarchal relations of friendship or “sisterhood.” In the process, they 
learned some lessons about power. In a widely influential essay from the early 1970s, Joreen 
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testified that the informal associations of social privilege can lead to a kind of “tyranny of 
structurelessness,” which presents a new set of dangers.  
If the movement continues to deliberately not select who shall exercise power, it 
does not thereby abolish power. All it does is abrogate the right to demand that 
those who do exercise power and influence be responsible for it. If the movement 
continues to keep power as diffuse as possible because it knows it cannot demand 
responsibility from those who have it, it does not prevent any group or person from 
totally dominating.  517
The tyranny of rule by formal authority is one kind of power, but the rules of in-group friendship 
circles and sisterhood dynamics conduct another. The more an organization “adheres to an 
ideology of ‘structurelessness’, the more vulnerable it is to being taken over by a group of 
political comrades.”  As feminist political theorist Anne Phillips has said, “the problem with 518
power that is based on friendship networks is that it does not look like power, and is therefore 
rarely brought to account.”  519
In consensus decision-making principles of open expression and free speech are crucial tenets. 
Take, as an example, this prefigurative plea for a cultural transformation of speech patterns from 
Seeds for Change manual: “Making decisions by consensus is based on openness — this means 
learning to openly express both our desires (what we’d like to see happening), and our needs 
(what we have to see happening order to support a decision).”  They want consensus process to 520
help people develop a way of conversing that is different from the hard-edged, bargaining 
business of political argumentation towards a more open, dialogical form of conversation. Within 
consensus, there is a near-universal assertion that a proper process must assure everyone has the 
right to speak and that everyone is responsible for listening, such that all participants are granted 
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an equal opportunity to contribute to the decision-making process and everyone has an equal say 
in the final decision. This principle is always forefront in the manuals, as when the Occupy Wall 
Street General Assembly Guide states that “there is no single leader or governing body of the 
General Assembly — everyone’s voice is equal. Anyone is free to propose an idea or express an 
opinion as part of the General Assembly.”  Or, for another version, the Act-Up guide to 521
consensus says that “the fundamental right of consensus is for all people to be able to express 
themselves in their own words and of their own will.”   522
Consensus is primarily about talk: it is a power of building solidarity through speaking and 
listening. There is power in building new solidarities from hearing people talk out their 
convictions, and people change their minds by being forced to actually listen. Reflecting on the 
use of consensus at the Sleepless Goat Co-operative Cafe in Kingston Ontario, former co-op 
member P. Quick marks this point as the primary benefit of their process: 
The main advantage of consensus decision-making as it plays out in the Goat, as 
opposed to say voting, is when there are concerns, you end up talking about them to 
the point where everyone understands clearly why we're making a decision that we're 
making. It can take a lot of time but you get into all kinds of different issues, and 
often someone will be against something at the beginning of a meeting that everyone 
else is keen on, and if that person sticks to their guns and articulates themselves, 
you'll have situations where everyone else will come over to their side, not because 
they're blocking a decision but because they're convinced. In another situation, you 
never would have listened to the details of that issue. Sometimes that can be really 
tedious, if you're talking about fucking peanut butter or whatever, but sometimes it 
ends up being really important and you're glad you took the time to talk about the 
issue, even if it seems small.  523
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On the other hand, the priority of talk also provokes this crucial weakness in the consensus 
process. All that emphasis on “self-expression” highlight a crucial aspect of cultural bias that 
emerges from the in-group’s ideal. As any observer of the differential effect of race, gender, 
class, age, or dis/ability (among other such distinctions of status and privilege) in decision-
making scenarios will attest, the formal structural “right to speak and be heard” cannot force 
equality upon cultural habits of “value and support” which grant certain voices more or less 
impact according to the informal affective power relationships that constitute the reality of group 
dynamics. We must remember that procedurally assuring everyone is able to speak does not 
mean that everyone will actually speak or that anyone will actually listen. The structural rule of 
equal access to deliberative expression may indeed create a situation where all can speak-up and 
be heard, but it does not necessarily affect the underlying power relations, ethical orientations, 
and cultural habits which are so influential in determining who has their say and is listened-to.  
Karl Deutsch once defined power as "the ability to afford not to learn.”  This point plays 524
perfectly as a description of the informal in-group privilege which is heightened in anti-
authoritarian systems like consensus decision-making, where friendship circles and insider status 
can dominate a collective action system simply by the force of familiarity and experience. The 
in-group is the in-group because it is in the know. Of course not everyone who participates in a 
consensus decision-making process (or who could participate but might choose not to) is familiar 
with the prevalent cultural background, and everyone won’t be equally prepared for its expected 
norms of proper dialogue. Kristin Becker, for instance, recounts the experience of 
marginalization from anarchist meetings in this way. “When their ignorance and refusal to listen 
and process what I say causes me to repeat myself (often over and over until I just quit), it is very 
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obvious that they do not want to hear and process what I am saying, and that they would rather 
that I not speak at all.”  If you don’t say something in a way that other people want to hear it, 525
then sometimes they simply won’t hear it. Then, your potential influence on decision-making 
power is lost; in one ear and out the other. As Anne Phillips expresses, “decision-making based 
on meetings is almost invariably weighted toward those with the confidence to articulate their 
position.”  The models of speech and interaction which people assume to be proper for 526
confident consensus decision-making skills are derived from the tangled threads of that largely 
white, middle-class, feminist, Christian and 60s counter-culture inflected context of the 1970s 
social movements that birthed them. Today, as is in evidence at Occupy, the practice reigns in a 
predominantly white, educated, progressive grassroots activist tradition which has its own 
cultural and technical expectations for proper speaking and listening habits. These cultural 
assumptions end up defining vague informal limits of in-group access to the power of speech, 
which is so crucial tot eh egalitarian success of the process. 
The capacity for consensus to operate as an insurgent democratic tool depends on addressing 
these abstract and amorphous power differentiations, where some people fail to be counted and 
are excluded by so many means of silent elision. If people are silenced, uncounted, excluded, or 
subdued within a group, then those people have to wage insurgent democracy from the inside in 
order to break new subjectivations of equality onto the scene of their own collective action 
system. If it becomes too difficult for alternative voices to speak and be heard, then the 
possibility of emergent inter-actions falters. In order to challenge such effects of established 
power solidity, the power-less have to stand up and interrupt and the powerful have to shut up 
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and listen: a moment of interruptive manifestation from those who have been uncounted and a 
moment of silent reflection from those who have counted.  
However, as a process of internal interruption, we have to be aware of how to best nurture the 
manifestation of insurgent democracy in a way that won’t irrevocably split our movements. The 
question of insurgent democracy is not only a problem of contentious action — how to empower 
an interruption that can crack new space into external systems of domination. It is also a problem 
of prefigurative politics — how to construct collective action system dynamics that can nurture 
and conduct insurgent democratic capacities for self-reflexive openness to change within our 
own modes of politics. We can open ourselves to insurgent democratic progress by engaging 
actively in building reflexive solidarity, understanding and making connection between 
previously separated positions, connecting old identities to make new powers. Consensus can 
actually serve these tasks by providing a means of focusing on synthetic communication which 
can help people hear from others and recognize people as others, in ways that they may never 
have before. But this communication will only be democratically insurgent if those who are 
partaking in it are self-aware of the prejudices inherent in their own social power systems, and 
strive to reopen cracks in their own established collective solidity.  
 Maybe this suggests a lesson that should seem simpler than the ongoing debate between those 
two guys would have us believe. If we shut out the terms of their binary bickering, we can think 
more pragmatically about how tools like consensus decision-making are neither the idol of 
democratic perfection nor the devil of democratic destruction. Yes, consensus decision-making is 
often used as a means to focus on prefigurative preoccupations that build group identity, at the 
beginning of movements when spirits are high. But, no, this isn’t necessarily a bad thing. There 
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is a time and place for prefigurative preoccupations. In the great array of tasks and programmes 
which feed the anarchist radical democratic project, mightn’t there be room for that moment? If it 
is going to be deployed in alliance with insurgent democratic action, then consensus should 
should be used for a transient, performative, fugitive moment. The Occupy movement intensely 
demonstrated the way an anarchist group can begin with radically open intentions for reflexive 
democratic solidarity, but then close itself off when the established solidity of in-group privilege 
tilts into an overemphasis on the powers of belonging and uniformity, wherein “maintaining that 
Occupy is leaderless only leaves its leaders invisible, unaccountable and no matter how well 
intended, free to push a course that will isolate the movement.”  Creative opening can and 527
should be leaderless, but consistent organizing requires some kind of collectively appropriate 
type of leadership system. Nathan Schneider, for instance, quotes antinuclear activist Bill 
Moyer’s observation that “an ‘anarchistic loose structure’ such as Occupy Wall Street’s general 
assembly can last in a movement for only about the first three months, while adrenaline is 
high.”  After the initial rush of collective unity, “such a structure ‘tends to cause excessive 528
inefficiency, participant burnout, and group domination by the most domineering and oppressive 
participants.’”  A key to using this dangerous tool safely: always remember, this too shall pass. 529
 The project for anarchist dual power requires both prefigurative and contentious political 
activities in balance, but “balance” doesn’t mean that each side always keeps perfectly even on a 
steady-keel flat line. It’s not like the balance of a tightrope walk, it’s more like the balance of a 
homeostatic regulation: a systemic process of fluctuating activities that balance an overall system 
within optimum limits. A good homeostatic process is responsible for adjusting its power 
dynamics to fit the challenges of various circumstances and tasks; it doesn’t keep everything in 
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locked equivalent ratio, it adjusts constantly to find the most powerful operating system for the 
given environmental conditions and the practical challenges at hand. There can be moments 
where we give one side of dual power precedent over the other, such that their forces are 
ultimately coordinated in an overall ongoing balancing act.  
 The needs of a group will change; the group itself will changes. The procedures and tools of 
collective action should be adjusted to engage those changes, and although consensus may 
continue to serve well for some problems, its role in the overall praxis of deliberation must 
always be revisable. The prefigurative and the contentious powers of consensus decision-making 
can align in the task of creating anarchist collective solidarities, but once those solidarities have 
attained a more permanent organizational form, the anarchist radical democratic moment has 
passed. My point here is basically that by recognizing a difference between how consensus 
functions for creative emergence and for conservative establishment, we should emphasize that 
its special power works optimally for creating emergent political subjectivations that can act in 
the in-between places of a movement as transient, performative, role that has its season. 
Knowing when to quit with consensus is just as important as knowing when to start. If it gets too 
comfy and settled, it will transform into the conservative established function. We should not 
organize, manage, or govern longterm collective action systems by consensus alone, in the same 
way that insurgent democracy is not a practice that organizes, manages, or governs institutional 
democratic structures. There are other tasks and other tools for the complex array of power inter-
actions required across the overall balancing act of radical democratic anarchist movements. 
Insurgent democratic anarchist solidarities may be one tool of dual power, and a special one that 
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fills in the gaps between institutionalized states, but we need many more to fill out the whole 
praxis of a homeostatic dual power balancing act. To every power a season. 
!
(4.3) Empowering Anarchist Radical Democratic Dual Power 
It is foolish to glorify one tool to the point where it is expected to solve each and every problem, 
and it is just as foolish to demonize one tool so that it cannot help to solve anything. Powerful 
tools are also dangerous tools. As a chainsaw is both powerful and a dangerous, so too is 
consensus decision-making. We don’t ban them outright because they could be used 
inappropriately. We teach people how to use them properly, safely, at the right moments and for 
the right jobs.  
 In this frame, we have to understand consensus as a collective action power tool insofar as it 
can empower and hinder the larger project of anarchist radical democratic dual power. Like any 
tool, its usefulness will always depend on how and when it is used. In this chapter I have 
inspected how and when consensus decision-making tends to be used across its two polar 
opposite functions: as a tool for creating emergent solidarity or as a tool for conserving 
established solidity. For enhancing anarchist radical democratic dual power, we have to improve 
our ability to use it for creating emergent solidarities and decrease our reliance on using it to 
conserve established solidities. To each job a tool and to each power a season. The dual power of 
emergent solidarity is a unique and special capacity in the consensus decision-making process 
that can be especially allied with insurgent democratic tasks: that’s power we need to practice 
when we are learning how and when to use the consensus process.  
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5) Conclusions 
We can learn a lot about how to do radical democracy better if we can begin think more tactically 
about our power praxis. Francesca Polletta’s optimism about the history and its potentials still 
encourages: 
Today, activists are moving once again toward complex understandings of equality. 
But they are more alert to the inequalities that are built into conventional 
understandings of equal treatment, more sensitive to the liabilities of informality in 
relations among those unequal in status, and, at the same time, more attuned to the 
necessity of forging egalitarian relationships as well as rules. Therein lies great 
possibility.  530
We have work to do, searching for ways to actualize this “great possibility.” I hope that in this 
project I have contributed something to that possibility, something that can fertilize the many 
quest(ion)s of anarchist power.  
 
(5.1) Praxis: For the Anarchist Toolbox of Power 
Treating the consensus process as a tool rather than as an ideal is a vitally important step towards 
using it better. The issue of consensus process is thus posed as a set of technical problems: How 
to refine it as a precision instrument, as a particular means? When and where is it a useful 
power? When and where is it a dangerous power? How does this tool fit in with all the others? 
 This last point is especially crucial. A good toolbox has many tools, each with its own jobs 
and seasons. In this project have tried to articulate a theory of power that supports this way of 
thinking technically about consensus decision-making as a power-tool for anarchist collective 
action systems that is specifically useful when creating emergent anarchist solidarity and 
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especially dangerous when conserving established anarchist solidity. In either use, it is still the 
same tool — a special anarchist mode of powering collective action systems. The “good” and the 
“bad” effects are particular to its applications. Using consensus as the one and only ideally 
utopian radical democratic process, as has been commonly the case over its modern history, is 
like making a really big hammer and then saying: because this is the most powerful hammer of 
all time, all construction projects shall henceforth use only this hammer. That hammer may 
indeed be very useful; it may even, in fact, be the very best hammer ever created. But it’s still 
just a big hammer. It’s definitely not the only tool we should ever use. Any complex 
revolutionary project built like that will be a rickety unstable mess. Consensus is not a utopian 
hammer. It is not the be-all and end-all of the whole revolutionary story, but it can be an 
important part of the revolutionary repertoire. We will need to continue to detail when, where, 
how, why, and for whom consensus is usefully applicable for generating emergent synthetic 
collective unity, and when and where it is abusefully applied to control and conserve collective 
uniformity.  
Radical democracy is not the be-all and end-all of the revolutionary story. Anarchism is not. 
Insurgent democracy is not. But… they can all be gathered together to make a more powerful 
revolutionary toolbox. For the project of anarchist radical democratic dual power, consensus 
decision-making should be thought of in this way: as a unique tool of anarchist solidarity which 
should be brought out of the toolbox whenever groups need to institute an emergent autonomous 
solidarity for their collective action system and/or interrupt the regular course of their own 
collective action systems with the new influence of interruptive voices.  
!
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(5.2) Praxis: For the Anarchist Quest(ion) of Power 
In this dissertation, I have constructed a theory of power that analyzes the dynamic conduct of 
collective action systems according to the concepts of power-to, power-over, and power-with. 
This idea of power ceases to allow the concept to stand in for binary, dichotomous ideals of 
agency/structure, internal/external, and good/evil distinctions, and instead begins to pose the 
problems of power as an essential matter of the struggle to determine human collective self-
constitution. By considering power as a function of conduct of conduct, communicative 
causation, and collective control the commonly used anarchist conceptual format of power-to, 
power-over, and power-with can be made more useful for describing various facets of collective 
action systems and their inter-actions. As long as we treat the idea of “power” as incompatibly 
split between agency and structure, between the external relations and the internal relations the 
dichotomy of power-to and power-over will require that the prefigurative work is done only upon 
“us” and the contentious fight is waged only upon “them.”  
 My basic point, the crux around which all the other supporting concepts are tightened, is that 
power is collective action. In one way or another, willingly or unwillingly, to the benefit of one 
or to the benefit of many, humans act collectively, taking part in common projects, altering each 
other’s future and present possible actions through ceaseless inter-action of allegiances and 
coalitions, struggles and confrontations. Power always has a dimension of coordination and 
alliance (producing anarchist collective action systems and modes of inter-action) and a 
dimension of resistance and struggle (fighting against archist collective action systems and 
modes of inter-action). The anarchist quest(ion)s of power are always both prefigurative and 
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contentious, always about how to make a network of interlocking dual powers, always about 
producing anarchist powers that can resist archist powers, even within their own articulations. In 
order to devise methods of empowering the anarchist project we have to be more aware of the 
difficulties and the challenges involved in the inseparable complex bonds by which power-to, 
power-over, and power-with can be used as an analytic complex to identify and map power 
relations in every dynamic of collective action system interactions. 
 This perspective on power requires that we cease to think of the anarchist project for radical 
democratic dual power as a quest(ion) of accepting or rejecting power in general. It’s rather a 
question of determining how we organize our power, how we influence one another, trying to 
make the constraints we expect from each other as equal and as free as possible. Power is the 
social quest(ion), the quest(ion) of sociality: how can we coordinate power-to, power-over, and 
power-with in collective action systems that help us to conduct each other in mutually equal and 
communicatively responsive dynamics?  
In a word, this is the anarchist quest(ion) of power: how? Like the project of radical 
democracy, it should always be a question invested in an ongoing quest. I hope that I have 
contributed some power to keep the anarchist quest(ion)s going on. Word out.  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